^p^fe, 


v>i 


»  V     21 


WAR    IN   DISGUISE; 


OR, 


THE  FRAUDS 


OF    THE 


NEUTRAL  FLAGS, 


Si 


LONDON,  Printed  : 

NEW-YORK:  Re-printed  by  Hopkins  b*  Seymour, 

FOR   I.   RILEY,    AND    CO.    NEW-YORK,     AND    SAMUEL   F.   BRADFORD, 
PHILADELPHIA. 

January,  1806. 


S7 


49\^4Z 


PREFACE 

TO  THE  LOJVnOJ\r  EDITIOM 


1  HOUGH  the  following  sheets  have  been  xvritten 
arid  sent  to  press  in  considerable  haste,  on  account  of 
some  tevfiporary  considerations  which  add  to  the  im- 
mediate importance  of  their  subject,  the  author  has 
spared  no  pains  that  could,  tend  to  guard  his  state- 
ments  from  mistake.  His  facts  are  for  the  most 
part,  derived,  as  the  reader  will  perceive,  from  those 
authentic  and  original  sources  of  information,  the 
records  of  our  courts  of  prize :  and  it  may  therefore 
perhaps  be  surmised,  that  some  practitioner  in  those 
courts,  if  not  the  author  of  the  argument,  has  at 
least  contributed  his  aid,  iji  furnishing  premises  for 
its  use. 

Adverting  to  the  probability  of  such  a  conjecture, 
•and  to  an  erroneous  notion  which  he  knows  to  be 
fvery  prevalent,  namely,  that  the  practitioners  in  the 
<idmiralty  courts  have  an  interest  opposite  to  the 


pretensiojis  of  neutral  merchants^ he  thinks  it  right 
to  guard  both  his  facts  and  his  opinions  against  this 
source  of  jealousy,  by  one  brief  remark — contests  in 
the  prize  jurisdiction  arise  almost  exclusively  from 
claims  of  property  preferred  by  neutrals  j  and  there- 
fore, the  business  of  the  prize  courts,  would  obvious- 
ly be  impaired,  not  extended,  by  narrowing  the  legal 
confines  of  the  neutral  flags. 

If  the  intelligent  reader  should  stand  in  no  need 
ef  this  information,  he  will  still  feel  such  caution  in 
an  anonymous  ivriter,  not  to  be  excessive  s  for  how- 
ever sacred  a  national  cause  may  be,  it  is  become 
too  common  a  rule,  to  suppose  that  no  man  exerts 
himself  in  it  from  a  public  motive,  if  a  private  one 
can  possibly  be  suspected, 

October  18th,  1805. 


AMERICAN  PREFACE. 


It  was  intended  to  have  prefixed  to  this  edi- 
tion, an  Introduction  of  some  length,  exposing, 
in  a  succinct  manner,  some  of  the  sophistries 
with  which  this  singular  work  abounds,  by  way 
of  putting  the  reader  on  his  guard  against  them; 
but  as  it  is  now  proposed  to  follow  it  shortly 
with  a  formal  answer,  nothing  more  is  thought 
necessary  here,  than  merely  to  apprize  the 
reader  of  this  circumstance. 


WAR  IN  DISGUISE, 

8(c. 


The  hope  of  Peace,  which  long,  though  faint- 
ly, gleamed  from  the  North,  has  vanished;  the 
political  atmosphere  of  Europe  is  become  dark- 
er than  ever ;  and  the  storm  menaces  a  wider 
range,  as  well  as  a  lengthened  duration. 

At  such  a  period,  it  is  natural  to  cast  forward 
an  anxious  glance  toward  the  approaching  events 
of  war,  and  to  calculate  anew  the  chances  of  a 
happy  or  disastrous,  issue  of  this  momentous 
contest :  but  it  is  wise  also  to  look  backward, 
to  review  the  plan  on  which  the  war  has  hither- 
to been  conducted,  and  inquire,  whether  expe- 
rience has  not  proved  it  to  be  in  some  points, 
erroneous  or  defective. 

The  season  seems  favourable  for  improve- 
ment, especially  in  our  offensive  measures,  since 

B 


hew  relations  will,  in  all  probability,  demand 
an  important  change  in  them :  while  the  acqui- 
sition of  allies,  however  powerful  and  active, 
will  diminish  in  no  degree  the  duty  of  putting 
forth  our  utmost  exertions. 

Fatal  might  be  that  assistance  in  the  war, 
which  should  lead  us  to  cherish  less  carefully 
our  own  independent  means  of  annoyance  or  de- 
fence. The  arch  enemy  of  the  civilized  world, 
in  the  prospect  of  having  a  new  confederacy  to 
contend  with,  like  Satan  when  opposed  to  the  an- 
gelic phalanx,  is  "  collecting  all  his  might,'*  and 
seems  to  be  preparing,  for  his  continental  foes 
at  least,  an  impetuous  attack  ;  nor  are  their  pre- 
parations of  a  character  less  decisive 

**  One  stroke  they  aim, 
"  That  may  deteniune,  and  not  need  repeat." 

A  single  campaign,  if  disastrous  to  our  allies, 
inay  realize  some  of  the  late  threats  of  Bona- 
parte. He  may  "  acquire  a  new  line  of  coast, 
"  new  ports,  new  countries,"  and  then,  he  fair- 
ly tells  us  the  consequence — "  the  defeat  of  our 
"  confederates  would  be  reflected  back  upon 
"  ourselves — would  leave  France  more  at  liber- 
"  ty  than  ever  to  turn  her  whole  attention  to 
"  her  war  with  this  country,  and  to  employ 
"  against  us  still  augmented  means  of  annoy- 
"  ance ;"  it  would  render  our  dangers,  as  he 
truly  says,  "  more  imminent,'*  though,  I  trust,  he 


is  mistaken  in  the  insulting  conclusion,  that  it 
would  "  ensure  our  fall  *." 

The  plan  which  this  exasperated  enemy  has 
formed  for  our  destruction,  is  of  a  nature  far 
more  formidable  than  that  which  he  ostenta- 
tiously displayed.  The  flotilla  at  Boulogne,  and 
the  army  of  the  coast,  have  chiefly  excited 
our  attention ;  but  the  restitution  of  his  regular 
marine,  and  the  increase  of  the  confederated  na- 
vies, have  been  the  Usurper's  more  rational  de- 
pendence, and  the  means  of  war  which  he  has 
been  indefatigably  labouring  to  provide.  En- 
raged at  the  interruption  of  this  plan  by  his  quar- 
rel with  Austria,  he  now  avows  in  his  complaints 
its  real  nature  and  magnitude :  He  asserts  to  the 
Germanic  Diet,  "  that  he  has  been  employing  all 
*^  the  resources  of  his  empire,  to  construct  fleets, 
•^  to  form  his  marine,  and  to  improve  his  ports  j* ;" 
nor  is  the  important  fact  unfounded,  though  al- 
leged by  Bonaparte. 

These  dangerous  efforts  may  be  in  some  mea- 
sure diverted  by  the  new  continental  war;  but 
they  will  not  be  wholly  suspended ;  and  should 
we  again  be  left   singly  to  sustain  the  contest^ 

*  See  an  official  article  in  the  Moniteur  of  August  16th  or  17tb,  co- 
pied into  the  London  papers  of  the  28th. 

f  Paper  presented  by  M.  Bacher  to  the  Di«t  of  Ratisbon,  Mouiteiti 
of  September  llth» 


I 


I 


they  will,  of  course,  be  resumed  on  their  former 
scale,  with  renovated  vigour  and  effect. 

In  preparations  like  these,  consist  the  chief 
danger,  not  only  of  England,  but  of  Europe  -,  for 
the  fall  of  this  country,  or  what  would  be  the 
same  in  effect,  the  loss,  at  this  perilous  conjunc- 
ture, of  our  superiority  at  sea,  would  remove  from 
before  the  ambition  of  France,  almost  every  ob- 
stacle by  which  its  march  to  universal  empire 
could  be  finally  impeded. 

•Nor  let  lis  proudly  disdain  to  suppose  the  pos- 
^sibility  of  such  a  reverse.  Let  us  reffect,  what 
the  navies  of  France,  Spain,  and  Holland,  once 
were ;  let  us  consider  that  these  countries  form 
but  a  part  of  those  vast  maritime  regions,  the 
united  resources  of  which  are  now  at  the  com- 
mand of  the  same  energetic  government  ^  and  if 
these  considerations  are  not  enough  to  repel  a 
dangerous  confidence,  let  those  great  maritime 
advantages  of  the  enemy,  which  the  following 
pages  will  expose,  be  added  to  the  large  account ; 
for  I  propose  to  show,  in  the  encroachments  and 
frauds  of  the  neutral  flags,  a  nursery  and  a  refuge 
of  the  confederated  navies ;  as  well  as  the  secret 
conduits  of  a  large  part  of  those  imperial  resources, 
the  pernicious  application  of  which  to  the  restitu- 
tion of  his  marine,  the  Usurper  has  lately  boasted 
2 — I  propose  to  show  in  them  his  best  hopes 
in  a  naval  war^  as  well   as   channels  of  a  re- 


venue,  which  sustains   the    ambition  of  France, 
and  prolongs  the  miseries  of  Europe. 

In  the  retrospect  of  the  last  war,  and  of  the 
progress  we  have  yet  made  in  the  present,  one 
singular  fact  immediately  arrests  the  attention. 

The  finances  of  France  appear  scarcely  to  be 
impaired,  much  less  exhausted,  by  her  enormous 
military  establishments  and  extensive  enterpris-  « 
es,  notwithstanding  the  ruin  so  long  apparently 
imposed  on  her  commerce.  Poverty,  the  ordinary 
sedative  of  modern  ambition,  the  common  peace- 
maker betv/een  exasperated  nations,  seems  no 
longer  to  be  the  growth  of  war. 

The  humblest  reader  in  this  land  of  politi- 
cians, if  he  has  raised  his  eyes  so  high  as"  to  the 
lore  of  Poor  Robin's  Almanac,  has  learned  that — 
"  War  begets  poverty,  poverty  peace,  &c.";  but 
now,  he  may  reasonably  doubt  the  truth  of  this 
simple  pedigree ;  while  the  statesman  must  be 
staggered  to  find  the  first  principles  of  his  art 
shaken  by  this  singular  case. 

In  fact,  political  writers  have  been  greatly  em- 
barrassed with  it  3  and  have  laboured  to  account 
for  it  by  the  unprecedented  nature  of  the  interior 
situation  and  policy  of  France,  or  from  the  rapa- 
cious conduct  of  her  armies;  but  none  of  these 
theories  were  quite  satisfactory  when  promulg- 
ed ;  and  they  have  since,  either  been  shaken  by  the 
failure  of  those  prospective  consequences  which 


were  drawn  from  them,  or  have  been  found  iii- 
adequate  to  explain  the  new  and  extended  diffi- 
culties of  the  case. 

Let  ample  credit  be  taken  for  revolutionary 
confiscations  at  home,  and  military  rapine  a- 
broad,  for  the  open  subsidies,  or  secret  contribu- 
tions of  allies,  and  for  the  gifts  or  loans  extorted 
from  neutral  powers,  by  invasion  or  the  menace 
of  war;  still  the  aggregate  amount,  however  enor- 
mous in  the  eye  of  justice  and  humanity,  must 
be  small  when  compared  to  the  prodigious  ex- 
penses of  France. 

In  aid  of  that  ordinary  revenue,  of  which  com- 
merce was  the  most  copious  source,  these  extra- 
ordinary supplies  may,  indeed,  be  thought  to  have 
sufficed;  but  when  we  suppose  the  commercial 
and  colonial  resources  of  France  to  have  been 
ruined  by  our  hostilities  during  a  period  of  near 
twelve  successive  years,  the  brief  term  of  the  late 
peace  excepted ;  and  when  we  remember  that  she 
has  not  only  sustained,  during  a  still  longer  peri- 
od, and  with  scarcely  any  cessation*,  a  war  ardu- 
ous and  costly  beyond  all  example,  but  has  fed, 
in  addition  to  her  military  myriads,  those  nu- 
merous swarms  of  needy  and  rapacious  upstarts, 
who  have  successively  fastened  on  her  treasury. 


*  A  most  expensive  contest  with  the    negroes    in   the   West-Indie^ 
filled  up  the  whole  interval  between  the  last  wid  present  war. 


and  fattened  by  its  spoil;.!  say,  when  these  ex- 
hausting circumstances  are  taken  into  the  account, 
the  adequacy  of  the  supply  to  the  expenditure, 
seems,  notwithstanding  the  guilty  resources  which 
have  been  mentioned,  a  paradox  hard  to  explain. 
Were  the  ordinary  sources  of  revenue  really  lost, 
those  casual  aids  could  no  more  maintain  the  vast 
interior  and  exterior  expenses  of  France,  than 
the  autumnal  rains  in  Abyssinia  could  fill  the 
channel  of  the  Nile,  and  enable  it  still  to  inun* 
date  the  plains  of  Egypt,  if  its  native  stream  were 
drawn  off. 

Besides,  the  commerce,  and  the  colonial  resour- 
ces, of  Spain  and  Holland  are,  like  those  of  France 
herself,  apparently  ruined  by  the  war. — ^When, 
therefore,  we  calculated  on  contributions  from 
these  aHies,  this  common  drawback  on  their  finan- 
ces should  diminish  our  estimate  of  that  resource. 

If  we  look  back  on  the  wars  that  preceded 
the  last,  the  difficulties  in  this  subject  will  be  en- 
hanced. 

To  impoverish  our  enemies  used,  in  our  former 
contests  with  France  and  Spain,  to  be  a  sure  effect 
of  our  hostilities;  and  its  extent  was  always  pro- 
portionate to  that  of  its  grand  instrument,  our  supe* 
riority  at  sea.  We  distressed  their  trade,  we  inter- 
cepted the  produce  of  their  colonies,  and  thus  ex- 
hausted their  treasuries,  by  cutting  olf  their  chief 
sources  of  revenue,  as  the  philosopher  proposed  to 


dry  up  the  sea,  by  draining  the  rivers  that  fed  it. 
By  the  same  means,  their  expenditure  was  im- 
mensely increased,  and  wasted  in  defensive  pur- 
poses. They  were  obliged  to  maintain  fleets  in 
distant  parts  of  the  world,  and  to  furnish  strong 
conVoys  for  the  protection  of  their  intercourse 
with  their  colonies,  both  on  the  outward  and 
homeward  voyages.  Again,  the  frequent  capture 
of  these  convoys,  while  it  enriched  our  seamen, 
and  by  the  increase  of  import  duties  aided  our 
revenue,  obliged  our  enemies,  at  a  fresh  expense, 
to  repair  their  loss  of  ships ;  and  when  a  convoy 
outward-bound,  was  the  subject  of  capture,  com- 
pelled them  either  to  dispatch  duplicate  supplies 
in  the  same  season,  at  the  risk  of  new  disasters,  or 
to  leave  their  colonies  in  distress,  and  forfeit  the 
benefit  of  their  crops  for  the  year. 

In  short,  their  trans-marine  possessions  became 
expensive  incumbrances,  rather  than  sources  of 
revenue ;  and  through  the  iteration  of  such  losses, 
more  than  by  our  naval  victories,  or  colonial  con- 
quests, the  house  of  Bourbon  was  vanquished  by 
the  masters  of  the  sea. 

Have  we  then  lost  the  triumphant  means  of 
such  effectual  warfare^  or  have  the  ancient  fields 
of  victory  been  neglected  ? 

Neither  such  a  misfortune,  nor  such  folly,  can 
be  alleged.  Never  was  our  maritime  superiority 
more  decisive  than  in  the  last  and  present  war. 


We  are  still  the  unresisted  masters  of  every  sea ; 
and  the  open  intercourse  of  our  enemies  with 
their  colonies,  was  never  so  completely  preclud- 
ed ;  yet  we  do  not  hear  that  the  merchants  of 
France,  Spain,  and  Holland,  are  ruined,  or  that 
their  colonies  are  distressed,  much  less  that  their 
exchequers  are  empty. 

The  true  solution  of  these  seeming  difficul- 
ties, is  this  :  The  commercial  and  colonial  inter- 
ests of  our  enemies,  are  now  ruined  in  appear- 
ance only,  not  in  reality.  They  seem  to  have 
retreated  from  the  ocean,  and  to  have  abandoned 
the  ports  of  their  co]onies,but  it  is  a  mere  ruse  de 
guerre — They  have,  in  effect,  for  the  most  part, 
only  changed  their  flags,  chartered  many  vessels 
really  neutl*al,  and  altered  a  little  the  former  routes 
of  their  trade.  Their  trans-marine  sources  of  re- 
venue, have  not  been  for  a  moment  destroyed 
by  our  hostilities,  and  at  present  are  scarcely  im~ 
paired. 

Let  it  not,  however,  be  supposed,  that  the  pro- 
tection of  the  trade,  and  the  revenue  of  an  ene- 
my, from  the  fair  effects  of  our  arms,  is  the  only 
prejudice  we  have  sustained  by  the  abuse  of 
the  neutral  flag.  To  the  same  pestilent  cause, 
are  to  be  ascribed  various  other  direct  and  c-ol- 
lateral  disadvantages,  the  effects  of  which  we 
have  severely  felt  in  the  late  and  present  war, 
and  which  now  menace  consequences  still  more 

C 


to 

pernicious,  both  to  us  and  our  allies.  Hitherto 
we  have  suffered  the  grossest  invasions  of  our  b^Ir 
ligerent  rights,  warrantably  if  not  wisely ;  for  the 
cost  was  all  our  own ;  and  while  the  enemy  to- 
tally abandoned  the  care  of  his  marine,  the  sacri' 
fice  could  more  safely  be  made :  but  now,  when 
he  is  eagerly  intent  on  the  restitution  of  his  navy, 
and  when  other  powers  have  gallantly  stood  forth 
to  stem  the  torrent  of  French  ambition,  the  asser- 
tion of  our  maritime  rights  is  become  a  duty  to 
them  as  well  as  to  ourselves;  for  our  contribution 
to  an  offensive  war  must  be  weak,  or  far  less  than 
may  Justly  be  expected  from  such  an  ally  as 
Grreat-Britain,  while  the  shield  of  an  insidious 
neutrality  is  cast  between  the  enemy,  and  the 
sword  of  our  naval  power. 

In  the  hope  of  contributing  to  the  correction  of 
this  great  evil,  I  propose  to  consider, — 

1st.  Its  origin,  nature,  and  extent. 

2d.  The  remedy,  and  the  right  of  applying 
it. 

3d.  The  prudence  of  that  resort. 

There  are  few  politi(^al  subjects  more  impor- 
tant, and  few,  perhaps,  less  generally  understood 
by  the  intelHgent  part  of  the  community,  than 
the  nature  of  that  neutral  commerce,  which  has 
lately  in  some  measure  excited  the  public  atten- 
tion, in  consequence  of  the  invectives  of  Bonaparte 
»nd  the  complaints  of  the  American  merchants. 


11 

The  Moniteur  asserts,  that  we  have  declared  sugar 
and  coffee  to  be  contraband  of  war*,  and  some 
of  our  own  newspapers,  in  their  accounts  of  con- 
ferences supposed  to  have  taken  place  between 
the  minister,  and  the  American  resident,  are 
scarcely  nearer  the  truth.  Our  government  has 
been  stated  to  have  recalled  orders,  which  never 
issued,  and  to  have  promised  concessions,  whi<;h 
I  believe  were  never  required. 

To  show  what  the  subject  of  controversy,  if  any 
controversy  actually  now  depends  between  the 
two  nations,  may  probably  be,  as  well  as  to 
make  the  abuses  which  I  have  undertaken  to  deli- 
neate more  intelligible,  I  must  begin  with  stating 
some  important  historical  facts. 

The  colonizing  powers  of  Europe,  it  is  well 
known,  have  always  monopolized  the  trade  of 
their  respective  colonies  ;  allowing  no  supplies  to 
be  carried  to  them  under  any  foreign  flag,  or  on 
account  of  any  foreign  importers  ;  and  prohibiting 
the  exportation  of  their  produce  in  foreign  ships, 
or  to  any  foreign  country,  till  it  has  been  previously 
brought  into  the  ports  of  the  parent  state. — Such, 
with  a  few  trivial  and  temporary  exceptions,  has 
been  the  universal  system  in  time  of  peace  ;  and, 
on  a  close  adherence  to  this  system,  the  value  of 

*     Moniteur  of  August  16th  :     London    newspapers    of  the   27th. 


'W^ 


12 

colonies  in  the  new  world,  has  been  supposed 
wholly  to  depend. 

In  the  war  which  commenced  in  the  year  1756, 
and  was  ended  hy  the  peace  of  1763,  France,  be- 
ing hard  pressed  by  our  maritime  superiority,  and 
unable  with  safety  either  to  send  the  requisite  sup- 
plies to  her  West-India  Islands,  or  to  bring  their 
produce  to  the  European  market,  under  her  own 
mercantile  flag,  resorted  to  the  expedient  of  re- 
laxing her  colonial  monopoly;  and  admitted  neu- 
tral vessels,  imder  certain  restrictions,  to  carry  the 
produce  of  those  islands  to  French  or  foreign  ports 
in  Europe.  Of  course  it  was  so  carried,  either 
really  or  ostensibly,  on  neutral  account ;  the  object 
being  to  avoid  capture  on  the  passage, 

But  the  prize  courts  of  Great-Britain,  regard- 
ing this  new  trade  as  unwarranted  by  the  rights 
of  neutrality,  condemned  such  vessels  as  were 
captured  while  engaged  in  it,  together  with  their 
cargoes;  however  clearly  the  property  of  both 
might  appear  to  be  in  those  neutral  merchants,  on 
whose  behalf  they  were  claimed. 

As  these  vessels  were  admitted  to  a  trade,  in 
which,  prior  to  the  war,  French  bottoms  only  could 
be  employed,  they  were  considered  as  made  French 
by  adoption  :  but  the  substantial  principle  of  the 
rule  of  judgment  was  this — "  that  a  neutral  has 
no  right  to  deliver  a  belligerent  from  the  pressure 
of  his  enemy^s  hostilities,  by  trading  with  his  co- 


13 

lonies  in  time  of  war,  in  a  way  that  was  prohibited 
in  time  of  peace/* 

When  the  facts  which  I  would  submit  to  the 
attention  of  the  reader  are  fully  before  him,  the 
justice  and  importance  of  this  limitation  of  neu- 
tral commerce,  which  has  sometimes  been  called, 
"  the  rule  of  the  war  1756,"  will  be  better  under- 
stood. Yet  a  general  preliminary  account  of  the 
reasons  on  which  it  is  founded,  seems  necessary  to 
the  right  apprehension  of  some  of  those  historical 
facts ;  I  give  it,  therefore,  in  the  larrguage  of  one, 
whose  ideas  it  is  always  injurious  to  quote  in  any 
words  but  his  own. 

"  The  general  rule  is,  that  the  neutral  has  a 
"  right  to  carry  on,  in  time  of  war,  his  accus- 
"  tomed  trade,  to  the  utmost  extent  of  which  that 
"  accustomed  trade  is  capable.  Very  different  is 
"  the  case  of  a  trade  which  the  neutral  has  never 
"  possessed,  which  he  holds  by  no  title  of  use  and 
"  habit  in  times  of  peace  ;  and  which,  in  fact,  can 
"  obtain  in  war,  by  no  other  title,  than  by  the 
"  success  of  the  one  belligerent  against  the  other ; 
"  and  at  the  expense  of  that  very  belligerent 
"  under  whose  success  he  sets  up  his  title ;  and 
"  such  I  take  to  be  the  colonial  trade,  generally 
*^  speaking. 

"  What  is  the  colonial  trade,  generally  speak- 
^^  ing  ?  It  is  a  trade  generally  shut  up  to  the  ex- 
"  elusive  use   of  the  mother  country,  to  which 


14 

''  the  colony  belongs,  and  this  to  a  double  use — the 
"  one  that  of  supplying  a  market  for  the  consump- 
"  tion  of  native  confimodities,  and  the  other,  of 
''  furnishing  to  the  mother  country  the  peculiar 
'^  commodities  of  the  colonial  regions :  to  these 
^'  tw6  purposes  of  the  mother  country,  the  gene- 
'^  ral  policy  respecting  colonies  belonging  to  the 
''  states  of  Europe,  has  restricted  them. 

"  AVith  respect  to  other  countries,   generally 
"  speaking,  the  colony  has  no  existence.     It   is 
"  possible  that?  indirectly,  and  remotely,  such  co- 
"  lonies  may  affect  the  commerce  of  other  coun- 
"  tries.     The  manufactures  of  Germany,  may  find 
"  their  way  into  Jamaica  or  Guadaloupe,  and  the 
"  sugar  of  Jamaica  or  Guadaloupe,  into  the  inte- 
"  rior  parts  of  Germany;    but  as  to  any  direct 
"  communication  or  advantages  resuliiag  there- 
"  from,  Guadaloupe  and  Jamaica  are  no  more  to 
"  Germany,  than  if  they  were  settlements  in  the 
"  mountains  of  the  moon.     To  commercial  pur- 
"  poses  they  are  not  in  the  same  planet.     If  they 
"  were  annihilated,  it  would  make  no  chasm  in 
"  the  commercial  mrp  of  Hamburgh.     If  Guada- 
"  loupe  (ould  be  sunk  in  the  sea,  by  the  eilect  of 
"  hostility  at  the  beginning  of  a  war,  it  would  be 
*'  a  mighty  loss  to  France,  as  Jamaica  would  be  to 
"  England,  if  it  could  be  made  the  subject  of  a  ' 
"  similar  act  of  violence;   but  such  events  would 
**  fmd  their  way  into  the  chronicles  of  other  coun- 


15  V 

'^  tries,  as  events   of  disinterested  curiosity,  and 
"  nothing  more. 

''  Upon  the  interruption  of  a  war,  what  are  the 

*^  rights  of  belligerents  and  neutrals  respectively, 

'^  regarding  such  places  ?  It  is  an  indubitable  right 

"  of  the  belligerent  to  possess  himself  of  such 

"  places,  as  of  any  other  possession  of  his  enemy. 

"  This  is  his  common  right ;  but  he  has  the  cer- 

''  tain  means  of  carrying  such  a  right  into  effect, 

"  if  he  has  a  decided  superiority  at  sea.     Such 

"  colonies  are  dependent  for  their  existence,  as 

**  colonies,  on  foreign  supplies ;   if  they   cannot 

''  be  supplied  and  defended,  they  must  fall  to  the 

"  belligerent  of   course :  and  if  the    belligerent 

''  chooses  to  apply  his  means  to  such  an  object, 

"  what  right  has  a  third  party,  perfectly  neutral, 

**  to  step  in  and  prevent  the  execution  ?  No  exist- 

*'  ing  interest  of  his,  is  affected  by  it;  he  can  have 

**  no  right  to  apply  to  his  own  use  the  beneficial 

"  consequences  of  the  mere  act  of  the  belligerent, 

*'  and  to  say,  "  True  it  is  you  have,  by  force  of 

"  arms,  forced  such  places  out  of  the  exclusive 

^  possession  of  the  enemy,  but  I  will  share  the 

'^  benefit  of  the  conquest,  and  by  sharing  its  be- 

"  nefits,  prevent  its  progress.     You  have  in  effect, 

"  and  by  lawful  means,  turned  the  enemy  out  of 

'^  the  possession  which  he  had  exclusively  main- 

'^  tained  against  the  whole  world,  and  with  whom 

^'  we  had  never  presumed  to  interfere ;  but  we 


16 

•*  will  interpose  to  prevent  his  absolute  surrendei*, 
"  by  the  means  of  that  very  opening,  which  the 
"  prevalence  of  your  arms  alone  has  effected : — 
*'  supplies  shall  be  sent  and  their  products  shall 
"be  exported:  you  have  lawfully  destroyed  his 
"  monopoly,  but  you  shall  not  be  permitted  to 
"  possess  it  yourself ;  we  insist  to  share  the  fruits 
"  of  your  victories  ;  and  your  blood  and  treasure 
"  have  been  expended,  not  for  your  own  interest, 
"  but  for  the  common  benefit  of  others.*' 

"  Upon  these  grounds,  it  cannot  be  contended 
"  to  be  a  right  of  neutrals,  to  intrude  into  a  com- 
*'  merce  which  had  been  uniformly  shut  against 
"  them,  and  which  is  now  forced  open  merely  by. 
"  the  pressure  of  war :  for  when  the  enemy,  un- 
*^  der  an  entire  inability  to  supply  his  colonies, 
'^  and  to  export  their  products,  affects  to  open 
"  them  to  neutrals,  it  is  not  his  will,  but  his  ne- 
"  cessity,  that  changes  the  system :  that  change 
"  is  the  direct  and  unavoidable  consequence  of  the 
"  compulsion  of  war ;  it  is  a  measure  not  of  French 
"  councils,  but  of  British  force*/* 


*  Judgment  of  Sir  William  Scott,  in  the  case  of  the  Immanucl,  at  the 
Admiralty,  Nov.  1799. 

I  quote  from  the  second  volume  of  the  Reports  of  Dr.  Robinson  ;  a 
work  of  transcendent  value  ;  and  whieh  will  rise  in  the  estimation  of  Eu- 
rope and  America,  in  proportion  us  the  rights  and  duties  of  nations  are  bet- 
ter known  and  respected.  It  repays  the  attention  of  the  English  lawyer* 
statesman,  or  scholar,  not  only  by  legal  and  political  information  of  a 
highly  important  kind,  and  which  is  no  where  else  to  be  so   fully   »n4 


17 

Such  were  the  principles  of  a  rule  first  practi- 
cally established  by  the  supreme  Tribunal  of 
Prize  during  the  war  of  1756,  only  because  the 
case  which  demanded  its  application  then  first 
occurred ;  and  it  ought  to  be  added^  that  the  de- 
cisions of  that  tribunal,  at  the  same  period,  were 
justly  celebrated  throughout  Europe  for  their  equi- 
ty and  wisdom*. 

After  France  became  a  party  to  the  American 
war,  some  captures  were  made,  to  which  the  same 
rule  of  law  might,  perhaps,  in  strictness,  have  been 
applied :  for  that  power  had  again  opened,  in  some 
degree,  the  ports  of  her  West-India  islands,  to  the 
ships  of  neutral  powers.  In  this  case,  however,  the 
measure  preceded  the  commencement  of  her  hos- 
tilities with  Great  Britain ;  and  it  was  therefore  spe- 
ciously represented  on  the  part  of  the  neutral  claim- 
ants, as  a  genuine  and  permanent  change  in  the 
commercial  system  of  the  enemy,  by  which  they 
had  a  right  to  profit.  The  case  in  other  respects  also 
was  much  weaker  than  that  of  the  war  of  1756; 
for  our  enemies,  during  the  American  contest,  were 
never  so  inferior  at  sea,  as  to  be  unable  to  pro- 


correctly  obtained  ^  but  by  exhibiting  some  of  the  happiest  models  of  a 
chaste  judicial  eloquence. 

*  See  Blackstone's  Commentaries,  Vol.  III.  70;  Montesquieu's 
Letters,  5th  March,  1753;  and  Vattel's  Law  of  Nations,  Book  H. 
c.  7.  s.  84. 


18 

tect,  in  a  great  measure,  their  colonial  trade  from 
our  hostilities.  At  some  periods,  they  even  possess- 
ed a  naval  superiority ;  especially  in  the  West- 
Indian  seas;  where,  in  consequence,  some  of 
our  most  valuable  islands  fell  into  their  hands, 
and  were  retained  by  them  till  the  peace.  France, 
therefore,  could  scarcely  be  said,  in  this  case,  to 
have  rescued  herself  by  the  relaxation  of  her  co- 
lonial system  from  actual  distress,  the  effect  of  a 
maritime  war. 

It  was  a  measure  of  convenience,  no  doubt, 
otherwise  it  would  not  have  been  adopted :  but 
it  was  not  an  expedient  which  the  pressure  of  our 
hostilities  had  made  absolutely  necessary.  The 
distinction  which  I  have  first  mentioned,  however, 
was  that  which  was  principally  insisted  upon,  in 
the  leading  cases  of  this  class '^. 

On  these  grounds,  presumably,  or  on  some  of 
them,  the  ships  in  question,  were  restored  by  our 
Supreme  Tribunal  of  Prize. — Perhaps  the  politi- 
cal difficulties  of  the  day,  especially  the  powerful, 
though  injurious,  influence  of  the  first  armed  neu- 
trality, may  have  had  some  weight  in  those  deci- 
sions. But  whatever  the  motives  were,  the  rule  of 
the  war  1756  was  not  avowedly  departed  from; 


♦  Cases  of    the  Tiger,   and   tlie    Copenhagen,    at    the    Cockpit,  in 

nsi. 


19 

much  less  expressly  reversed.  The  most  that  can 
be  alleged  is,  that  in  a  case  which,  notwithstanding 
the  distinctions  above  mentioned,  may  be  possibly 
thought  to  have  warranted  the  application  of  that 
rule,  it  was  not  at  this  time  applied. 

The  next  war,  w^s  our  late  arduous  contest  with 
France ;  in  which  our  enemy,  from  the  very  com- 
mencement of  hostilities,  reverted  to  his  former 
policy,  without  limitation  or  disguise. — Despairing 
of  being  able  to  dispute  with  us  the  dominion  of 
the  sea,  the  Republic,  the  moment  she  drew  the 
sword  against  us,  threw  wide  open  to  every  paci- 
fic flag  all  the  ports  of  her  colonies ;  some  of 
which  had  been,  in  fact,  partially  opened  a  little 
earlier,  without  her  licence,  by  the  local  revolu- 
tionary powers ;  and  the  neutral  merchants  im- 
mediately rushed  in  with  avidity,  to  reap  the  of- 
fered harvest. 

Our  government,  on  notice  of  the  general  fact, 
adopted  with  promptitude  the  course  which  it 
seemed  proper  to  take.  On  the  6th  of  November, 
1793,  a  royal  instruction  to  the  commanders  of 
his  Majesty's  ships  of  war  and  privateers,  was  is- 
sued, ordering  them  "  to  stop  and  detain  for  law- 
*'  ful  adjudication,  all  vessels  laden  with  goods  the 
"  produce  of  any  French  colony,  or  carrying  pro- 
"  visions  or  other  supplies  for  the  use  of  any  such 
"  colony." 

A  new  Pow^r  had  now  arisen  on  the  western 


\y' 


^ 


20 

shore  of  the  Atlantic,  whose  position,  and  mari=^ 
time  spirit,  were  calculated  to  give  new  and  vast 
importance  to  every  question  of  neutral  rights ; 
especially  in  the  American  seas.  The  merchants 
of  the  United  States  were  the  first,  and  by  far  the 
most  enterprising  adventurers  in  the  new  field  that 
was  opened  to  neutrals  in  the  Antilles ;  and  the 
ports  of  the  French  islands  were  speedily  crowded 
with  their  vessels. 

Of  course,  the  cargoes  they  received  there,  as 
Well  as  those  they  delivered,  were  all  declared  by 
their  papers  to  be  neutral  property;  but  when 
instead  of  rum  and  molasses,  the  ordinary  and 
ample  exchange  in  the  West-India  markets  for  the 
provisions  and  lumber  of  America,  the  neutral 
ship  owners  pretended  to  have  acquired,  in  barter 
for  those  cheap  and  bulky  commodities,  full  car- 
goes of  sugar  and  coffee ;  the  blindest  credulity 
could  scarcely  give  credit  to  the  tale.  It  was 
evident,  that  the  flag  of  the  United  States  was, 
for  the  most  part,  used  to  protect  the  property 
of  the  French  planter,  not  of  the  American  mer- 
chant. 

The  royal  instruction,  nevertheless,  seemed  to 
t)perate  severely  against  the  new-born  neutral 
power.  Great  numbers  of  ships,  under  American 
colours,  were  taken  in  the  West-Indies,  and  con- 
demned by  the  Vice  Admiralty  Courts. 

The  fraudulent  pretences  of  neutral  property 


21 

in  the  cargoes  were  in  general  so  gross,  being 
contrived  by  men  at  that  time  inexpert  in  such 
business,  that  a  great  part  of  these  prizes  might 
have  been  condemned  on  the  most  satisfactory 
grounds  as  hostile  property,  had  the  proper  exa- 
minations taken  place.  But  the  Vice  Admiralty 
Courts,  which  at  that  time  were  very  badly  con- 
stituted, regarded  the  illegality  of  the  trade,  as  an 
infallible  ground  of  decision  ;  and  therefore  w^ere 
grossly  remiss  in  taking  and  preserving  the  evi- 
dence on  the  point  of  property.  In  many  cases, 
they  proceeded  no  further  in  putting  the  standing- 
interrogatories  to  the  persons  usually  examined, 
than  was  necessary  to  obtain  from  them  an  avowal 
of  the  place  of  shipment  or  destination.  The  cap- 
tors, influenced  by  the  same  reliance  on  the 
rule  of  law,  neglected  to  search  for  concealed 
papers ;  and  those  documents  which  the  masters 
thought  fit  to  produce,  were  often  given  back  to 
them  at  their  request,  without  the  preservation  of 
a  copy,  or  any  minute  of  their  nature  or  con- 
tents: irregularities,  which  proved  in  the  sequel 
highly  injurious  to  the  captors,  and  a  cover  for 
fraudulent  claims. 

It  is  needless  to  state  particularly,  the  disputes 
that  ensued  between  our  government  and  the 
neutral  powers,  or  the  amicable  arrangements  by 
which  they  were  terminated ;  as  these  facts  are 
suiTiciently  known.     It  is  however  proper  to  re- 


^% 


mark,  that  nothing  was  expressly  settled  by  any 
convention,  respecting  the  lawfulness  oC  neutral 
commerce  with  the  colonies  of  a  belligerent  state  ; 
nor  were  any  concessions  made,  whereby  this 
country  was  in  any  degree  precluded  from  assert- 
ing the  rule  of  the  war  17^6,  at  any  subsequent 
period,  to  its  utmost  practical  extenf. 

It  was  agreed,  that  all  sentences  of  condem- 
nation founded  on  the  instruction  of  November, 
1793,  should  be  submitted  to  the  revision  of  the 
appellate  jurisdiction;  but  that  instruction  was  in 
January,  1794,  so  far  repealed,  that  instead  of  the 
comprehensive  order  therein  contained,  the  direc- 
tion only  was  to  seize  "  such  vessels  as  were  laden 
with  goods  the  produce  of  the  French  West-India 
Islands,  and  coming  directly  from  any  port  of  the 
said  Islands  to  Europe.*' 

The  latter  instruction  remained  in  force  till 
January,  1798,  when  a  new  one  was  substituted, 
which  remained  unrevoked  to  the  end  of  the  war. 
By  this  last  Royal  Order,  the  direction  was  to 
bring  in  for  lawful  adjudication  all  "  vessels  laden 
"  with  the  produce  of  any  island  or  settlement 
^^  of  France,  Spain,  or  Holland ;  and  coming  di- 
i  "  rectly  from  any  port  of  the  said  island  or  set- 
'^  tlements  to  any  port  in  Europe,  not  being  a 
"  port  of  this  kingdom,  or  of  the  country  to  which 
"  the  vessel,  being  neutral,  should  belong.*'  In 
other  words,  European  neutrals,  might,  without 


If 


S5 

being  liable  to  capture  under  this  last  instruction, 
bring  the  produce  of  a  hostile  colony  to  ports  of 
their  own  country ;  and  either  these,  or  the  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States,  might  now  carry  such 
produce  directly  to  England;  either  of  which  voy- 
ages would  have  subjected  the  ship  to  seizure  un- 
der the  Instruction  of  1794. 

The  decisions  of  the  Admiralty  Courts,  and  of 
the  Lords  Commissioners  of  Appeals,  on  this  in- 
teresting subject,  next  demand  our  notice. 

Royal  instructions,  from  the  time  of  their  pro- 
rrtulgation,  of  course^  become  law  to  all  executive 
officers  acting  under  his  Majesty's  commission, 
so  as  absolutely  to  direct  their  conduct,  in  relation 
either  to  the  enemy,  or  the  neutral  flag.  Their 
legislative  force  in  the  prize  court  also,  will  not 
be  disputed  ;  except  that  if  a  royal  order  could  be 
supposed  to  militate  plainly  against  the  rights  of 
neutral  subjects,  as  founded  on  the  acknowledged 
law  of  nations,  the  judge,  it  may  be  contended, 
ought  not  to  yield  obedience;  but  when  the  so- 
verign  only  interposes  to  remit  such  belligerent 
rights,  as  he  might  lawfully  enforce,  there  can  be 
no  room  for  any  such  question  ;  for,  "  volenti  non 
fit  injur ia^'  and  the  captor  can  have  no  rights,  but 
such  as  he  derives  from  the  sovereign,  whose  com- 
mission he  bears. 

It  results  from  these  principles,  that  whether  a 
judgment  by  the  prize  court,  condemning  pro- 


^ 


24 

perty  claimed  as  neutral,  but  captured  pursuant  to 
a  prohibitory  royal  instruction,  does  or  does  not 
amount  to  a  positive  declaration  of  the  opinion 
of  that  tribunal,  on  the  principle  of  the  prohibition 
itself;  the  restitution  of  property  so  claimed,  in 
pursuance  of  a  permissive  instruction,  clearly  is 
no  ailirmation  that  by  the  general  principles  of 
the  law  of  nations,  independently  of  the  will  of 
the  Sovereign,  the  captured  property  ought  to 
have  been  restored. 

If  this  remark  be  kept  in  view,  it  will  T)e 
found  that  the  Admiralty  Court,  and  the  Lords 
Commissioners,  were  so  far  from  impeaching  dur- 
ing the  late  war,  by  any  of  their  decisions,  the 
rule  of  the  war  1756,  that  they,  on  the  contrary, 
adhered  firmly  to  the  sense  of  their  predecessors, 
the  judges  of  that  period.  They  condemned  all 
vessels  and  cargoes,  taken  in  voyages  that  fell 
within  the  prohibitory  intent  of  the  existing  in- 
struction, which  was  so  far  practically  pursuant  to 
that  rule :  nor  did  they  omit  in  such  decisions  to 
declare  that  they  considered  the  i*ule  of  the  war 
17«56,  as  founded  on  most  incontestible  principles 
of  the  law  of  nations.  On  the  other  hand,  they 
restored  such  neutral  property  as  was  captured  in 
the  course  of  a  voyage  allowed  by  the  existing 
instruction ;  expressly  on  the  ground  of  that  vo- 
luntary relaxation  of  the  rule  of  law,  which  his 
Majesty  had  been  pleased  to  introduce. 


25 

It  should  here  be  observed,  that  these  royal 
orders  were  all  couched  in  directory,  not  in  pro- 
hibitory terms;  also,  that  in  none  of  them  is  any 
branch  of  the  neutral  intercourse  with  the  colo- 
nies of  our  enemies,  expressly  permitted.  But 
when  the  order  of  November,  1793,  to  seize  all 
vessels  bringing  produce  from  the  hostile  colonies, 
was  revoked  by  that  of  January,  1794,  and  in 
lieu  thereof,  a  direction  was  given  to  seize  such 
vessels  when  bound  to  Europe,  an  indulgence  to 
neutral  vessels  carrying  such  cargoes  to  other 
parts  of  the  world,  was  plainly  implied;  and  in  like 
manner,  when  the  instruction  of  1798  still  further 
narrowed  the  prohibitory  effect  of  the  direction^ 
confining  it  to  vessels  bound  to  countries  in  Eu- 
rope not  their  own,  with  the  exception  of  Great- 
Britain,  the  trade  to  their  own  ports,  and  to  ports 
of  this  kingdom,  was  by  clear  implication  per- 
mitted. 

Their  lordships,  and  the  judges  of  the  court 
of  admiralty,  also  followed  these  distinctions  into 
fair  analogies,  in  respect  of  the  outward  voyage. 
This  branch  of  the  trade,  was  left  unnoticed  in  the 
two  latter  instructions;  but  as  that  of  1793,  which 
placed  the  carrying  supplies  to  a  hostile  colony,  on 
tiie  same  footing  with  the  bringing  away  its  pro- 
duce, had  been  generally  revoked;  it  would  have 
been  unreasonable  and  inconsistent  not  to  admit, 
that  a  neutral  vessel  might  allowably  go  to  the 

E 


26 

colony,  from  the  same  port,  to  which  she  was  now 
allowed  to  carry  its  produce.  Such  outward  voy- 
ages therefore  were  held  to  be  within  the  clear 
meaning  of  the  relaxation. 

On  the  other  hand,  when  neither  the  letter  nor 
spirit  of  the  royal  instructions,  could  fairly  be 
construed  to  have  permitted  the  particular  branch 
of  this  commerce  with  the  hostile  colonies,  in  re- 
spect of  which  a  question  arose,  it  was  always 
held  by  those  tribunals  to  be  illegal.  Thus,  a 
voyage  from  any  hostile  country,  whether  in 
Europe  or  elsewhere,  to  any  hostile  colony ;  or 
vice  versa  ;  the  voyage  of  an  American  from  a 
hostile  colony  to  any  port  in  Europe  except 
Great-Britain;  the  voyage  of  a  Dane  or  Swede 
from  any  hostile  colony  to  the  United  States  of 
America  ;  and  their  respective  converses,  have  all 
been  held  tp  be  contrary  to  the  law  of  war,  and 
have  induced  the  condemnation  both  of  the  ships 
and  cargoes*. 

In  short,  the  doctrine  uniformly  held  by  the 
lords  commissioners  of  appeals,  as  well  as  by  the 
Court  of  Admiralty,  was  such  as  the  learned 
judge  of  that  court,  has  thus  comprehensively  ex- 
pressed:— "  The  true  rule  of  the  court,  is  the  text 
"  of  the  instructions ;   what  is  not  found  therein 


*    Cast's   of    the    New     Advt;uturc  ;     The    Charlotte',     c  u-liu  ;    the 
Volant,    BessoDi  ;    tlit     Wilhehnina,    &c.     &c.    at    the    Cockpit,    last 


n 


'*  permitted,  is  understood  to  be  prohibited ;  upon 
*^  this  plain  principle,  that  the  colony  trade  is  ge- 
"^  nerally  prohibited,  and  that  whatever  is  not  spe- 
"  cially  relaxed,  continues  in  a  state  of  interdic- 
*^tion*.'* 

The  only  decisions  in  which  the  supreme  tri- 
bunal may  possibly  be  supposed  to  have  departed 
from  the  rule  of  the  war  of  17'56,  on  any  other 
ground  than  that  of  a  voluntary  remission  of  bel- 
ligerent rights  by  the  crown,  were  the  restitu- 
tions of  vessels  and  cargoes  which  had  been  cap- 
tured and  condemned  prior  to  the  instruction  of 
January  1794  ;  for  by  that  order  the  first  legisla- 
tive relaxation  of  the  general  prohibitory  rule  was 
introduced. 

Vessels  and  cargoes  of  this  description  certainly 
were  restored,  when  the  voyages  in  which  they 
were  taken  were  found  to  have  been  such,  as  that 
instruction,  if  in  force  at  the  time,  would  have  le- 
galised. 

There  may  be  good  reasons  for  giving  to  such 
orders  in  time  of  war,  when  they  go  to  enlarge,  not 
to  restrain,  the  indulgence  of  neutral  trade,  a  re- 
troactive effect  upon  cases  still  depending  in  judg- 
ment. Nor  is  it  unjust  towards  captors  ;  for  since 
they  often  derive  from  sudden  changes,  during  the 

■^  Case  of  the  Immanuel  at  the  Admiralty,  2d  Robinson's  Reports,  202. 


% 


i 


28 

war,  in  our  relations  with  different  powers,  or 
from  new  strictness  in  the  conduct  of  the  war 
itself,  benefits  not  in  their  contemplation  at  the 
time  of  the  capture  ;  it  is  reasonable  that  their  pri- 
vate interest  should,  on  the  other  hand,  give  way 
to  the  public  good,  when  necessary  for  purposes 
of  conciliation  with  neutral  states,  and  to  effec- 
tuate such  arrangements  with  them,  as  may 
intervene  between  the  capture  and  the  judgment. 
It  might  be  added,  that  a  captor's  rights  under 
the  acts  of  parliament  which  give  him  the  benefit 
of  the  prizes  he  makes,  comprehend  by  express 
law,  no  more  than  property  taken  from  the  ene- 
my ;  and  are  extended  to  neutral  property  con- 
demned for  violations  of  the  law  of  war,  only 
through  a  liberal  construction  made  by  the  prize 
tribunals  ;  consequently  it  would  be  the  more  un- 
reasonable to  restrain  on  the  notion  of  an  inchoate 
right  in  him  prior  to  the  definitive  sentence,  the 
power  of  the  state  itself  to  decide,  how  far  the 
rules  of  that  law  shall  be  relaxed  in  favour  of 
neutral  powers.  It  is  enough  that  he  is  indemni- 
fied \  and  in  the  present  case,  all  captors,  whose 
disappointment  would  have  been  attended  with 
actual  loss,  had  reason  to  be  satisfied  with  the  na- 
tional liberality  and  justice. 

But   in   truth,   the  lords  commissioners  found 
also  some  equitable  reasons,  on  behalf  of  the  neu- 


^9 

tral  claimants,  for  giving  to  such  of  them  as  had 
traded  with  the  French  islands,  prior  to  January 
1794,  the  benefit  of  that  instruction. 

I  presume  not  to  develope  the  motives  of  his 
Majesty's  government  for  granting  such  large  and 
truly  costly  indulgences  as  were  ultimately  ac- 
corded to  neutral  commerce  during  the  last  war,  at 
the  expense  of  our  belligerent  interests.  They  were 
perhaps  proportionate  in  their  weight,  to  the  mag- 
nitude of  the  sacrifice.  But  the  indulgent  instruc- 
tion  of  1794,  was  probably  founded  in  part,  on  a 
consideration  which  avowedly  weighed  much  with 
the  lords  commissioners,  for  giving  it  a  retrospec- 
tive effect.  It  was  found,  that  before  the  French 
actually  engaged  in  hostilities  with  any  maritime 
power,  the  revolutionary  assemblies  and  governors 
of  her  West-India  islands,  had  opened  some  of 
their  ports,  to  a  considerable  extent,  to  foreign  ves- 
sels bringing  necessary  supplies ;  and  consequent- 
ly that  the  principle  of  the  rule  of  the  war  1756, 
did  not  apply  to  the  whole  extent  of  the  existing 
neutral  commerce  with  thofe  colonies  *. 


*  As  this  is  an  important  fact,  of  which  authentic  eridence  is  not 
easily  to  be  found  in  Europe,  I  subjoin  a  proclamation  of  the  French 
governor  Behague  and  the  colonial  assembly  of  Martinique,  by  which 
certain  ports  of  that  island  were  opened.  It  is  extracted  fx-om  the  evi- 
dence in  a  prize  appeal,  that  of  the  Peter,  Augustus Robson,  mas- 
ter, before  the  lords  commissioners,  Dec.  16,  1801. 


m 


so 


This  innovation  was  apparently  unknown  to,  or 
overlooked  by  oar  government,  when  the  instruc- 

"  PROCLAMATION. 

♦♦  John  Peter  Anthony  de  Behague,  Iieutenant-g;eneral  in 
*'  the  King's  armies,  governor-general  of  the  Windward  Is- 
"  lands,  commanding  in  chief  the  forces  by  land  and  sea. 

*'  Examined  by  us  the  resolution  of  the  colonial  assem- 
"  bly  of  the  14th  of  this  month,  the  purport  whereof  fol- 
"  lows  : 

"  Extract  of  the  verbal  process  of  the  resolution  of  the  colo- 
"  nial  assembly  in  their  silting  of  the  fourth  day  of  December, 
*'   1792. 

*'  The  colonial  assembly  of  Martinique,  after  hearing  the  re- 
"  ports  of  its  committee,  and  taking  into  consideration  what 
*'  had  been  done  at  Guadaloupe,  upon  opening  the  ports,  re- 
"  solved, 

*'  lat.  That  the  ports  and  roads  of  Saint  Pierre,  Fort 
*'  Royal,  and  Marin,  siiall  be  open  to  all  strangers  without 
"  exception,  for  the  introduction  of  all  sustenances,  and 
"  other  necessary  articles,  as  well  for  the  cultivation  of  lands, 
*'  as  the  er:.clion  of  buildings,  and  they  are  permitted  to  ex- 
*'  port  produce  of  every  kind,  which  may  be  given  them  in  re- 
*'  turn. 

*'  2d.  That  without  altering  old  customs  in  the  regard  to 
"  the  duties  on  importation,  those  payable  on  exportation, 
'*  as  well  l)y  foreigners  as  Frenchmen,  as  also  by  those  ship- 
*•  pir.;"  either  to  a  foreign  country,  or  the  French  ports 
♦'  bhull,  from  the  date  of  the  publication  of  tiicse  presents, 
*'  consist  in  one  sole  duty  of  three  ,^>er  cent, ;  which  duty 
''  shall  be  borne  by  the  shippers,  independent  of  the  addi- 
*•  ditional  duty  of  27  livres  per  hogshead  of  sugar,  and  two 


# 


31 

tion  of  November  1793,  was  framed  ;  otherwise  an 
exception  would  probably  have  been  made  in  fa- 

"  and    a     quarter   per   cent,     en     all     other   island     produce 
''  which    shall  be    received    as   before,  and   which   are   at   the 
"  charge    of  the   seller.       TafTia,  rum,    and    molasses,   shall 
*'  continue  to  be    liable  only   to   the     former    established   du« 
"  ties. 

"  3d.  That  the  duties  above  alluded  to  shall  be  paid, 
"  according  to  the  usages  and  forms  already  fixed.  That  all 
"  the  above  regulations  shall  continue  in  full  force  until  ex- 
"  press  orders  to  the  contrary.  In  order  that  the  present 
"  resolution,  with  the  approbation  of  the  governor,  may 
"  be  carried  into  effect  without  delay,  1000  copies  shall  be 
"  forthwith  printed,  affixed,  published, and  sent  to  the  neighbour- 
"  ing  islands,  wherever  it  may  be  necessary. 

(Signed) 

"  GiLLiET  Charley,  Vice-President. 
"  Gallet  S.  Aurin,  President. 
"  RiGGRDY,  Secretary. 
"  Des  Londes,  Joint  Secretary.'* 
"  By  virtue  of  the  powers  with  which  we  are  invested,  we 
"  approve,    and   do  approve  of  the   above   decree  being   car- 
*'  ried    into   execution,    according    to    the    form    and    effect 
*'  thereof;  and   in   consequence,   and  by   virtue   of  the   same 
"  powers,    order,    and   do  order,   to     the    administration,   bo- 
"  dies,   and   functionaries,   that  these    presents  be  transcribed 
"  in   our  registry,  read,  published,   and  executed  in    the   re- 
"  spective  districts.     Given  at  Fort  Royal,  Martinique,  undcp 
"  our  seal,  and  the  countersign  of  our  secretary,  the  1 5th  day 
•«  of  December,  1792. 

(Signed)  "  Behague. 

"  By  order  of  the  General, 

(Signed)  "  Peuriquet." 


r 


vour  of  such  neutral  vessels  as  were  found  trading 
within  the  limitations  of  the  new  laws,  promulged 
hefore  the  war. 

It  must  indeed  be  owned,  that  this  relaxation 
of  the  national  monopoly,  was  a  mere  temporary 
expedient,  the  result  of  distress  occasioned  by  re- 
vohition  and  civil  war  in  the  parent  state,  and  the 
consequent  neglect  of  her  trans-marine  interests 
in  general ;  that  the  legislative  authority  from 
w  hich  it  flowed  was  highly  questionable*  ;  and 
that  it  was  not  even  pretended  by  its  authors,  to 
be  founded  on  any  intention  of  permanently  al- 
tering the  established  commercial  relations  be- 
tween the  mother  country  and  her  colonies. 
Nor  would  it  have  been  unnatural  to  surmise, 
that  this  innovation  was  adopted  in  contempla- 
tion of  that  war  with  the  maritime  powers,  which 
Francci  was  determined  to  provoke,  and  which  so 


*  It  appeared  in  the  evidence  in  the  isainc  cause  from  which  th« 
above  proclamation  is  extracted,  that  the  royalist  and  republican  par- 
ties, who  alternately  i)revailed  in  the  French  Windward-Islands  in  tiiat 
season  of  distraction  which  immediately  preceded  the  late  war,  suc- 
cessively opened  and  shut  the  ports  in  opposition  to  each  other,  du 
ring  their  brief  periods  of  authority  ;  and  it  is  remarkable  that  th< 
party  of  the  royalists  and  planters,  imder  General  Behague,  was 
that  which  introduced  and  supported  this  innovation. — Their  oppo- 
nents abstained  from  it  ou  motives  of  respect  to  the  authority  of 
the  National  Convention,  u'^twithstanding  the  distress  of  the  islands  a». 
thi?  time. 


33 

soon  after  took  place.  If  so,  it  was  a  mere  stra- 
tagem to  elude  our  belligerent  rights ;  and  we  were 
no  more  bound  to  admit  any  claims  of  neu- 
tral privilege  which  might  be  deduced  from  it,  than 
if  the  innovation  had  been  made  after  the  war 
had  actually  commenced.  The  claimants,  how- 
ever, contended  that  it  was  not  to  be  considered 
as  a  temporizing  measure,  but  as  a  change  of 
system  to  which  France  would  permanently  ad- 
here; and  the  revolutionary  spirit  ofthe  day  gave 
some  plausibility  to  the  expectation,  though  the 
conduct  of  the  French  government,  subsequent  to 
the  treaty  of  Amiens,  has  proved  it  to  have  been 
groundless. 

But  however  disputable  the  duty  might  be  on 
our  part,  to  tolerate  this  new  trade  during  the  late 
war,  on  the  ground  of  any  change  that  had  pre- 
viously taken  place  in  the  West-Indies,  it  is  clear 
that  the  neutral  merchants  who  had  engaged  in  it 
prior  to  any  notice  of  our  hostilities  with  France, 
were  entitled  to  fmish  their  voyages  without  mo- 
lestation. This  indeed  was  never  disputed ;  un- 
less when  their  ships  were  detained  on  suspicion 
of  having  French  property  on  board.  But  had 
the  fact  of  the  new  colonial  regulations  been 
known,  something  more  seems  to  have  been  due 
to  them.  Some  notice  ought,  perhaps,  to  hav& 
been  given,  that  this  country  would  not  acquiesce 

F 


54 

fn  the  further  prosecution  of  a  trade  so  oppositely 
her  belligerent  rights  ;  and  this  the  rather,  because 
we  had  already  forborne  to  assert  them  in  a  case 
somewhat  similar,  in  the  last  preceding  war. — 
No  such  notice  was  given  prior  to  the  instruc- 
tion of  November,  1793;  and  therefore  the  neu- 
tral merchants  might  naturally  enough  conclude, 
that  the  toleration  of  this  commerce,  which  they 
experienced  at  the  commencement  of  the  war, 
would  be  extended  to  their  future  voyages. 

That  these  considerations  were  admitted  by  his 
Majesty's  ministers,  in  the  discussions  that  ensued 
between  them  and  the  neutral  powers,  may  be 
reasonably  conjectured;  but  certain  it  is,  that  the 
lords  commissioners  of  appeals,  adverted  to  them 
as  one  motive  of  the  great  indulgence  shown  by 
their  lordships  to  the  class  of  claimants  whose 
cases  we  are  now  reviewing  ;  and  consequently,  if 
the  right  to  give  a  retroactive  effect  to  the  in- 
struction of  January,  1794,  can  reasonably  be 
questioned,  we  have  here  another  ground,  on  which 
these  restitutions  may  well  be  reconciled  with  the 
rule  of  the  war  1756. 

So  far  were  the  decisions  of  their  lordships,  even 
in  these  early  and  favourable  cases,  from  impeach- 
ing the  principle  of  that  important  rule,  that  by 
some  of  them  it  was  practically  affirmed.  Such 
American  vessels  captured  in  the  summer  of  1793, 
as  were  laden  with  French  colonial  produce,  and 


55 

"bound  to  the  ports  of  France,  or  to  Europe,  were 
condemned  expressly  on  that  rule  of  law  *. 

Haying  stated  thus  generally  the  conduct  both 
of  the  executive  government,  and  of  the  prize  tri- 
bunals of  Great-Britain,  in  regard  to  this  great 
principle  of  the  law  of  nations,  during  the  last 
war,  I  have  to  add,  that  on  the  recommencement 
of  hostilities  with  France  in  1803,  the  same  sys- 
tem was  with  little  variation  pursued. 

An  instruction,  dated  the  2!4th  of  June  in  that 
year,  directed  the  commanders  of  his  Majesty's 
ships  of  war  and  privateers  "  not  to  sei^e  any 
^'  neutral  vessels  which  should  be  found  carrying 
^^  on  trade  directly  between  the  colonies  of  the 
*^  enemy,  and  the  neutral  country  to  which  the 
*^  vessel  belonged,  and  laden  with  property  of  the 
"  inhabitants  of  such  neutral  country ;  provided 
"  that  such  neutral  vessel  should  not  be  supply- 
"  ing,  nor  should  have  on  the  outward  voyage  sup- 
"  plied,  the  enemy,  with  any  articles  contraband 
"  of  war,  and  should  not  be  trading  with  any 
"  blockaded  ports." 

This  proviso  had  been  rendered  too  necessary 
by  the  misconduct  of  neutrals  in  the  former  war, 
to  be  now  omitted,  and  forms  the  only  substantial 
difference  between  the  existing  instruction,  and 
that  of  January  1798;  except  that  the  ports  of 

*  Cases  of  the  Charlotte,  Coffin;  tlie   Volant,  Bessojnj  and  Betsy, 
Kinsman:  19th  Dec.  1801. 


his  kingdom  are  no  longer  permitted  places  of 
destination,  from  the  hostile  colonies  ;  and  that  the 
cargo,  as  well  as  the  ship,  is  now  required  to  belong 
to  subjects  of  the  same  neutral  country  to  or  from 
which  the  voyage  is  made. 

The  general  result  of  this  historical  statement 
is,  that  we  have  receded  very  far  in  practice  from 
the  application  of  the  rule  of  the  war  1756,  in  some 
points,  while  we  have  adhered  to  it  in  others  j  but 
that  the  principle  of  that  important  rule  in  point 
of  right,  has  never  been  at  any  time,  either  theo- 
retically or  practically  abandoned. 

Let  us  next  inquire  what  use  has  been  made  by 
neutral  merchants,  of  the  indulgences  which  the 
British  government  has  thus  liberally  granted. — 
We  have  suffered  neutrals  to  trade  with  the  colo- 
nies of  our  enemy,  directly  to  or  from  the  ports  of 
their  own  respective  countries,  but  not  directly  to 
or  from  any  other  part  of  the  world,  England,  dur- 
ing the  last  war,  excepted.  Have  they  been  con- 
tent to  observe  the  restriction } 

One  pretext  of  the  neutral  powers,  for  claim* 
ing  a  right  to  trade  with  the  hostile  colonies, 
was  the  desire  ofsupplying  themselves  with  sugar, 
and  other  articles  of  West-India  produce,  for  their 
own  consumption  5  and  it  was  speciously  repre* 
sented  as  a  particular  hardship  in  the  case  of  Ame- 
rica, that,  though  a  near  neighbour  to  the  West- 
Indies,  she  should  be  precluded  from  buying  those 


37 

eommodities  in  the  colonial  markets. of  our  ene- 
mies, while  shut  out  by  law  from  our  own. 

The  argument  was  more  plausible  than  sound; 
for  in  time  of  peace,  this  new  power  was  subject 
to  the  same  general  exclusion ;  as  were  also  the 
other  neutral  nations. — Besides,  Denmark  has  co- 
lonies, which  more  than  supplies  her  own  moderate 
consumption;  and  as  to  that  of  Sweden,  and  of  the 
United  States,  it  was  always  exceedingly  small. 
The  only  products  of  the  West-Indies,  that  the  lat- 
ter usually  imported,  a  little  refined  sugar,  and  cof- 
fee from  England  excepted,  were  rum  and  molas- 
ses ;  and  with  these  we  were  willing  still  copious-, 
ly  to  supply  them  from  our  own  islands;  nor  would 
the  importing  of  such  articles  as  these  from  the  hos- 
tile colonies  perhaps  have  been  thought  worth  a 
serious  dispute.  It  is  well  known  that  the  frugal  citi- 
zens of  America,  make  molasses  for  the  most  part 
their  substitute  for  sugar  ;  and  have  learned  from 
habit  to  prefer  it  to  that  more  costly  article. 

However,  this  pretext  was  completely  removed, 
when  the  British  government  gave  way  so  far  to  it, 
and  the  other  arguments  of  the  neutral  powers,  as 
to  allow  them  to  carry  on  the  trade  in  question, 
to  their  own  ports.  The  instruction  of  1794, 
indeed,  seemed  not  to  concede  so  much  to  the  neu- 
tral states  of  Europe ;  but  when  it  is  recollected, 
that  Denmark  and  Sweden  each  possessed  islands 
in  the  West-Indies,  which  might  be  made  entre- 


38 

pots  between  their  European  dominions  and  the 
French  colonies,  it  will  be  seen  that  they  were 
put  nearly  on  an  equal  footing  with  the  United 
States  of  America. 

Had  the  neutral  powers  been  influenced  by  jus- 
tice and  moderation,  these  concessions  would  not 
only  have  been  satisfactory,  but  might  have  been 
guarded  by  reciprocal  concessions,  perhaps,  against 
any  pernicious  abuse ;  as  was  attempted  in  the  12th 
article  of  our  treaty  with  America,  soon  after  ne- 
gociated  and  signed  by  Mr.  Jay. 

The  chief  danger  of  our  so  far  receding  from  the 
full  extent  of  our  belligerent  rights,  as  to  allow  the 
neutral  states  to  import  directly  the  produce  of  the 
hostile  colonies,  was  that  it  might  be  re-exported, 
and  sent  either  to  the  mother  country  in  Europe, 
or  to  neighbouring  neutral  ports,  from  which  the 
produce  itself,  or  its  proceeds,  might  be  easily  re- 
mitted to  the  hostile  country;  in  which  case  our  ene- 
mies would  scarcely  feel  any  serious  ill  effect  from 
the  war,  in  regard  to  their  colonial  trade.  It  was 
wisely,  therefore,  stipulated  in  the  American  treaty, 
that  West-India  produce  should  not  be  re-exported 
during  the  war  from  that  country ;  and  the  bet- 
ter to  reconcile  the  United  States  to  that  restric- 
tion, they  were  admitted,  by  the  same  article, 
to  an  extensive  trade,  during  the  same  period,  and 
for  two  years  longer,  with  the  British  West-India 
islands. 


S9 

'  Had  not  this  equitable  agreement  proved  abor- 
tive, arrangements  of  a  like  tendency  would  no 
doubt  have  been  negociated  with  the  neutral 
powers  of  Europe :  but  unfortunately,  the  clamor- 
ous voice  of  the  French  agents,  and  of  a  few  self- 
interested  men,  in  America,  prevailed  so  much 
over  the  suggestions  of  justice,  and  the  true  per- 
manent interests  of  both  countries,  that  in  the  ra- 
tification of  the  treaty  by  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  the  12th  article  was  excepted. 

In  truth,  those  injurious  consequences  which 
formed  a  reasonable  subject  of  apprehension  to  this 
country,  were  essential  to  the  selfish  views  of  the 
neutral  merchants  who  had  engaged  in  the  new 
trade  with  the  French  colonies. 

To  the  Americans  especially,  whether  dealing 
©n  their  own  account,  or  as  secret  agents  of  the 
enemy,  the  profit  would  have  been  comparatively 
small,  and  the  business  itself  inconsiderable,  had 
they  not  been  allowed  to  send  forward  to  Europe, 
at  least  in  a  circuitous  way,  the  produce  they 
brought  from  the  islands.  The  obligation  of  first 
importing  into  their  own  country,  was  an  incon- 
venience which  their  geographical  position  made  of 
little  moment ;  but  the  European,  and  not  the 
American  market,  was  that  in  which  alone  the  ul- 
timate profit  could  be  reaped,  or  the  neutralizing 
commission  secured. 

In  the  partial  ratification  of  the  treaty  by  Ame- 


40 

rica,  our  government  acquiesced.  No  conven- 
tional arrangements  consequently  remained  with 
that  neutral  power,  and  none  were  made  with  any 
other  for  palliating  the  evils  likely  to  arise  from 
the  relaxing  instruction;  but  they  were  left  to 
operate,  and  progressively  to  increase,  to  that  per- 
nicious and  dangerous  extent  which  shall  be  pre- 
sently noticed. 

War,  in  suspending  the  direct  communication 
between  the  hostile  colonies  and  their  parent 
states,  ''cannot  dissolve  those  ties  of  property,  of 
private  connexion,  of  taste,  opinion,  and  habit, 
which  bind  them  to  each  other.  The  colonist  still 
prefers  those  manufactures  of  his  native  country 
with  which  he  has  been  usually  supplied ;  and  still 
wishes  to  lodge  in  her  banks,  or  with  her  mer- 
chants, the  disposable  value  of  his  produce.  That 
the  colonial  proprietors  resident  in  Europe,  must 
desire  to  have  their  revenues  remitted  thither,  as 
formerly,  is  still  more  obvious;  and  indeed  such  an 
adherence  to  the  old  course  of  things,  is  both  with 
them  and  their  absent  brethren,  in  general  rather 
a  matter  of  necessity  than  choice ;  for  mortgagees, 
and  other  creditors,  in  the  mother  country,  are 
commonly  entitled  to  receive  a  large  part  of  the 
annual  returns  of  a  West-India  plantation. 

The  consequence  is,  that  into  whatever  new  chan- 
nels the  commerce  of  the  belligerent  colonies  may 
artificially  be  pushed  by  the  war,  it  must  always  have 


41 

a  most  p6werfixl  tendency,  to  find  its  way  from  its 
former  fountains  to  its  former  reservoirs.  The 
colonial  proprietor,  if  obliged  to  ship  his  goods 
in  neutral  bottoms,  will  still  send  them  directly 
to  his  home  in  Europe,  if  he  can  ;  and  if  not,  will 
make  some  neutral  port  a  mere  warehouse,  or  at 
most  a  market,  from  which  the  proceeds  of  the 
shipment,  if  not  the  goods  themselves,  may  be  re- 
mitted to  himself,  or  his  agents,  in  the  parent  state. 

Such  has  been  the  event  in  the  case  before  us. 
But  let  us  see  more  particularly  how  the  grand 
objects  of  the  enemy  planter  and  merchant,  have 
been,  in  this  respect,  accomplished. 

When  enabled  by  the  royal  instructions, 
to  trade  safely  to  and  from  neutral  ports,  they 
found  various  indirect  means  opened  to  them  for 
the  attainment  of  those  ultimate  ends,  of  which 
the  be^,  and  most  generally  adopted,  were  the  two 
following : — They  might  either  clear  out  for  a 
neutral  port,  and,  under  cover  of  that  pretended 
destination,  make  a  direct  voyage  from  the  colony 
to  the  parent  state ;  or  they  might  really  proceed 
to  some  neutral  country,  and  from  thence  re- 
export the  cargo,  in  the  same  or  a  different  bot- 
tom, to  whatever  European  market,  whether  neu- 
tral or  hostile,  they  preferred. 

The  first  of  these  was  the  shortest,  and  most 
convenient  method  ;  the  other  the  most  secure. — 

G 


42. 

The  former  was  chiefly  adopted  by  the  Dutch,  on 
their  homeward  voyages ;  because  a  pretended 
destination  for  Prussian,  Swedish,  or  Danish  ports 
in  the  North  Sea,  or  the  Baltic,  was  a  plausible 
mask,  even  in  the  closest  approximation  the  ship 
might  make  to  the  Dutch  coast,  and  to  the  mo- 
ment of  her  slipping  into  port  :  but  the  latter 
method,  was  commonly  preferred  by  the  Spaniards 
and  French,  in  bringing  home  their  colonial  pro- 
duce; because  no  credible  neutral  destination  could 
in  general  be  pretended,  that  would  consist  with  the 
geographical  position  and  course  of  a  ship  coming 
directly  from  the  West-Indies,  if  met  with  near 
the  end  of  her  voyage,  in  the  latitude  of  their 
principal  ports. 

The  x\merican  flag,  in  particular,  was  a  cover 
that  could  scarcely  ever  be  adapted  to  the  former 
method  of  eluding  our  hostilities;  while  it  was 
found  peculiarly  convenient  in  the  other.  Such 
is  the  position  of  the  United  States,  and  such  the 
effect  of  the  trade-winds,  that  European  vessels, 
homeword-bound  from  the  West-Indies,  can  touch 
at  their  ports  with  very  little  inconvenience  or 
delay ;  and  the  same  is  the  case,  though  in  a  less 
degree,  in  regard  to  vessels  coming  from  the  re- 
motest parts  of  South  America  or  the  East-Indies. 
The  passage  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico,  espe- 
cially, runs  so  close  along  the  North  American 
shore,  that  ships  bound  from  the  Havannah,  from 


43 

Vera  Cruz,  and  other  great  Spanish  ports  border- 
ing on  that  Gulf,  to  Europe,  can  touch  at  cer- 
tain ports  in  the  United  States  with  scarcely  any 
deviation.  On  an  outward  voyage  to  the  East 
and  West-Indies,  indeed,  the  proper  course  is 
more  to  the  southward,  than  w^ill  well  consist  with 
touching  in  North- America  3  yet  the  deviation 
for  that  purpose  is  not  a  very  formidable  incon- 
venience. Prior  to  the  independency  of  that 
country,  it  was  not  unusual  for  our  own  outward 
bound  West-Indiamen  to  call  there,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  fdling  up  their  vacant  room  with  lumber 
or  provisions. 

But  this  new  neutral  country,  though  so  hap- 
pily placed  as  an  entrepot,  is  obviously  no  place 
for  a  fictitious  destination,  on  any  voyage  between 
the  colonies  and  Europe ;  because,  as  it  lies  mid- 
way between  them,  the  pretext  would  be  worn  out 
long  before  its  end  was  accomplished. 

From  these  causes  it  has  naturally  happened 
that  the  protection  given  by  the  American  flag, 
to  the  intercourse  between  our  European  enemies 
and  their  colonies,  since  the  instruction  of  January, 
1794,  has  chiefly  been  in  the  way  of  a  double 
voyage,  in  which  America  has  been  the  half-way 
house,  or  central  point  of  communication.  The 
fabrics  and  commodities  of  France,  Spain,  and 
Holland,  have  been  brought  under  American  co- 
lours to  ports    in  the    United  States;  and    from 


44 

thence  re-exported,  under  the  same  flag,  for  the 
supply  of  the  hostile  colonies.  Again,  the  pro- 
duce of  those  colonies  has  been  brought,  in  a  like 
manner,  to  the  American  ports,  and  from  thence 
re-shipped  to  Europe. 

The  royal  instruction  of  1798,  however,  opened 
to  the  enemy  a  new  method  of  eluding  capture 
under  the  American  flag,  and  enabled  it  to  per- 
form that  service  for  him,  in  a  more  compendious 
manner.  The  ports  of  this  kingdom,  were  now 
made  legitimate  places  of  destination,  to  neutrals 
coming  with  cargoes  of  produce  directly  from  the 
hostile  colonies. 

Since  it  was  found  necessary  or  prudent, 
to  allow  European  neutrals  to  carry  on  this  trade 
directly  to  their  own  countries,  it  was,  per- 
haps, deemed  a  palliation  of  the  evils  likely  to 
follow,  and  even  some  compensation  for  them  in 
the  way  of  commercial  advantage,  to  obtain  for 
ourselves  a  share  of  those  rich  imports,  which  were 
now  likely  to  be  poured  more  abundantly  than 
ever,  through  our  own  very  costly  courtesy,  into 
the  neutral  ports  of  Europe.  We  had  submitted 
to  a  most  dangerous  mutilation  of  our  belligerent 
rights,  to  gratify  the  rapacity  of  other  nations ; 
and  we  felt,  perhaps,  like  a  poor  seaman,  men- 
tioned by  Goldsmith,  who,  in  a  famine  at  sea, 
being  obliged  to  spare  a  certain  part  of  his  body  to 
feed  his  hungry  companions,  reasonably  claimed 


45 

a  right  to  have  the  first  steak  for  himself.  Or,  per- 
haps, the  motive  was  a  desire  more  effectually  to 
conciliate  America.  If  so,  we  were  most  ungrate- 
fully requited  -,  but  in  the  other  case,  the  error 
flowed  from  a  very  copious  source  of  our  national 
evils,  though  one  too  plausible  and  popular,  to  be 
incidentally  developed  in  a  work  like  this  :  I  mean 
a  morbid  excess  of  sensibility  to  immediate  com- 
mercial profit.  The  Dutch,  who  during  a  siege 
sold  gunpowder  to  their  enemies,  were  not  the 
only  people  who  have  sometimes  preferred  their 
trade  to  their  political  safety. 

The  use  immediately  made  by  the  American 
merchants  of  this  new  licence,  was  to  make  a  pre- 
tended destination  to  British  ports,  that  conve- 
nient cover  for  a  voyage  from  the  hostile  colonies 
to  Europe,  which  their  flag  could  not  otherwise 
give ;  and  thus  to  rival  the  neutrals  of  the  old 
world,  in  this  method  of  protecting  the  West-India 
trade  of  our  enemies,  while  they  nearly  engrossed 
the  other.  The  destination  of  American  West-In- 
diamen  "  to  Cowes,  and  a  market,"  became  as  pro- 
verbial a  cheat  in  the  Admiralty  Courts,  as  ring 
dropping  is  at  Bow-street. 

They  often  indeed  really  did  call  at  Cowes,  or 
some  other  port  in  the  channel :  but  it  was  in  ge- 
neral, only  to  facilitate  through  a  communication 
with  their  agents  here,  and  by  correspondence  with 
their  principal  in  the  hostile  countries,  the  true 


46 

ultimate  purpose  of  the  voyage.  They  might  even 
sell  in  our  markets,  when  the  prices  made  it  clear- 
ly the  interest  of  their  French  or  Spanish  employers 
to  do  so  ;  but  whether  Havre,  Amsterdam,  Ham- 
burgh, or  London,  might  be  the  more  inviting 
market,  the  effect  of  touching  in  England  was 
commonly  only  that  of  enabling  them  to  deter- 
mine, in  what  way  the  indulgence  of  this  country 
might  be  used  with  the  greatest  profit  to  our  ene- 
mies. 

This  last  extension  of  our  ruinous  liberality 
has  not,  in  the  present  war,  been  renewed.  The 
method  of  the  double  voyage,  therefore,  which 
was  always  the  most  prevalent,  is  now  the  only 
mode,  of  American  neutralization  in  the  colonial 
trade. 

It  may  be  thought,  perhaps,  that  this  allowed 
method  of  eluding  our  hostilities,  might  have 
contented  the  French  and  Spaniards,  and  their 
neutralizing  agents,  as  a  deliverance  from  all  the 
perils  of  capture,  sufficiently  cheap  and  safe,  to  sa- 
tisfy the  enemies  of  this  great  maritime  country, 
when  they  durst  not  show  a  pendant  on  the 
ocean.  To  neutrals,  trading  on  their  own  ac- 
count, this  qualified  admission  into  the  rich  com- 
merce of  both  the  Indies,  may  seem  to  have 
been  a  boon  advantageous  enough ;  when  con- 
sidered as  a  gratuitous  gain  derived  from  the 
misfortunes  of  other  nations.      But  moderation. 


47 

is  the  companion  of  justice,  and  belongs  not  to 
the  selfish  spirit  of  encroachment ;  nor  is  success- 
ful usurpation  ever  satisfied,  while  there  remains 
with  the  injured  party  one  unviolated,  or  unabdi- 
cated  right. 

America,  we  have  seen,  like  other  neutral 
powers,  was  permitted  to  (^arry  the  produce  of 
the  hostile  colonies  to  her  own  ports,  and  from 
thence  might  export  it  to  Europe  ;  nay,  even  to 
France  and  Spain.  She  was  also  at  liberty  to 
import  the  manufactures  of  those  countries,  and 
might  afterwards  export  the  same  goods  to  their 
colonies ;  but  the  word  directly,  in  the  royal 
instruction,  as  well  as  the  spirit  of  these  relaxa- 
tions, in  general,  plainly  required,  that  there 
should  be  a  bona  fide  shipment  from,  or  delivery 
in,  the  neutral  country — in  other  words,  that  the 
voyage  should  actually,  and  not  colourably,  ori- 
ginate, or  terminate,  in  such  a  way  as  the  subsist- 
ing rule  allowed. 

The  American  merchants,  however,  very  early 
began,  in  their  intercourse  with  the  Spaniards, 
to  elude  the  spirit  of  the  restriction,  by  call- 
ing at  their  own  ports,  merely  in  order  to  ob- 
tain new  clearances;  and  then  proceeding  for- 
ward to  Spain  with  produce  which  they  had  ship- 
ped in  her  colonies ;  or  to  the  latter,  with  supplies, 
which  were  taken  on  board  in  Spain. 

It  seems  scarcely  necessary  to  show,  that,  by 


•  48 

this  practice,  the  licence  accorded  by  the  Bri- 
tish government  was  grossly  abused.  What  was 
the  principle  of  the  relaxation  ? — an  indulgence 
expressly  to  the  commerce  of  neutral  countries. 
AVhat  was  the  object  of  the  restriction  ? — To  pre- 
vent, as  much  as  consisted  with  that  indulgence, 
the  intercourse  between  the  European  enemy  and 
his  colonies,  in  neutral  ships.  But  the  mere 
touching,  or  stopping,  of  a  ship  at  any  country, 
does  not  make  her  voyage  a  branch  of  the  trade 
of  that  country.  Our  East-India  trade,  is  not  the 
trade  of  St.  Helena.  Neither  was  it  any  restraint 
on  the  intercourse  between  the  enemy  and  his 
colonies,  such  as  could  gravely  be  ^  posed  to  be 
meant  by  the  restriction,  to  oblige  nim  merely  to 
drop  anchor,  at  some  neutral  port  in  his  way. 

According  to  some  recent  doctrines,  indeed, 
which  that  great  champion  of  neutral  rights,  the 
murderer  of  the  Due  D'Enghein,  inculcates,  trade 
in  a  neutral  vessel,  be  the  voyage  what  it  may,  is 
neutral  trade ;  but  America  does  not,  in  the  pre- 
sent case  at  least,  assert  that  preposterous  rule ;  for 
she  tacitly  professes  to  acquiesce  in  the  restriction 
in  question,  when,  in  point  of  form,  she  complies 
with  it ;  and  the  neutrality  of  the  trade,  in  the  sense 
of  tlie  royal  instruction,  is  plainly  a  local  idea : — it 
is  the  ccrmmerce,  not  of  the  ship,  but  of  the  coun- 
try, to  which  indulgence  was  meant  to.be  given. 
Tlic  only  question  therefore,  is,  whether  the  trade 


49 

between  France  or  Spain  and  their  colonies,  be- 
comes the  trade  of  America,  merely  because  the 
ships  which  conduct  it,  call  at  one  of  her  ports 

on  their  way. 

By  the  merchants  and  custom-house  officers 
of  the  United  States,  the  line  of  neutral  duty  in 
this  case  was  evidently  not  misconceived ;  for  the 
departures  from  it,  were  carefully  concealed,  by 
artful  and  fraudulent  contrivance.  When  a  ship 
arrived  at  one  of  their  ports,  to  neutralize  a  voy- 
age that  fell  within  the  restriction,  e.  g.  from  a 
Spanish  colony  to  Spain,  all  her  papers  were  im- 
mediately sent  on  shore,  or  destroyed.  Not  one 
document  was  left,  which  could  disclose  the  fact 
that  her  cargo  had  been  taken  in  at  a  colonial 
port :  and  new  bills  of  lading,  invoices,  clearances, 
and  passports,  were  put  on  board,  all  importing 
that  it  had  been  shipped  in  America.  Nor  were 
official  certificates,  or  oaths  wanting,  to  support 
the  fallacious  pretence.  The  fraudulent  precau- 
tion of  the  agents  often  went  so  far,  as  to  dis- 
charge all  the  officers  and  crew,  and  sometimes 
even  the  master,  and  to  ship  an  entire  new  com- 
pany in  their  stead,  who,  being  ignorant  of  the  for- 
mer branch  of  the  voyage,  could,  in  case  of  exa- 
mination or  capture,  support  the  new  papers  by 
their  declarations  and  oaths,  as  far  as  their  know- 
ledge extended,  with  a  safe  conscience.  Thus, 
the  ship  and  cargo  were  sent  to  sea  again,  per- 
il 


60 

haps  within  eight-and-forty  hours  from  the  time 
of  her  arrival,  in  a  condition  to  defy  the  scrutiny 
of  any  British  cruizer,  by  which  she  should  be 
stopped  and  examined  in  the  course  of  her  pas- 
sage to  Europe. 

By  stratagems  like  these,  the  commerce  be- 
tween our  enemies  and  their  colonies  was  carried 
on  even  more  securely,  than  if  neutrals  had  been 
permitted  to  conduct  it  in  the  most  open  manner, 
in  a  direct  and  single  voyage. 

In  that  case,  both  the  terms  of  the  voyage  being 
hostile,  and  the  papers  put  on  board  at  the  port  of 
shipment,  being  derived  from  an  enemy,  or  from 
agents  in  the  hostile  country,  the  suspicion  of  a 
visiting  officer   would  be  broad  awake  :    and    a 
strict  examination,  even  though  the  vessel  should 
be  brought  into  port  for  the  purpose,  would,  ge- 
nerally speaking,  be  justifiable  and  safe.     The  al- 
leged right  of  property  in  a  neutral  claimant  of 
the  cargo,  might  also  in  such  a  case  be  examined 
up  to  its  acquisition  in  the  hostile  country,  by  the 
light  of  the  evidence  found  on  board.     Whereas, 
in  the  latter  branch  of  the  voyage  that  has  been 
described,  all  ordinary  means   of  detecting  the 
property  of  an  enemy  under  its  neutral  garb,  are 
as  elTectually  withdrawn,  as  if  the  transaction  had 
really  begun  in  a  neutral  port. 

The  illegal  plan  of  the  voyage    itself  is    ve- 
ry easily  concealed  during  its  anterior  branch. 


51 

since  the  papers  then  point  only  to  the  neutral 
country,  as  the  ultimate  place  of  destination  ;  and 
there  is  not  the  least  necessity  for  hazarding  a 
disclosure  to  the  master,  much  less  to  the  crew, 
that  the  real  intention  is  different. 

With  such  facilities,  it  is  not  strange  that  this 
fraudulent  practice  should  have  prevailed  to  a 
great  extent,  before  it  met  the  attention  of  our 
prize  tribunals.  In  fact,  though  often  since  inci- 
dentally discovered  in  the  course  of  legal  pro- 
ceedings, it  can  scarcely  ever  be  detected  in  the 
first  instance  by  a  captor  at  sea,  so  as  to  be  a 
ground  of  seizure,  unless  by  an  accident  such  as 
once  brought  it  to  judicial  notice. 

A  ship,  with  a  valuable  cargo  of  sugars  from 
the  Havannah,  on  her  passage  to  Charleston, 
the  port  to  which  she  belonged,  was  stopped 
and  examined  by  a  British  privateer.  As  the  pa- 
pers were  perfectly  clear,  and  concurred  with  the 
master's  declaration,  in  showing  that  the  cargo 
was  going  on  account  of  the  American  owners  to 
Charleston,  where  the  voyage  was  to  end,  the 
ship  was  immediately  released. 

After  a  stay  of  a  few  days  at  that  port,  she 
sailed  again  with  the  same  identical  cargo,  bound 
apparently  to  Hamburgh,  perhaps,  in  fact,  to 
Spain  ',  but  with  an  entire  new  set  of  papers  from 
the  owners  and  the  Custom-House,  all  importing 
that  the  cargo,  not  one  package  of  which  liad  been 


52 

in  fact  landed  since  she  left  the  Havannah,  had 
been  taken  on  board  at  Charleston.  The  fact  al- 
so was  solemnly  attested  on  oath. 

Soon  after  the  commencement  of  this  second 
part  of  her  voyage,  she  was  again  brought  to  by  a 
British  cruizer  ;  and  her  papers,  aided  by  the 
master *s  asseverations,  would  doubtless  have  in- 
duced a  second  dismissal,  but  for  one  awkward 
coincidence.  It  happened  that  the  visiting  cruiz- 
er, was  the  very  same  privateer  by  which  she  had 
been  boarded  on  her  voyage  from  the  Havannah ; 
and  whose  commander  was  able  to  recognize  and 
identify  both  her  and  her  cargo,  as  those  he  had 
lately  examined. 

This  case  came  by  appeal  before  the  lords 
commissioners  ;  who  finding  the  above  facts  clear 
and  undi^^puted,  thougiit  them  a  sufficient  ground 
for  condemning  the  property.  They  held  that  the 
touching  at  a  neutral  port,  merely  for  the  purpose 
of  colourably  commencing  a  new  voyage,  and 
thereby  eluding  the  restrictive  rule  of  law,  in  a 
branch  of  it  not  relaxed  by  the  royal  instructions, 
could  not  legalize  the  transaction;  but  that  it 
ought  nevertheless  to  be  considered  as  a  direct  and 
continuous  voyage  from  the  hostile  colony  to 
Europe,  and  consequently  illegal  *. 


*  Case  of  the   Mercury,   Roberts,  at  the    Cockpit,  July  2S,  1800, 
and  Jan.  13,  1802. 


53 

In  this  case,  the  detection  being  full  and  con- 
clusive, it  would  have  been  in  vain  for  the  claimants 
to  contend  that  there  had  been  an  actual  impor- 
tation into  America,  with  an  intention  to  land  and 
sell  the  cargo.  But  other  cases  occurred,  wherein 
the  evidence  taken  in  the  prize  court  brought  to 
light  less  circumstantially  the  fact,  that  the 
captured  cargoes,  though  ostensibly  shipped  in 
America,  had  been  previously  brought  in  the  same 
bottoms,  and  on  account  of  the  same  persons,  from 
Spain,  or  a  Spanish  colony  -,  and  in  these  cases  an 
explanation  was  offered  by  the  American  claim- 
ants, to  which  the  court  of  admiralty,  and  the  lords 
commissioners,  in  their  great  indulgence, thought 
proper  to  listen.  It  was  alleged,  that  the  impor- 
tations into  America  were  genuine,  and  were  made 
with  a  view  to  the  sale  ofthe  cargoes  in  that  country; 
but  that  in  consequence  of  a  fall  of  price  in  the 
markets,  the  importers  found  themselves  unable 
to  sell  without  loss ;  and  therefore  w^ere  obliged, 
contrary  to  their  original  design,  to  re-export  the 
cargoes,  and  send  them  to  Europe  or  the  West- 
Indies,  according  to  the  now  acknowledged  desti- 
nations. 

An  excuse  like  this,  had  it  been  offered  even 
in  the  first  instance,  with  a  gratuitous  disclosure 
ofthe  anterior  branch  of  tlje  transaction,  might 
reasonably  have  been  received  with  diffidence; 
especially  when  it  was  considered,  that  the  goods 


54 

composing  these  cargoes,  were  of  a  kind  not  gene- 
rally consumed  in  America,  and  such  as  could^ 
be  in  common  demand  there  only  for  the  purpose 
of  re-exportation  to  that  very  country,  to  which 
they  were  now  actually  proceeding.  Such  is  noto- 
riously the  case,  in  respect  of  the  white  sugars  of 
the  Havannah,  and  also  in  respect  of  the  planta- 
tion stores,  and  supplies  usually  sent  to  the  foreign 
West-Indies  from  Europe,  of  which  these  cargoes 
were  chiefly  composed ;  and  it  was  evidently  very 
unnatural,  that  a  merchant,  found  in  actual  con- 
nexion both  with  the  hostile  colonies,  and  with 
the  hostile  or  prohibited  port  in  Europe,  as  an 
importer  from  the  one,  and  an  exporter  to  the 
other,  should  have  been  driven  unintentionally, 
and  by  necessity  alone,  into  that  very  convenient 
and  profitable  course  of  trade,  which  he  was  found 
actually  pursuing. 

But  when  the  studied  suppression  of  the  former 
branch  of  the  transaction,  is  taken  into  the  ac- 
count ;  and  when  it  is  considered  that  this  excuse 
was  commonly  brought  forward  in  the  last  in- 
stance, to  avert  the  penal  consequences  of  a  dis- 
covery accidentally  made  in  the  prize  court ;  the 
pretence  must  be  admitted  to  have  been  in  the 
highest  degree  suspicious,  if  not  absolutely  un- 
worthy of  credit. 

Yet  such  has  been  the  extreme  lenity  of  those 
tribunals,  of  whose  severity  the  enemy  and  hig 


55 

neutralizing  agents  have  the  effrontery  to  com- 
plain, that  these  excuses  were  not  rejected  as  in- 
credible ;  and  the  claimants  were  indulged,  when 
necessary,  with  time  to  establish  them  in  point  of 
fact,  by  further  proofs  from  America. 

When  an  actual  attempt  to  sell  the  cargo  in 
the  neutral  port,  has  been  in  such  cases  alleged, 
and  in  any  degree  verified,  that  fact  has  been  held 
sufficient  to  support  the  general  excuse.  A  cargo 
of  Spanish  manufactures  shipped  at  Bilboa,  and 
taken  when  proceeding  from  America  to  the  Ha- 
vannah,  on  account  of  the  same  shippers,  was  re- 
stored on  evidence  of  an  attempt  to  sell,  having 
been  made  by  the  claimant,  on  the  ship's  arrival 
at  Philadelphia;  though  the  cargo  chiefly  consist- 
ed of  nails  for  sugar  boxes,  an  article  consumed 
only  in  the  Spanish  West-Indies  *. 

Certain  other  general  criteria  of  a  bojiafide  im- 
portation into  the  neutral  country,  have  been  in 
these  cases  admitted  and  required. 

Those  who  are  conversant  with  the  business  of 
the  prize  court,  well  know,  that  affidavits  in  fur- 
ther proof,  are  never  wanting  to  support  every 
case  that  a  claimant  may  be  allowed  to  set  up. 
It  may  be  even  asserted  with  truth,  that  property 


*  Case  of  the  Eagle, Weeks,  at  the  Cockpit,  May  15th,  1S02. 


56 

taken  under  neutral  colours  is  scarcely  ever  con- 
demned, but  by  a  sentence  which  in  effect  im- 
peaches the  neutral  merchants  and  their  agents,  of 
wilful  and  elaborate  perjury.  Nor  is  the  shocking 
fact  surprising,  if  it  be  considered,  that  every 
man  who  undertakes,  for  a  commission,  to  cover 
the  enemy's  property  under  neutral  papers,  en- 
gages beforehand  to  furnish  all  the  perjury  that 
may  be  necessary  to  support  his  claim  in  case  of 
capture,  as  an  essential  part  of  the  contract. 
Courts  of  prize,  therefore,  wisely  lay  much  stress 
on  such  probable  presumptions  as  may  arise  from 
undisputed  facts ;  especially  such  facts  as  are  col- 
lateral to  the  main  transaction,  of  a  public  na- 
ture, and  not  likely  to  have  been  contrived  for 
the  purpose  of  imposition. 

Accordingly,  in  the  class  of  cases  we  are  con- 
sidering, it  was  held  of  great  importance  to  show, 
that  the  cargo  had  been  landed  in  the  neutral 
port,  that  the  duties  on  importation  had  been  paid, 
and  that  the  first  insurance  had  been  made  for  a 
voyage  to  terminate  in  the  neutral  country.  In 
a  case  of  this  description,  which  came  before  Sir 
William  Scott  early  in  1800,  he  laid  great  stress 
on  these  circumstances,  especially  the  two  former; 
regarding  them  as  the  clearest  general  indica- 
tions of  the  original  intention  on  which  he  could 
found  his  judgment ;  and  accordingly,  on  proof 
being  exhibited  that  the  goods  in  question  had 


57 

been  landed,  and  the  duties  for  them  paid  in 
America  he  restored  th^  property  *.  The  lords 
commissioners,  in  subsequent  cases  before  them, 
were  of  the  same  opinion ;  and  therefore  it  became 
tacitly  a  general  rule,  that  when  the  excuse  in 
question  was  set  up  by  a  claimant,  he  must  sup- 
port it  by  showing  those  ordinary  features  of  a 
sincere  and  genuine  importation. 

But,  unfortunately,  such  practical  rules  as  are 
devised  for  the  better  discovery  of  truth,  and  sup- 
pression of  fraud  in  the  prize  court,  are  liable  to 
lose  their  effect  as  soon  as  they  become  known 
in  neutral  countries ;  for  persons  meditating  future 
imposition,  will  adapt  their  conduct  prospectively 
to  the  rule  of  practice,  so  as  to  prepare  the  means 
of  furnishing,  in  case  of  necessity,  the  proofs  which 
they  know  will  be  required. 

The  landing  the  cargo  in  America,  and  re-ship- 
ping it  in  the  same  bottom,  were  no  very  costly 
precautions  for  better  securing  the  merchant 
against  the  peril  of  capture  and  detection  in  the 
latter  branch  of  these  important  voyages.  In  fact, 
it  is  commonly  a  necessary  proceeding,  in  or- 
der to  'clear,  and  refit,  ox  repair  the  yessel ;  for 
in  the  West-India  trade,  ships  must  usually  go  into  ^ 
dock  to  be  careened,  and  receive  all  necessary  re- 

*  Case  of  the  Polly, Laskf,   at  the  Adnuralty,   Feb.  5tb,  180O. 

2  Robinson's  Report*,  36. 

I 


5S 

pairs,  once  in  every  voyage.  American  owners, 
therefore,  whose  ships  ar^fconstantly  employed  in 
this  circuitous  commerce  between  the  West-Indies 
'  and  Europe,  must,  to  maintain  them  in  proper  con- 
dition, either  submit  to  the  great  expense  and  dis- 
advantage of  careening  and  repairing  in  a  foreign 
and  belligerent  country,  or  embrace  the  opportu- 
nity of  doing  so  on  the  arrival  at  their  own  ports, 
either  on  the  outward  voyage  from  Europe,  or 
the  return.  It  is,  probably,  so  much  cheaper  to 
dock  their  ships  in  America,  than  in  Spain  or  the 
West-Indies,  as  to  compensate  them  for  the  ex- 
pense of  landing  and  re-shipping  the  cargo. 

The  laying  a  foundation  for  the  necessary  evi- 
dence, in  regard  to  insurance,  was  a  still  easier 
work :  for  though  at  first  they  sometimes  insured 
the  whole  intended  voyage,  with  liberty  to  touch 
in  America,  it  was  afterwards  found,  in  conse- 
quence perhaps  of  the  captures  and  discoveries 
we  have  noticed,  to  be  much  safer  for  the  under- 
writers, and  consequently  cheaper  in  point  of 
premium  to  the  owners,  to  insure  separately  the 
two  branches  of  the  voyage  ;  in  which  case,  Ame- 
rica necessarily  appeared  by  the  policies  on  the 
lirst  brancli,  to  be  the  place  of  ultimate  destina- 
tion j  and  on  the  last,  to  be  that  of  original  shipment. 

The  payment  of  duties,  then,  was  the  only  re- 
maining badge  of  the  simulated  intention  for 
which  the  merchants  had  to  provide ;  and  here 


59 

they  found  facilities  from  the  port  officers  and 
government  of  the  United  States,  such  as  obviated 
every  inconvenience.  On  the  arrival  of  a  cargo 
destined  for  re-exportation  in  the  course  of  this 
indirect  commerce,  they  were  allowed  to  land  the 
goods,  and  even  to  put  them  in  private  ware- 
houses, without  paying  any  part  of  the  duties ; 
and  without  any  further  trouble,  than  that  of 
giving  a  bond,  with  condition  that  if  the  goods 
should  not  be  re-exported,  the  duties  should  be 
paid.^  On  their  re-shipment  and  exportation,  of- 
ficial  clearances  were  given,  in  w^hich  no  mention 
was  made  that  the  cargo  consisted  of  bonded  or 
debentured  goods,  which  had  previously  been  en- 
tered for  re-exportation ;  but  the  same  general 
forms  were  used,  as  on  an  original  shipment  of 
goods  which  had  actually  paid  duties  in  America. 
Nor  was  this  all ;  for,  in  the  event  of  capture  and 
further  inquiry  respecting  the  impqrtation  into 
America,  the  collectors  and  other  officers  were  ac- 
commodating enough  solemnly  to  certify,  that  the 
duties  had  been  actually  paid  or  secured  to  the 
United  States ;  withholding  the  fact,  that  the 
bonds  had  been  afterwards  discharged  on  the  pro** 
duction  of  debentures,  or  other  official  instruments, 
certifying  the  re-exportation  of  the  goods. 

By  these  means,  the  American  merchant,  whe- 
ther trading  on  his  own  account,  or  as  an  agent 
for  the  enemy,  was  enabled  securely  to  carry  on 


60 

a  commerce,  such  as  the  royal  instructions  wefe 
far  from  meaning  to  tolerate.  If  by  any  accident 
or  inadvertency,  the  preceding  branch  of  the 
voyage  should  be  discovered,  he  had  an  excuse  at 
hand,  such  as  would  be  accepted  by  the  British 
prize  court ;  and  which  he  was  prepared  to  sup- 
port by  such  evidence,  as  he  knew  beforehand 
v>^ould  suffice. 

But  rules  of  practice,  which  have  been  devised 
by  any  court,  for  the  guidance  and  assistance  of 
its  own  judgment  on  questions  of  fact,  can  evi- 
dently not  be  binding  on  the  court  itself,  wh^fi 
discovered  to  be  no  longer  conducive  to  that 
end ;  much  less,  when  they  are  found  to  be 
made  subservient  to  the  purposes  of  imposition 
and  fraud.  The  lords  commissioners  of  appeal, 
therefore,  finding  it  manifest  in  a  recent  case, 
that  the  alleged  importation  into  Salem,  of  a 
cargo  which  had  been  shipped  in  Spain,  and 
afterwards  re-shipped  for  the  Havannah  in  the 
same  bottom,  was  wholly  of  a  colourable  kind; 
and  that,  notwithstanding  the  usual  clearances 
and  certificates,  the  duties  had  not  been  final- 
ly paid  to  the  American  custom-house  ;  re- 
jected the  claim,  and  condemned  the  ship  and 
cargo  *. 

*  Case  of  the  Essex,  —  Orme,  at  the  Cockpit,  May  22,  1805. 
There    were    in    this   case    great   doubts  as  to  the  neutrality  of  the 
property  ;    and    their   lordships  did  not  express  on  what  ground  they 


rr  LacM^  1^M^/k  ^^^ 


61 

In  this  case,  as  in  others  of  the  same  descrip- 
tion,  there  was  found  on  board  an  affidavit  of  the 
proprietor,  stating,  that  the  goods  had  been 
"  laden  on  board  from  stores  and  wharves  at  Sa- 
"  lem,  and  that  the  duties  thereon  were  secured  to 
"  the  United  States,  or  paid,  according  to  law.'* 4^ 
Yet  it  afterwards  appeared,  on  his  own  admission, 
that  he  had  only  given  the  usual  bond  on  the  en- 
try of  tlie  cargo  from  Barcelona ;  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  js  a  security  to  re-export,  rather  than 
to  pay  duties  on  the  cargo,  and  whi^n  had  been 
*  accordingly  cancelled  on  the  re-exportation. 

Two  other  American  cases  were  soon  after 
heard  at  the  Admiralty,  in  whic;h,  under  similar 
circumstances,  the  learned  judge  of  that  court 
made  similar  decrees ;  holding,  that  this  mode  of 
landing,  and  paying  or  securing  duties  on,  the 
cargoes  in  America,  was  not  sufficient  to  consti- 
tute an  importation  into  the  neutral  country,  so 
as  to  break  the  continuity  of  the  voyage  from  the 
French  colonies  to  Europe,  and  thereby  legalize 
the  transaction  under  the  indulgent  instruction 
now  in  force :  the  intention  of  the  parties  ap- 
parently being  to  elude  the  legal  restriction  *. 

decided  j    but  their  sentence  was  understood  at  the  bar  to    have  been 
founded  on  the  illegality  of  the  trade. 

*  Cases  of  the  Enoch  and  the  Rowena,  at  the  Admiralty,   July  23, 
1805. 

0(^  Avi'^i'ki^j  /mx'iAy  ^ifu  ^ffm/i^  7^  z;^  driuM,  _ 


62 

It  seems  impossible  for  any  man  seriously  to 
disapprove  of  these  decisions,  without  denying 
the  validity  of  the  rule  of  law,  which  it  is  the 
purpose  of  these  colourable  importations  into 
America  to  evade — a  rule  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
is  acquiesced  in  by  the  neutral  powers  themselves. 

The  payment  or  non-payment  of  duties  in  a 
neutral  country  cannot,  of  itself,  vary  our  belli 
gerent  rights ;  nor  can  the  mere  landing  and  re- 
shipment  of  goods,  without  a  change  of  property 
or  intention,  give  to  the  owner  any  right  of 
carriage  which  he  did  not  previously  possess. — 
Those  circumstances  consequently  were  never  re- 
garded in  the  prize  court  as  of  any  intrinsic  or 
substantive  importance  ;  they  were  merely  con- 
sidered as  evidence  of  the  alleged  primary  inten- 
tion of  the  neutral  importer ;  and  that  intention 
was  inquired  into  only  for  his  benefit,  in  order  to 
absolve  him  from  strong  general  presumptions 
against  the  fairness  and  legality  of  the  voyage.  It 
would  therefore  have  been  inconsistent  and  prepos- 
terous, to  give  to  any  or  all  of  those  circumstances 
any  justificatory  efi^ct,  when  they  were  found  not 
at  all  to  support  the  favourable  conclusions  which 
had  been  originally  drawn  from  them ;  but  ra- 
ther, on  the  contrary,  to  confirm  the  general 
adverse  presumptions,  which  they  had  been  once 
supposed  to  repel.  When  it  was  found  that  the 
duties   had  been    secured,    not  in  a  way   natu- 

Ci'YuJi/yiKn^i  iuxA^  oIama4/i-j  ih)^^^  /jM/Um  0i}^i7CC^tui^  ivi^vtZhi 


65 

rally  applicable  to  goods  meant  to  be  sold  and 
consumed  in  America,  but  in  a  mode  devised  for 
the  special  convenience  of  importers  intending-ja. 
re-ex portationythe  suspicion  that  the  claimant 
originally  meant  to  continue  the  voyage,  as  he 
eventually  did,  was  obviously  strengthened,  if  not 
absolutely  confirmed. 

If  the  justice  or  consistency  of  our  prize  tri- 
bunals in  these  cases,  needed  a  further  defence,  it 
might  be  found  in  the  great  frequency,  I  might 
say  universality,  of  the  excuse  which  they  had  too 
indulgently  allowed.  The  credit  of  the  main 
pretext  itself,  was  worn  out  by  frequency  of  use. 

A  man  on  whose  person  a  stolen  watch  should 
be  found,  might  allege  that  he  had  picked  it  up 
in  the  street,  and  might  fmd  probable  evidence  to 
satisfy  a  magistrate  that  his  defence  was  well- 
founded:  but  what  if  he  were  found  possessed  of 
ten  or  twenty  watches,  stolen  at  different  times, 
from  different  persons,  and  should  ofler  in  respect 
of  them  all,  the  same  identical  explanation  ?  The 
same  evidence  would  now  be  reasonably  regarded 
as  insufiicient  to  deliver  him  from  the  highly  ag- 
gravated suspicion. 

Or,  to  borrow  an  illustration  from  a  case  more 
nearly  parallel,  and  one  which  is  practically  noto- 
rious : — A  neutral  vessel  is  taken  in  the  attempt 
to  enter  a  blockaded  port,  which  lies  wide  of  her 
course  to  that  place  to  which  she  is  ostensibly  des- 


MyUL-J-^ 


64 

tined :  the  excuse  offered  to  the  captor  is,  that  a 
storm  had  driven  her  out  of  her  proper  course;  and 
that,  being  in  distress,  she  was  going  into  the  block- 
aded port  of  necessity,  in  order  to  refit.  For 
once,  or  twice,  perhaps,  such  excuses  might  gain 
credit,  on  the  oaths  of  the  master  and  his  people ; 
but  a  multitude  of  vessels  are  taken  in  the  same 
attempt ;  and  all  their  masters  give  precisely  the 
same  excuse.  They  have  all  met  with  a  storm  ; 
and  are  all  obliged  by  distress,  to  put  into  the  pro- 
hibited port.  Surely  the  commanders  of  the  block- 
ading squadron,  and  the  judges  of  the  prize  courts, 
may  now  justifiably  shut  their  ears  to  this  stale 
pretext ;  unless  it  comes  supported  by  more  than 
ordinary  evidence. 

So  in  the  case  before  us,  when  it  has  been 
found,  during  several  years,  that  all  American 
merchants  detected  in  carrying  from  their  own 
country  to  Europe,  produce  which  they  had  im- 
ported into  the  former  in  the  same  bottoms,  from 
the  colonies  of  our  enemies,  have  exactly  the 
same  exculpatory  facts  to  allege ;  the  defence,  on 
this  ground  alone,  might  justly  forfeit  the  cre- 
dit which  it  in  the  first  instance  received.  It 
would  be  strange  indeed,  if  so  many  men  had 
all  been  accidentally,  and  reluctantly,  driven  to 
cpnsult  their  own  interest  to  the  utmost  possible 
advantage,  through  a  disappointment  in  their  more 
abstinent  views  ;  and  compelled  to  go  eventually 


to  the  best  markets,  instead  of  selling,  as  they  de- 
signed, at  the  worst. 

Too  much  time  may  perhaps  appear  to  have 
been  spent  on  the  history  of  these  circuitous  voy- 
ages, which,  though  an  extensive,  form  but  a  sin- 
gle branch,  of  the  abuses  I  wish  to  expose. 

It  was  however  not  unimportant  to  show  in  it, 
the  true  subject  of  those  violent  clamours  with 
which  the  public  ear  has  been  lately  assailed.  The 
recent  invectives  of  the  Moniteur,  and  the  com- 
plaints of  the  American  merchants,  which  have 
been  echoed  by  oar  own  newspapers,  and  falsely 
alleged  to  have  produced  concessions  from  his  Ma- 
jesty's government,  have  all  had  no  sounder  foun- 
dation, than  the  late  conduct  of  our  prize  courts 
as  here  explained,  in  regard  to  this  indirect  trade. 
The  sole  offence  is,  that  those  tribunals,  finding 
themselves  to  have  been  deceived  for  years  past  by 
fallacious  evidence,  have  resolved  to  be  cheated  in 
the  same  way  no  longer.  It  is  on  this  account 
only,  and  the  consequent  capture  of  some  Ameri- 
can West-Indiamen  supposed  to  be  practising  the 
old  fraud,  that  we  are  accused  of  insulting  the  neu- 
tral powers,  of  innovating  on  the  acknowledged 
law  of  nations,  and  of  treating  as  contraband  of 
war,  the  produce  of  the  West-India  Islands. 

Thougli  these  collusive  voyages,  are  the  most 
general  abuse    of  the  indulgence   given   by  the 

K 


66 

royal  instructions,  and  are  a  mode  of  intercourse 
with  the  hostile  colonies,  peculiarly  productive  of 
a  fraudulent  carriage  for  the  enemy  on  his  own 
account  under  neutral  disguise,  the  suppression  of 
the  practice  would  by  no  means  remedy  the  enor- 
mous evils  which  result  from  that  intercourse  in 
general. 

An  adherence  by  our  prize  tribunals  to  their 
recent  precedents,  will  no  doubt  put  a  stop  to  the 
re-exportation  from  neutral  ports,  of  the  same  co- 
lonial produce,  in  the  same  identical  bottom,  and 
on  account  of  the  same  real  or  ostensible  owners 
by  whom  it  was  imported ;  but  a  change  of  pro- 
perty in  the  neutral  country  will  be  a  false  pretence 
easily  made,  and  not  easily  detected  :  nor  will  the 
substitution  of  a  different  vessel,  add  very  much  to 
the  trouble  or  expense  of  the  transaction.  Two 
ships  arriving  about  the  same  time,  in  the  same 
harbour,  may  commodiously  exchange  their  car- 
goes, and  proceed  safely  with  them  to  the  same 
places  of  ulterior  destination.  In  short,  new  me- 
thods of  carrying  the  produce  of  the  hostile  colo- 
nies to  any  part  of  Europe,  will  not  be  wanting,  nor 
will  there  be  any  dearth  of  means  for  amply  sup- 
plying those  colonies  with  the  manufactures  of 
their  parent  states,  so  long  as  both  are  permitted 
not  only  to  be  brought  to,  but  exported  from,  a 
neutral  country,  according  to  the  existing  in- 
struction. 


67 

Having  shown  how  much  has  been  indulgently 
conceded  to  the  neutral  flag,  in  respect  of  the  co- 
lonial trade  of  our  enemies,  and  how  much  more 
it  has  licentiously  and  fraudulently  assumed,  I 
proceed  to  notice,  as  briefly  as  possible,  the  high- 
ly alarming  effects. 

The  mischief,  to  correct  which  the  rule  of  the 
war  1756  was  first  applied,  was  of  a  partial  and 
limited  kind.  In  that  war,  neutral  ships,  though 
admitted  into  some  of  the  colonial  ports  of 
France,  were  by  no  means  the  sole  carrier:^  of 
their  produce  or  supplies.  The  enemy  continued 
to  employ  his  own  commercial  flag,  as  far  as  his 
inadequate  power  of  protecting  it  extended  ;  and 
neutrals  were  rather  partners  in,  than  assignees  of, 
the  national  monopoly. 

In  the  American  war,  their  participation  in  this 
commerce,  was  still  more  limited. 

But  during  the  last  war,  and  in  the  present,  a 
far  more  comprehensive  innovation  has  taken 
place.  France  and  Holland  have  totally  ceased 
to  trade  under  their  own  flags,  to  or  from  the  ports 
of  any  of  their  colonies;  and  have  apparently  as- 
signed the  whole  of  these  branches  of  their  com- 
merce, to  the  merchants  of  neutral  slates. 

Spain,  though  with  more  hesitation,  and  by 
gradual  advances,  has  nearly  made  as  entire  a 
transfer  of  all  her  trade  with  her  colonies  on  the 
Atlantic  ;  and  if  any  reservation  now  remains,  it 


6s 

is  in  respect  of  some  part  only  of  the  specie  and 
bullion,  for  conveying  which  a  ship  of  war  or  two 
may  be  occasionally  risked.  Even  these  most  va- 
luable exports  have  been  largely  intrusted  to  the 
neutral  flag,  at  Vera-Cruz,  Carthagena,  La  Plata, 
and  other  ports ;  while  the  still  more  important 
commerce  of  the  Havannah,  and  Cuba  in  general, 
has  known  no  other  protection  *. 

Of  the  French  colonies  in  the  Antilles,  of  Cay- 
enne, and  Dutch  Guiana,  while  that  country  was 
hosrtle  to  us,  of  the  Isles  of  France  and  Bourbon, 
of  Batavia,  Manilla,  and  of  all  other  Asiatic  settle- 
ments which  have  remained  under  a  flag  hostile 
to  this  country,  it  may  be  truly  affirmed  that  neu- 
trals have  been  their  only  carriers.  The  mercan- 
tile colours  of  their  respective  countries,  and  of 
their  confederates,  have  been  absolute  strangers 
in  their  ports.  Even  the  gum  trade  of  Senegal, 
has  been  made  over  to  neutrals,  and  its  garrison 
supplied  by  them  in  return  f . 

But  why  should  I  enumerate  the  particulars  of 
this  unprecedented  case,  when  it  may  be  truly  af- 
firmed in  few  words,  that  vot  a  single  merchant 
ship  under  a  flag  inimical  to  Great-Britainy  now 
crosses  the  equator,  or  trax^erses  the  Atlantic 
Ocean. 

*  Cases  of  the   Flora,    Arnold,    Gladiator,  Emeiia,  Vera  Cniz,  &o. 
&c.  at  the  Cockpit, 
f  Case  of  the  Juliana,  Carsten,  at  the  Coclvpit,  1805. 


69 

Though  to  the  generality  of  my  readers  this 
proposition  may  seem  extraordinary,  and  perhaps 
too  strange  to  be  believed,  yet  it  forms  only  part 
of  a  still  more  comprehensive  and  singular  truth — 
With  the  exception  only  of  a  very  small  portion  of 
the  coasting  trade  of  our  enemies,  not  a  viercantile 
sail  of  any  description,  nozv  enters,  or  clears  from 
their  ports  in  any  part  of  the  globe,  but  under  neu- 
tral colours.  My  more  immediate  business  how- 
ever is  with  that  colonial  trade,  which  subsists  by 
our  indulgence  alone  ;  and  which  fraud  and  per- 
jury could  not  rescue  from  our  cruizers,  if  we  did 
not  forbear  to  exercise  our  clear  belligerent 
rights. 

The  commerce  Vfhich  thus  eludes  the  grasp  of 
our  naval  hostilities,  is  not  only  rich  and  various, 
but  of  a  truly  alarming  magnitude. 

The  mercantile  registers  at  Lloyd's  alone,  might 
sufficiently  manifest  its  great  extent ;  for  they  an- 
nounce every  week,  and  almost  every  day,  nu- 
merous arrivals  of  ships  from  America  in  the 
ports  of  Holland  and  France ;  and  it  is  noto- 
rious that  they  are  freighted,  for  the  most  part, 
with  sugar,  coifee,  and  the  other  rich  productions 
of  the  French  and  Spanish  West-Indies.  Indeed, 
when  the  harvests  of  Europe  have  not  failed  so 
much  as  to  occasion  a  large  demand  for  the  flour 
and  grain  of  North  America,  that  country  has 
scarcely  any  native  commodities,  tobacco  excepted, 


70 

that  can  be  the  subjects  of  such  a  commerce. 
These  vessels  return  chiefly  in  ballast ;  but  the 
portion  of  goods  they  obtain  as  return  cargoes, 
are  stores  and  manufactures,  destined  for  the  sup- 
ply of  the  hostile  colonies  though  previously  to 
pass  through  the  neutralizing  process  in  America. 

Enormous  is  the  amount  of  the  produce  of  the 
new  world,  thus  poured  into  the  south,  as  well  as 
the  north  of  Europe,  under  cover  of  the  neutral 
flag  !  At  Cadiz,  at  Barcelona,  and  the  other  Spa- 
nish ports,  whether  within  or  without  the  Mediter- 
ranean,  neutral  vessels  are  perpetually  importing, 
unless  when  interrupted  by  our  blockades,  the 
sugar  of  the  Havannah,  the  cocoa,  indigo,  and 
hides  of  South  America,  the  dollars  and  ingots  of 
Mexico  and  Peru  ;  and  returning  with  European 
manufactures,  chiefly  the  rivals  of  our  own.  East- 
India  goods,  are  also  imported  by  these  com- 
mercial auxiliaries  into  Spain ;  but  still  more  co- 
piously, into  Holland  and  France. 

Nor  is  it  only  in  their  own  ports,  that  our  ene- 
mies receive  the  exports  of  America,  and  of 
Asia,  in  contempt  of  our  maritime  eflbrts. — 
Hamburgh,  Altona,  Embden,  Gottenburgh,  Co- 
penhagmi,  Lisbon,  and  various  other  neutral  mar- 
kets, are  su])plied,  and  even  glutted  with  the  pro- 
duce of  the  West-Indies,  and  the  fabrics  of  the 
East,  brought  from  the  prosperous  colonies  of 
powers  hostile  to  this  country.     By  the  rivers  and 


71 

canals  of  Germany  and  Flanders,  they  are  floated 
into  the  warehouses  of  our  enemies,  or  circulated 
for  the  supply  of  their  customers  in  neutral 
countries.  They  supplant,  or  rival,  the  British 
planter  and  merchant,  throughout  the  continent 
of  Europe,  and  in  all  the  ports  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean. They  supplant  even  the  manufactures  of 
Manchester,  Birmingham,  and  Yorkshire  ;  for  the 
looms  and  forges  of  Germany  are  put  inaction  by 
the  colonial  produce  of  our  enemies,  and  are 
rivalling  us,  by  the  ample  supplies  they  send 
under  the  neutral  flag,  to  every  part  of  the  New 
World. 

Antwerp,  a  happy  station  for  the  exchange  of 
such  merchandize,  is  now  rapidly  thriving  under 
the  fostering  care  of  Bonaparte.  His  efforts  for 
the  restoration  of  its  commerce,  during  the  short 
interval  of  peace,  produced  no  very  splendid  ef- 
fects ;  but  the  neutral  flags  have  proved  far  more 
auspicious  to  the  rising  hopes  of  the  Scheldt,  than 
the  colours  of  Holland  and  France.  Its  port  has 
become  the  favourite  haunt  of  the  American  West- 
Indiamen,  and  profits  in  various  ways,  by  the 
sale  of  their  valuable  cargoes. 

If  we  look  beyond  the  Atlantic,  and  into  the 
Eastern  Ocean,  we  shall  find  the  sources  of  this 
commerce,  under  the  same  benign  auspices  of  the 
neutral  flag,  in  the  most  thriving  and  productive 


n 

state.  Bonaparte  has  recently  boasted,  that  Mar- 
tinique and  Guadaloupe  are  flourishing,  in  despite 
of  our  hostilities,  so  much  beyond  all  former  ex- 
perience, that,  since  1789,  they  have  actually 
doubled  their  population  *.  Had  he  said  the 
same  also  of  their  produce,  the  boast  perhaps 
would  have  been  far  less  unfounded  than  his  as- 
sertions usually  are  :  but  he  ought  to  have  added, 
that  since  the  first  notice  of  the  war,  the  French 
flag  has  not  brought  them  a  barrel  of  flour,  nor 
exported  a  hogshead  of  their  sugar.  Even  the 
ships  in  their  harbours,  that  had  been  laden  before 
the  new  hostilities  were  announced,  were  osten- 
sibly transferred  with  their  cargoes  to  neutral 
merchants,  and  sailed  under  neutral  colours. 

He  has  vaunted  also,  and  with  truth,  the  pros- 
perous state  of  Cayenne,  and  of  the  Isles  of  France 
and  Reunion,  once  called  Bourbon,  whose  prospe- 
rity is  owing  to  the  same  eflicacious  cause ;  aided 
by  their  becoming  warehouses  for  the  commerce 
of  Batavia. 

The  Spanish  government  is  not  so  ostentatious ; 
but  its  colonies  are  quietly  reaping  the  fruit  of 
that  fortunate  revolution,  the  suspension  of  their 
prohibitory  laws.  The  neutral  flag  gives  to  them 
not  only  protection,  but  advantages  before   un- 


*  Extract  from  the  Moniteur,  in  the  London  papers  «f  SeptemWjr 


2d. 


73 

known.  The  gigantic  infancy  of  agriculture  in 
Cuba,  far  from  being  checked,  is  greatly  aided 
in  its  portentous  growth  during  the  war,  by 
the  boundless  liberty  of  trade,  and  the  perfect 
security  of  carriage.  Even  slaves  from  Africa  are 
copiously  imported  there,  and  doubtless  also  into 
the  French  islands,  under  American  colours.—- 
America  indeed  has  prohibited  this  commerce, 
and  wishes  to  suppress  it  ^  but  our  enemies  can 
find  agents  as  little  scrupulous  of  violating  the  law 
of  their  own  country,  as  the  law  of  war ;  and  so 
wide  has  been  our  complaisance  to  depredators  on 
our  belligerent  rights,  that  even  the  slave-trading 
smuggler,  has  been  allowed  to  take  part  of  the 
spoil  *. 

To  the  Spanish  continental  colonies  also,  war  has 
changed  its  nature :  it  has  become  the  handmaid 
of  commerce,  and  the  parent  of  plenty.  Even 
the  distant  province  of  La  Plata,  has  been  so  glut- 
ted with  European  imports,  that  the  best  manu- 
factures have  sold  there  at  prices  less  than  the 
prime  cost  in  the  distant  country  from  which  they 
came  f . 

In  short,  all  the  hostile  colonies,  whether  Spanish, 


*  Cases  of  the  Oxholm,  Chance,  &c.  at  the  Cockpit, 
f  This  fact  has  appeared  in  the  evidence  brought  before  our  prize  tri- 
bunals, in  the  case  of  the  Gladiator,  Turner,  at  the  Cockpit,  in  1802,  ami 
in  other  causes. 


74 

French,  or  Batavian,  derive  from  the  enmity  of 
Great-Britain,  their  ancient  scourge  and  terror^ 
not  inconvenience  but  advantage  :  far  from  being 
impoverished  or  distressed  by  our  hostilities,  as 
formerly,  they  fmd  in  war  the  best  sources  of 
supply,  and  new  means  of  agricultural,  as  well  as 
commercial  prosperity. 

Happy  has  it  been  for  them,  and  their  parent 
states,  that  the  naval  superiority  of  their  enemy 
has  been  too  decisive  to  be  disputed.  . 

'*  Una  salus  victis,  nuUam  sperare  salutem." 

A  fortunate  despair,  has  alone  saved  them  from  all 
the  ruinous  consequences  of  an  ineffectual  strug- 
gle; and  given  them  advantages,  greater  than 
they  could  have  hoped  from  a  successful  maritime 
war.  They  may  say  to  each  other  as  Themis- 
tocles  to  his  children,  when  enriched,  during  his 
.exile,  by  the  Persian  monarch,  "  We  should  have 
"  been  ruined,  if  we  had  not  been  undone." 

It  is  singular  enough,  that  the  same  policy 
which  the  most  celebrated  French  writers  on  co- 
lonial affairs,  earnestly  recommended  to  Bona- 
parte soon  after  the  peace  of  Amiens,  as  the  best 
mean  of  promoting  his  favourite  object,  the  re- 
storation of  the  colonies  and  the  marine  -,  is  that 
which  the  war  has  benignantly  forced  upon  him  *. 

*  See  Barre  Saint  Venant,  Des  Colonies  Moderncs,  &c.  and  Menaoiirs 
SUV  IcH  Colonies,  par  V.  P.  Malouet. 


75 

He  was  as  hostile  as  they  wished,  to  the  liberty  of 
1?he  negroes  ;  but  all  th^ir  persuasion  did  not  suf- 
fice, to  induce  him  to  unfetter  for  a  while  the  co- 
lonial trade,  till  their  powerful  arguments  were 
seconded  by  a  new  maritime  war. 

Perhaps  it  may  be  supposed  that  we  are  at 
least  able  to  diminish  the  immediate  profit  of 
that  commerce,  which  we  generously  forbear  to 
obstruct ;  by  obliging  our  enemies  to  import  their 
colonial  produce  on  dearer  terms  than  formerly, 
into  the  European  markets. 

But  let  it  be  considered,  that  in  a  mercantile 
view,  relative,  not  positive,  expense  on  importa- 
tion, is  the  criterion  of  loss  or  gain.  If  the  price 
of  the  commodity  rises  in  proportion  to  the  ad- 
vance in  that  expense,  the  importer  loses  no- 
thing :  and  if  the  war  enhances  the  freight,  and 
other  charges  to  the  British,  more  than  to  the 
French  or  Spanish  merchant,  then  the  latter  may 
derive  a  positive  advantage  from  the  general  rise 
in  the  neutral  markets ;  while,  even  in  respect 
of  the  home  consumption,  there  will,  in  a  national 
view,  be  a  balance  of  belligerent  inconvenience 
against  us. 

Now  I  fear  the  fact  is,  however  strange  it  may 
seem,  that  the  advance  made  by  the  war  in  the 
expense  of  importation  into  this  country  from  the 
British  colonies,  in  respect  of  freight,  insurance, 
and  all   other    charges   taken   together,  is   fully 


76 

'equal,  if  not  superior,  to  that  to  which  our  ene- 
mies are  subjected  in  their  covert  and  circuitous 
trade. 

The  average  freight  from  the  British  Leeward 
Islands  for  sugars,  immediately  prior  to  the  pre- 
sent war,  was  four  shillings  and  sixpence  per  cwt. ; 
it  is  now  a,bout  eight  shillings ;  an  advance  of 
above  77  per  cent. 

The  peace  freights  from  the  French  and  Spa- 
nish colonies,  were  rather  higher,  on  an  average, 
than  from  our  own  ;  but  I  am  unable  to  state  in 
what  degree  they  are  advanced  by  the  war :  for, 
in  the  circuitous  mode  of  conveyance  under  neu- 
tral colours,  by  which  alone  the  produce  of  those 
Tcolonies  now  passes  to  Europe,  the  cargo  is  al- 
ways either  represented  as  belonging  to  the  owner 
of  the  ship,  and,  consequently  not  subject  to 
freight ;  or  as  laden  in  pursuance  of  a  charter 
party,  in  which  the  ship  is  ostensibly  freighted 
on  account  of  some  other  neutral  merchant,  for 
a  sum  in  gross.  If  a  genuine  bill  of  lading  or 
charter  party  is  discovered,  the  freight  is  mixed 
up  with  a  neutralizing  commission,  from  which  it 
cannot  be  distinguished. 

It  may,  however,  be  safely  affirmed,  that  the 
freight,  independently  of  the  commission,  is  con- 
siderably less  in  neutral,  than  in  British  ships,  on 
account  of  the  comparative  cheapness  of  the  terms 
on  which  the  former  are  purchased,  fitted  out,  and 
insured. 


77 

A  comparison  of  the  expense  of  insurance,  at 
these  different  periods,  to  our  enemies,  and  to  our 
own  merchants  respectively,  will  be  easier  and 
more  material ;  for  the  advance  in  the  rates  of  in- 
surance, when  made  against  war  risks,  is  a  most 
decisive  criterion  of  the  effect  of  a  maritime  w^ar. 
Here  I  have  facts  to  submit  to  the  reader,  which 
an  Englishman  cannot  state  w ithout  mortification, 
though  they  are  too  important  to  be  withheld. 

Immediately  prior  to  the  present  war,  the  pre- 
mium of  insurance  from  the  Leeward  Islands  to 
London,  in  a  British  ship,  was  two  per  cent.;  from 
Jamaica,  four  per  cent, :  at  present,  the  former  is 
eight,  to  return  four  if  the  ship  sails  with  convoy 
and  arrives  safe  ;  the  latter  ten,  to  return  five,  on 
the  same  condition.  Single  or  running  ships,  if 
unarmed,  can  scarcely  be  insured  at  all — if  armed, 
the  premium  varies  so  much  according  to  the  dif- 
ferent estimates  of  the  risk,  that  an  average  is 
not  easily  taken. 

At  the  former  period,  the  insurance  from  the 
French  Windward  Islands  to  Bourdeaux,  v^as  three 
per  cent. ;  from  St.  Domingo,  it  was  as  high  as  five, 
and  even  six  5  from  the  Havannah,  to  Spain,  four 
per  cent,  in  ships  of  the  respective  countries. 
The  existing  premium  on  these  direct  voyages 
cannot  be  stated  ;  since  they  are  never  openly  in- 
sured in  this  country  :  and  as  to  the  French  and 
Spanish  commercial  flags,  they  can  no  where  be 


78 

the  subjects  of  insurance  ;  having  vanished,  as  al- 
ready observed,  from  the  ocean :  but  at  Lloyd*s 
Coffee-House,  cargoes  brought  by  the  indirect 
voyage  from  those  now  hostile  colonies,  under 
neutral  colours,  is  insured  as  follows:  from  Havan- 
nah,  to  a  port  in  North  America,  3  per  cent.;  from 
North  America  to  Spain,  the  like  premium ;  to- 
gether, 6  per  cent.  * :  and  I  apprehend  there  is  lit- 
tle or  no  difference,  in  the  insurance  of  a  like  cir- 
cuitous voyage  from  the  French  Windward  Islands 
to  France.  Of  course,  when  the  voyage  is  really 
to  end  at  a  neutral,  instead  of  a  belligerent  port, 
in  Europe,  the  premium  on  the  latter  branch  of 
it,  is  rather  lessened  than  increased. 

The  compound  premium  of  insurance  with  con- 
voy, or  the  long  premium,  as  it  is  called,  is  not 
easily  reducible  to  its  proper  absolute  value,  for 
the  purpose  of  this  comparison;  since  the  risk 
©f  missing  convoy,  is  compounded  of  too  many 
chances,  and  combinations  of  chances,  of  various 
kinds,  physical,  commercial,  and  political,  to  be 
averaged  by  any  calculation  :  but  since  the  as- 
sured, in  the  case  of  loss,  as  well  as  in  that  of 


*  This  statement  has  reference  to  tin?  month  of  August  last,  when  the 
author  can  with  confidence  assert  that  these  were  the  current  premiums. 
He  understands  that  they  have  since  been  raised  in  consequence  of  the  re- 
cent decisions  in  the  Prize  Court,  which  have  been  already  noticed. 


79 

missing  convoy,  has  no  return  of  premium,  and 
the  return  is  always,  with  a  deduction  of  the  dif- 
ference between  pounds  and  guineas,  or  5  per 
cent,  which  is  retained  by  tlie  underwriter  or  bro- 
ker, the  premium  of  10  to  return  5,  may  be  esti- 
mated at  near  7  per  cent,  and  that  of  8  to  return 
4,  about  one  per  cent,  lower. 

The  consequence  of  these  premises  is,  that  the 
sugars  of  Cuba  are  insured  on  their  circuitous 
carriage  to  Spain,  at  a  less  expense  by  1  per  cent, 
than  the  sugars  of  Jamaica  to  England ;  and  those 
of  Martinique  and  Guadaloupe,  probably,  are  in- 
sured by  a  like  route  to  France,  on  terms  nearly 
equal  to  the  value  of  the  long  premium,  on  the 
direct  voyage  from  our  own  Leeward  Islands. 

But  this  is  a  conclusion  far  short  of  the  true  re- 
sult of  the  comparison ;  for  the  English  merchant 
or  planter,  has  also  to  pay  the  convoy  duty,  which 
is  evidently  an  additional  price  of  his  insurance 
from  the  war  risks  of  the  passage. 

The  convoy  duty  on  the  outward  voyage  to  the 
West-Indies,  is  no  less  than  four  per  cent.  -,  on  the 
homeward  voyage,  there  is  at  present  no  duty 
expressly  for  the  protection  of  convoy ;  but  a  new 
war  tax,  by  way  of  advance  on  the  amount  of 
old  duties,  has  been  imposed  on  sugars  imported, 
and  on  all  other  articles  of  West-India  produce ; 
part  of  which  advance  was  understood  to  be  a 
substitute  for  an  express  convoy  duty,   and  on 


80 

that  priciple,  it  is  not  wholly  drawn  back  on 
exportation. 

It  would  require  an  intricate  calculation,  as 
well  as  data  not  easy  to  obtain,  to  determine  what 
is  the  amount  of  this  charge  to  the  importer,  if 
reduced  into  a  specific  tax  for  the  protection  of 
convoy.  I  will,  therefore,  suppose  it  to  be  equal 
to  the  convoy  duty  on  the  outward  voyage :  or 
what  will  equally  serve  our  purpose,  let  the  in- 
surance on  an  outward  voyage  to  the  West-Indies 
be  supposed  to  be  the  same  in  point  of  premium, 
as  in  fact  it  nearly,  if  not  exactly  is,  with  the  in- 
surance homeward  :  then  the  whole  price  of  pro- 
tection to  the  English  West-India  shipper,  is  in 
the  Jamaica  trade,  higher  by  five  per  cent,  and  in 
the  I^ee ward-Island  trade,  by  four  per  cent,  than 
that  for  which  the  enemy  planter  or  merchant,  is 
insured  by  the  same  underwriters,  on  the  passage 
of  his  goods  to  or  from  the  immediate  neighbour- 
hood of  the  same  islands. 

But  if  we  separate  the  price  of  the  sea  risk> 
or  the  warranty  against  those  dangers  which  are 
common  both  to  peace  and  war,  from  the  war 
risk,  or  price  of  the  insurance  against  detention 
or  capture  by  an  enemy,  the  difference  will  be 
found  still  more  highly  adverse  to  that  shipper^ 
whose  sovereign  is  master  of  the  sea :  for  as  the 
premium  of  insurance  from  Martinique  to  France^ 
before  the  war,  was  3  per  cent,  while,  from  the 


81 

British  islands  in  the  same  part  of  the  West-In- 
dies, it  was  only  2 ;  the  advance  occasioned  by 
the  war  to  the  British  shipper,  convoy  duty  being 
reckoned  as  insurance,  is  no  less  than  8  per  cent. ; 
while  to  the  French  it  is  only  3  ;  and  if  we 
compare,  on  the  facts  before  given,  St.  Domingo 
with  Jamaica,  the  advance  to  the  former  will  be 
found  to  be  7,  to  the  latter,  only  about  1  per  cent. 

An  objection  here  may  naturally  arise,  to  which 
I  regret  that  a  shameful  but  conclusive  answer, 
can  be  given.  Since  the  ratesof  insurance  which 
I  have  mentioned  as  the  current  prices  of  protec- 
tion to  the  commerce  of  our  enemies,  when  carri- 
ed on  under  neutral  colours,  are  those  which  are 
paid  in  this  country,  to  British  underwriters,  and 
an  insurance  on  the  property  of  enemies  is  ille- 
gal, the  hostile  proprietor  may  be  thought,  not  to 
be  efi'ectually  secured  ;  for  should  his  secret  be, 
as  in  the  event  of  capture  it  sometimes  is,  disco- 
vered, the  insurance  will  be  void. 

Neutralizing  agents,  I  first  answer,  are  not  so 
incautious,  after  twelve  years  experience  in  their 
business,  and  in  the  practice  of  the  British  prize 
courts,  as  to  expose  their  constituents  very  fre- 
quently to  detection.  But  such  as  this  risk  is, 
the  masqueraders  have  found  an  effectual  mean 
of  avoiding  it.  Though  a  strange  and  opprobri- 
ous truth,  it  is  at  Lloyd's  Coffee-House  perfectly 


notorious,  that  our  underwriters  consent  to  stand 
between  the  naval  hostilities  of  their  country, 
and  the  commerce  of  her  disguised  enemies, 
by  giving  them  an  honorary  guarantee  against 
the   perils  of  capture  and  discovery. 

The  mode  of  the  transaction  is  this :  A  policy 
is  executed,  such  as  may  be  producible  in  any 
court  of  justice  3  for  the  property  is  insured  as 
neutral :  but  a  private  instrument  is  afterwards 
signed  by  the  underwriters,  by  which  they 
pledge  themselves,  that  they  will  not,  in  case  of 
loss,  dispute  the  neutrality  of  the  property,  or 
avail  themselves  of  any  sentence  pronouncing  it 
to  be  hostile.  Sometimes,  a  verbal  engagement 
to  this  effect,  is  thought  sufficient,  but  it  has  now 
become  a  very  general  practice  to  reduce  it  into 
writing  ;  and  in  the  one  mode,  or  the  other,  these 
releases  of  the  warranty  or  representation  of 
neutrality,  are  almost  univei'sal.  It  is  true,  such 
stipulations  are  not  binding  in  point  of  law  :  but 
every  one  knows,  that  at  Lloyd's  Coffee-House, 
as  well  as  at  the  Stock  Exchange  and  Newmar- 
ket, those,  contracts,  which  the  law  will  not  en- 
force, arc  on  tluit  very  account,  the  most  sacred 
in  the  estimate  of  the  parties,  and  the  most  invio- 
lably observed. 

The  enemy,  therefore,  has  as  full  security  for 
his  low  premium,  as  the  British  importer  for  his 
high  one  -,  nor  is  the  comparative  result  of  our  pre- 


83 

mises  shaken  by  the  expense  of  this  special  addi- 
tion to  the  policy  -,  for  in  the  rates  of  insurance 
which  I  have  given,  the  extra  charge  of  the  hono- 
rary stipulation  is  included.  For  six  per  cent. 
the  British  underwriter  will  warrant  Spanish  pro- 
perty, knowing  it  to  be  such,  from  the  Havannah 
to  Spain,  by  way  of  America  ;  though  he  receives 
what  is  equal  to  seven,  on  British  property,  of  the 
same  description,  carried  with  convoy,  and  in  far 
better  bottoms,  from  Jamaica  to  London. 

The  proportion  of  this  premium,  which  may 
be  reckoned  as  the  price  of  the  secret  under- 
taking, is,  I  understand,  one  per  cent.  It  cannot 
be  much  more ;  since  the  excess  of  the  whole 
war  premium  above  that  which  was  paid  on  the 
direct  voyage  in  time  of  peace,  is  only  two  per 
cent.  The  point  is  of  no  importance  to  our  cal- 
culation ;  but  it  is  striking  to  reflect,  how  small 
an  additional  premium  is  enough  to  compensate 
the  insurer  for  the  risk  of  the  detection  of  hos- 
tile property  under  the  neutral  cover,  in  this  com- 
modious new  invented  course  of  the  colonial 
trade.  Can  we  wonder  that  Bonaparte  should  be 
indignant  and  clamorous  at  the  late  attempts  of 
our  prize  court  to  restrain  it } 

The  underwriters  of  America  have  pretty 
nearly  agreed  with  our  own,  in  the  appreciation 
of  the  trivial  danger  from  British  hostilities,  in  this 
great  branch  of  commerce.     In  July  and  August 


64 

last,  the  average  premiums  at  New-York  and 
Philadelphia,  on  the  separate  branches  of  the 
double  West-India  voyage,  without  any  war^ 
ranty  of  neutrality,  were  about  3  I  per  cent,  or 
7  in  the  whole,  from  the  West-Indies  by  way  of 
America  to  Europe.  Insurance  in  that  country, 
is  naturally  a  little  dearer  than  in  England  ;  and 
the  rates  of  premiums  at  Lloyd's,  probably  regu- 
late, with  an  advance  of  about  one  per  cent,  in 
general,  the  price  of  insurance  in  the  United  States. 

It  is  impossible  here  to  abstain  from  some  di- 
gressive remarks  on  the  conduct  of  the  British 
underwriters.  They  are,  certainly,  in  general, 
very  respectable  me;^  ;  and  comprise  within  their 
body,  merchants  of  great  eminence  in  the  most 
honourable  walks  of  commerce.  It  is  fair  to  pre- 
sume, therefore,  that  their  common  concurrence 
in  any  practice  contrary  to  the  duties  of  good 
subjects,  and  upright  men,  can  only  proceed  from 
inadvertency  or  mistake.  If  so,  I  would  con- 
jure them  to  reflect  seriously,  on  the  nature  and 
consequences  of  these  honorary  engagements, 
falsely  so  called,  into  which  the  secret  agents  of 
our  enemies  have  seduced  them. 

I^et  me  remind  them  of  the  moral  obligation, 
of  obeying,  in  substance,  as  well  as  inform,  the 
law  of  their  country  j  and  that  the  rule  which 
forbids  the  insurance  of  an  enemy's  property, 
not  having  been  founded  solely  on  a  regard  to 


85 

the  safety  of  the  underwriter's  purse,  they  have  no 
private  right  to  wave  its  application. 

Some  persons,  perhaps,  may  find  an  excuse  or 
palliation  of  this  practice,  to  satisfy  their  own  con* 
sciences,  in  a  doubt  of  the  public  utility  of  the  law, 
which  they  thus  violate  or  evade ;  for  specious 
arguments  have  been  heretofore  offered,  to  prove 
that  a  belligerent  state,  may  advantageously  per- 
mit its  subjects  to  insure  the  goods  of  an  enemy 
from  capture;  and  that  pestilent  moral  heresy, 
the  bane  of  our  age,  which  resolves  every  duty 
into  expediency,  may  possibly  have  its  prose- 
lytes at  Lloyd's,  as  well  as  at  Paris.  With  such 
men  as  have  imbibed  this  most  pernicious  error, 
I  have  not  time  to  reason  on  their  own  false' 
principles ;  though  the  notion  that  it  is  politic  to 
insure  an  enemy,  against  our  own  hostilities,  is 
demonstrably  erroneous  ;  and  seems  as  strange  a 
paradox  as  any  that  the  vain  predilection  for 
oblique  discovery  ever  suggested.  I  can  only 
offer  to  them  a  short  argument,  which  ought 
to  be  decisive,  by  observing  that  the  wisdom  of 
the  legislature,  and  of  our  ablest  statesmen  in 
general,  has  concluded  against  these  insurances 
on  political  grounds  ;  otherwise  they  would  have 
been  permitted,  instead  of  being,  as  they  are, 
prohibitted  by  law*. 

*  The  prohibitions  of  the  last  war,  33  George  II.  cap.  27.  s%  4,  has 
not,  I   belicre,  yet    been  renewed.     Perhaps,    during  the  pressure   of 


86 

But  I  conjure  the  British  underwriters  to  re- 
flect that  there  is  a  wide  difference  between  the 
insurance  of  an  enemy's  property,  fairly  passing 
on  the  seas  as  such,  in  his  own  name  ;  and  the  in- 
surance of  the  same  property  under  a  fraudulent 
neutral  disguise.  By  the  former  transaction,  in- 
deed, the  law  is  more  openly  violated  ;  but  in  the 
latter,  the  law-breaking  and  clandestine  contract, 
is,  in  effect,  a  conspiracy  of  the  underwriter  with 
the  enemy  and  his  agents,  to  cheat  our  gallant  and 
meritorious  fellow-subjects,  the  naval  captors ;  as 
well  as  to  frustrate  the  best  hopes  of  our  countr}", 
in  the  present  very  arduous  contest. 

Besides,  by  what  immoral  means  is  the  safety 
of  the  underwriters  in  these  secret  co^ttracts  con- 
sulted !  It  will  not,  it  cannot,  be  denied,  that  in- 
stead of  the  paltry  considerations  for  which  they 
now  consent  to  release  the  warranty  of  neu- 
trality, they  would  require  more  than  double  the 


parliamentary  business,  which  has  prevailed  ever  »ince  the  commence- 
ment of  the  present  war,  it  has  escaped  the  attention  of  government. 
The  illegality  of  insuring  hostile  property,  stands,  however,  on  conunon 
law  principles,  independent  of  any  positive  statute  ;  as  has  long  since 
been  solemnly  decided.  The  use  of  that  act  was  not  to  invalidate 
the  policy,  but  to  impose  specific  penalties  on  the  insurer  of  an 
enemy's  goods  -,  and  if  it  should  be  revived,  the  indirect  method 
of  accomplishing  the  illegal  object  by  a  secret  undertaking,  Mii\, 
I  trust,  be  made  at  least  equally  penal  with  the  direct  and  ^pea 
offence. 


f 


87 


open  premium  for  that  release,  if  they  did  not 
rely  on  the  effect  of  those  perjuries  and  forgeries 
by  which  capture  or  condemnation  is  avoided. 
The  underwriter,  therefore,  who  enters  into  the 
clandestine  compact,  is  an  accessary  to  those 
crimes. 

But  is  this  all  ?  Does  he  not  directly  contract 
for,  and  suborn,  as  well  as  abet  them  ?  For 
whose  benefit,  and  at  whose  instigation,  are 
those  false  affidavits  and  fictitious  documents, 
transmitted  from  the  neutral  country,  which  are 
laid  before  the  courts  of  prize  in  these  cases,  as 
evidence  of  the  property,  after  a  decree  for  fur- 
ther proofs  ?  The  claimant  receives  the  sum  in- 
sured from  the  underwriter,  and  allows  the  latter 
to  prosecute  the  claim  for  his  own  reimbursement; 
and  for  that  purpose,  the  necessary  evidence  is 
furnished  by  the  one,  and  made  use  of  by  the 
other,  to  support  at  Doctors  Commons  the  fact  of 
a  representation,  which  at  Lloyd's  Coffee-House 
is  known  to  be  false. 

It  may,  indeed,  be  alleged,  that  there  are  often 
other  reasons  with  the  assured,  for  asking  the  un- 
derwriter to  wave  the  question  of  neutral  proper- 
ty, than  a  consciousness  that  the  goods  belong  in 
fact  to  an  enemy.  .Courts,  it  may  be  said,  are  li- 
able to  be  mistaken  on  that  point ;  and  the  delay 
attending  its  investigation,  may  be  injurious. 


99. 


Pretences  like  these  can  never  be  wanting,  to 
palliate  any  indirect  and  disingenuous  transaction, 
that  has  for  its  object  the  concealment  of  an  illegal 
purpose.  To  the  gamester,  the  stock-jobber,  and 
the  usurer,  they  are  perfectly  familiar.  Should 
it,  howevei',  be  admitted,  that  such  specious  rea- 
sons are  sometimes  the  real  motives  of  the  as- 
sured, and  that  they  are  commonly  held  forth  to 
the  underwriters  as  such,  (which,  I  admit,  is  pro- 
bable enough;  for  it  is  not  likely  that  the  enemy's 
agent  often  needlessly  violates  decorum,  so  far  as 
to  announce  openly  the  true  character  of  his  prin- 
cipal,) still  the  defence  would  be  extremely  weak. 
That  enemies,  very  often  at  least,  are  the  real  pro- 
prietors in  these  cases,  is  too  natural,  and  too  fre- 
quently confirmed  by  actual  detection,  to  be  se- 
riously doubted :  besides,  our  London  insurers 
are  not  so  ill  informed,  as  to  be  at  a  loss  for  a 
shrewd  guess  in  regard  to  the  national  character 
of  the  true  owners  in  the  policy,  from  the  nature 
of  the  transaction  itself,  and  the  known  connex- 
ions of  the  agents.  A  large  part  of  all  the  pro- 
perty engaged  in  the  collusive  commerce  which 
I  have  described,  is  insured  in  Great-Britain : 
and  in  the  insurances  upon  it,  the  secret  engage- 
ment has  become  almost  universal.  If,  then,  any 
considerable  part  of  this  property  is  known  to  be 
hostile ;  how  can  our  underwriters  be  excused 
by  the  assertion,  supposing  it  true,  that  much  of  i^ 


%«.. 


1^' 


89 

is  really  neutral.  They  enter  into  a  clandestine 
contract,  which,  though  a  neutral  may  have  some 
good  reasons  for  proposing,  an  enemy,  it  can- 
not be  denied,  is  still  more  likely  to  propose^ 
and  which  is  peculiarly  well  adapted  to  the  pro- 
tection of  hostile  property ;  a  use  which  they  well 
know  too  is,  in  fact,  often  made  of  it.  The  de- 
fence, therefore,  is  like  that  of  a  general  receiver 
of  stolen  goods,  who,  while  he  deals  in  a  way 
peculiarly  fit,  by  its  secrecy  and  other  circum- 
stances, for  the  protection  of  thieves,  should  al- 
lege, that  honest  distressed  men,  frorti  a  fear  of 
disgrace,  often  bring  their  watches  and  plate  to 
his  shop,  in  the  same  covert  and  suspicious  man- 
ner. 

This  bad  and  dangerous  practice,  is  not  pecu- 
liar to  the  underwriters  on  colonial  produce  and 
supplies,  but  extends  to  almost  every  other  spe-^ 
cies  of  commerce,  that  is  now  fraudulently  car- 
ried on  under  neutral  colours.  Every  contest  in 
our  prize  courts,  respecting  property  so  insured, 
becomes  an  unnatural  struggle,  between  British 
captors,  fairly  asserting  their  rights  under  the  law 
of  war ;  and  British  underwriters,  clandestinely 
opposing  those  rights  under  cover  of  foreign 
names.  Every  sentence  of  condemnation,  in  such 
cases,  is  a  blow,  not  to  the  hostile  proprietor,  but 
to  our  own  fellow-subjects. 

N 


90 

If  the  danger  of  disloyal  correspondence,  in 
order  to  prevent  or  defeat  a  capture ;  if  the  aug- 
mented means  of  imposition  on  the  courts  of 
prize ;  or  if  the  cheap  and  effectual  protection 
given  to  the  enemy,  be  considered,  in  either 
view,  this  bad  practice  ought  to  be  immediately 
abolished.  ^ 

But  there  is  a  still  more  important  and  sacred 
reason  for  its  suppression.  If  neutral  merchants 
will  violate  the  obligations  of  truth  and  justice,  in 
order  to  profit  unduly  by  the  war,  the  societies 
to  which  they  belong,  will  soon  feel  the  poison- 
ous effects,  in  the  deterioration  of  private  morals ; 
for  habits  of  fraud  and  perjury,  will  not  terminate 
in  the  neutralizing  employments  that  produced 
them.  But  with  the  profit  which  redounds  to  them 
and  their  employers,  let  them  also  monopolize 
the  crimes.  Let  us  not  suffer,  at  once  in  our  bel- 
ligerent interests,  and,  in  what  is  far  more  valu- 
able, our  private  morals,  by  sharing  the  contami- 
nation ;  let  us  not  be  the  accomplices,  as  well  as 
victims  of  the  guilt. 

Since  it  is  not  enough,  that  the  engagements  in 
question  are  void  in  law ;  they  ought  to  be  prohi- 
bited, under  severe  penalties,  as  well  on  the  bro- 
ker who  negociates,  as  on  the  underwriter  who 
subscribes  them. 

Returning  from  this  digression,  let  us  re- 
sume for    a   moment    our   comparative   view   ot 


91 

English,  and  French  or  Spanish  commerce,  as  to 
the  expense  of  carriage  during  war  between  the 
West-Indies  and  Europe. 

There  is  one  remaining  head  of  expense  at- 
tending the  importation  of  colonial  produce,  un- 
der which  it  may  possibly  be  supposed,  that  the 
€nemy  sustains  a  loss,  more  than  equivalent  to 
his  comparative  advantages  in  other  respects.  I 
mean  the  commission  or  factorage  :  for  it  cannot 
be  disputed,  that  the  fraudulent  must  be  compen- 
sated more  liberally,  than  the  honourable  ser- 
vice. 

I  cannot  pretend  with  certainty  to  state  the 
average  price  of  that  collusive  agency,  the  busi- 
ness of  which  is  called  "  neutralization,"  either 
in  this  or  any  other  branch  of  trade ;  but  there 
is  every  reason  to  conclude,  that  it  is  by  no 
means  equal  to  those  differences  in  the  rate  of 
insurance,  which  have  been  shown  to  be  so  fa- 
vourable to  the  enemy.  I  am  credibly  informed, 
that  in  some  European  branches  of  trade,  it  is 
reduced  to  two,  and  even  to  one  per  cent,  on  the 
amount  of  the  invoice ;  and  there  seems  no  rea- 
son why  the  price  of  conscience  should  be  higher 
in  one  transaction  of  this  kind  than  another,  ex- 
cept in  proportion  to  the  profit  derived  by  the 
purchaser. 

But  here  it  may  perhaps  be  objected,  that  I  am 
building  on  an  hypothesis,  the  truth  of  which  has 


92 

not  hitherto  been  proved ;  namely,  that  the  co- 
lonial produce,  the  subject  of  the  commerce  in 
question,  though  ostensibly  neutral  property,  is 
carried  on  the  enemy's  account. 

Independently  of  the  discoveries  frequently 
made  in  the  prize  courts,  there  are  strong  pre- 
sumptive grounds  for  supposing  that  this  is  com- 
monly the  case,  not  only  in  the  colonial  trade,  but 
in  every  other  new  branch  of  commerce,  which 
the  neutral  merchants  have  acquired  during  the 
war.  The  general  views  and  interests  of  the 
parties  to  these  transactions,  must  strongly  in- 
cline them  to  that  fraudulent  course ;  and  the 
facility  of  concealing  it  is  become  so  great,  that 
nothing,  for  the  most  part,  can  induce  them  to 
ship  bona  fide  on  neutral  account,  but  a  principle 
which,  unhappily,  experience  proves  to  be  ex- 
tremely rare  among  them — respect  for  the  obli- 
gation of  truth. 

Besides,  where  can  America,  and  the  other 
neutral  countries,  be  supposed  to  have  suddenly 
found  a  commercial  capital,  or  genuine  commer- 
cial credit,  adequate  to  the  vast  magnitude  of 
their  present  investments? 

By  what  means,  could  the  new  merchants  of 
the  United  States,  for  instance,  be  able  to  pur- 
chase all  the  costly  exports  of  the  Havannah,  and 
the  other  Spanish  ports  in  the  AVest-Indies, 
which  now  cross  the   Atlantic  in   their  names  ? 


^ 


\ 


93 

Yet  what  are  these,  though  rich  and  ample, 
when  compared  to  the  enormous  value  of  that 
property  which  is  now  carried,  under  the  flag  of 
this  new  power,  to  and  from  every  region  of  the 
globe  ? 

Those  who  are  but  superficially  acquainted 
with  the  subject,  may  perhaps  be  ready  to  sup- 
pose, that  the  frauds  which  they  hear  imputed 
to  neutral  merchants  at  this  period,  are  like  those 
which  have  always  prevailed  in  every  maritime 
war ',  but  the  present  case,  in  its  extent  and 
grossness  at  least,  is  quite  without  a  precedent. 

Formerly,  indeed,  neutrals  have  carried  much 
of  the  property  of  our  enemies ;  and  great  part 
of  what  they  carried  was  always  ostensibly  their 
own  ;  but  now  they  carry  the  ivhole  of  his  ex- 
ports and  imports,  and  allege  the  ivhole  to  be 
neutral.  It  rarely,  if  ever  happens,  that  the  pro 
perty  of  a  single  bale  of  goods,  is  admitted  by  the 
papers  to  be  hostile  property.  We  are  at  war  with 
all  those  who,  next  to  ourselves,  are  the  chief 
commercial  nations  of  the  old  world;  and  yet 
the  ocean  does  not  sustain  a  single  keel,  ships 
of  war  excepted,  in  which  we  can  find  any 
merchandize  that  is  allowed  to  be  legitimate 
prize. 

France,  Spain,  Flolland,  Genoa,  and  the  late 
Austrian  Netherlands,  and  all  the  colonies  and 
trans-marine  dominions  of  those  powers,  do  not, 
collectively,  at  this  hour,  possess   a  single  mer- 


chant  ship,  or  a  merchant,  engaged  on  his  own 
account  in  exterior  commerce,  or  else  the  neutral 
flag  is  now  prostituted,  to  a  degree  very  far  beyond 
all  former  example. 

Those  who  dispute  the  latter  conclusion,  mtist 
ask  us  to  believe,  that  all  the  once  eminent  mer- 
cantile houses  of  the  great  maritime  countries 
now  hostile  to  England,  are  become  mere  fac- 
tors, who  buy  and  sell  on  commission,  for  the 
mighty,  though  new-born  merchants  of  Den* 
mark,  Russia,  and  America ;  for  in  all  the  num- 
berless ports  and  territories  of  our  enemies> 
there  is  not  one  man  who  now  openly  sustains 
the  character  of  a  foreign  independent  trader, 
even  hy  a  single  adventure.  Not  a  pipe  of 
brandy  is  cleared  outwards,  nor  a  hogshead  of 
sugar  entered  inwards,  in  which  any  subject  of 
those  unfortunate  realms,  has  an  interest  beyond 
his  commission. 

If  the  extravagance  of  this  general  result,  did 
not  sufficiently  show  the  falsehood,  in  a  general 
view,  of  the  items  of  pretence  which  compose  it, 
I  might  further  satisfy,  and  perhaps  astonish  the 
reader,  by  adducing  particular  examples  of  the 
gross  fictions,  by  which  the  claims  of  neutral 
property  are  commonly  sustained  in  the  prize 
court. 

Alerchant^,  who,  immediately  prior  to  the  last 
\^ ar,  were  scarcely  knoMii,  even  in  the*  obscure 
e:ea-port  towns  at  which  they  resided,  have  sud- 


95 

denly  started  up  as  sole  owners  of  great  num- 
bers of  ships,  and  sole  proprietors  of  rich  car- 
goes, which  it  would  have  alarmed  the  wealthiest 
merchants  of  Europe,  to  hazard  at  once  on  the 
chance  of  a  market,  even  in  peaceable  times. 
A  man  who,  at  the  breaking  out  of  the  war, 
was  a  petty  shoemaker,  in  a  sm.all  town  of  East 
Friesland,  had,  at  one  time,  a  hundred  and  fifty 
vessels  navigating  as  his  property,  under  Prussian 
colours. 

It  has  been  quite  a  common  case,  to  fmd 
individuals,  who  confessedly  had  but  recently 
commenced  business  as  merchants,  and  whose 
commercial  establishments  on  shore  were  so  in- 
significant, that  they  sometimes  had  not  a  single 
clerk  in  their  employment,  the  claimants  of  nu- 
merous cargoes,  each  worth  many  thousand 
pounds ;  and  all  destined  at  the  same  time,  with 
the  same  species  of  goods,  to  the  same  preca- 
rious markets  *. 

The  cargoes  of  no  less  than  five  East-India- 
men,  all  composed  of  the  rich  exports  of  Batavia, 
together  with  three  of  the  ships,  were  cotem- 
porary  purchases,  on  speculation,  of  a  single 
house  at  Providence  in  Rhode-Island,  and  were 
all  bound,  as  asserted,   to  that  American  port  5 

*  Cases  of  the  Bacchus,  the  Bedford,  the  London  Packet,  the  Pi- 
fou,  &c,  &c.  claimed  for  houses  in  Boston  and  George-Town  in  Ma- 
ryland, at  the  Cockpit,  last  war. 


96 

where,  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  add,  no  de- 
mand for  their  cargoes  existed  *. 

Adventures  not  less  gigantic,  were  the  subjects 
of  voyages  from  the  colonies  of  Dutch  Guiana, 
to  the  neutral  ports  of  Europe ;  and  from  the 
Spanish  West-Indies,  to  North  America.  Vessels 
were  sent  out  from  the  parsimonious  northern 
ports  of  the  latter  country,  and  brought  back,  in 
abundance,  the  dollars  and  gold  ingots,  of  Vera 
Cruz  and  La  Plata.  Single  ships  have  been 
found  returning  with  bullion  on  board,  to  the  va- 
lue of  from  a  hundred,  to  a  hundred  and  fifty 
thousand  Spanish  dollars,  besides  valuable  car- 
goes of  other  colonial  exports  -f. 

Yet  even  these  daring  adventurers  have  been 
eclipsed.  One  neutral  house  has  boldly  con- 
tracted for  all  the  merchandize  of  the  Dutch 
East-India  Company  at  Batavia;  amounting  in 
value  to  no  less  than  one  million  seven  hundred 
thousand  pounds  sterling  J. 

But  have  not,  it  may  be  asked,  the  means  of 
payment,  for  all  the  rich  cargoes  which  have 
been  captured,  undergone  a  judicial  investiga- 
tion ?  Yes,  such  ^slender  investigation  as  the 
prize  court  (which  of  necessity  proceeds  on  the 
ex  parte   evidence  of  the  claimants  themselves^^ 

*  Case  of  the  Reemsdyke. 

f  Case  of  the  Gladiator,  the  Flora,  &c.  at  the  Cockpit. 

t  Case  of  the  Reiidsbborg,  4  Robinson,  VZl.  ^ 


97 

has  power  to  institute ;  the  effect  of  which  has 
been,  to  produce  a  tribe  of  subsidiary  impostures, 
not  less  gross  than  the  principal  frauds  which  they 
were  adduced  to  support. 

Sometimes  a  single  outward  shipment,  has 
been  made  to  fructify  so  exuberently  in  a  hostile 
market  as  to  produce  three  return  cargoes,  far 
richer  in  kind  than  the  parent  stock  -,  with  two 
additional  ships  purchased  from  the  enemy,  to 
assist  in  carrying  home  the  harvest.  In  other 
cases  it  has  been  pretended,  that  bills  of  ex- 
change, or  letters  of  credit,  remittances  which 
usually  travel  from  Europe  to  the  colonies,  and 
scarcely  ever  in  the  reverse  of  that  direction, 
were  carried  to  the  East-Indies,  or  to  a  West- 
India  island,  and  applied  there  in  the  purchase 
of  the  captured  cargoes ;  or  that  the  master  or 
supercargo,  a  mere  stranger  perhaps  in  the  place, 
found  means  to  negociate  drafts  to  a  large  amount 
on  his  owners. 

A  pretence  still  more  convenient  and  compre- 
hensive, has  been  in  pretty  general  use — that 
of  having  an  agent  in  the  hostile  port,  whose 
ostensible  account  current  may  obviate  all  diffi- 
culties, by  giving  credit  for  large  funds  remain- 
ing in  his  hands,  the  imaginary  proceeds  of  for- 
mer consignments,  w^hich  he  invests  in  the  colo- 
nial exports, 

O 


98 

In  other  cases,  the  master  or  supercargo,  in 
order  to  give  colour  to  the  pretended  payment, 
has  really  drawn  bills  of  exchange  in  the  colony, 
payable  at  the  port  of  destination;  but  then 
there  has  been  a  secret  undertaking,  that  they 
shall  be  given  up,  on  delivery  of  the  cargo  to 
the  agent  of  the  hostile  proprietor ;  and  some- 
times, to  guard  against  breach  of  faith  by  the 
holders  of  such  bills,  and  possible  inconvenience 
to  the  drawers,  they  have  been  made  payable  at 
a  certain  period  after  the  arrival  of  the  ship  and 
cargo ;  so  that  in  the  event  of  capture  and  con- 
demnation, they  would  be  of  no  effect. 

A  still  grosser  device  has  at  other  times  been 
employed,  and  was  in  very  extensive  use,  by  the 
planters  of  the  Dutch  West-Indies  resident  in 
Europe,  before  the  conquest  of  Surinam,  and 
their  other  colonies  in  Guiana.  Contracts  were 
made  in  Holland  with  neutral  merchants,  for 
the  sale  of  large  quantities  of  sugar,  coffee,  and 
other  produce,  at  a  stipulated  price,  which  was 
supposed  to  be  paid  in  Europe  -,  and,  thereupon, 
directions  were  sent  to  the  attornies  or  managers 
of  the  estate  in  the  colony,  to  deliver  the  produce 
so  sold  to  the  order  of  the  neutral  purchasers. — 
Vessels,  chartered  by  the  latter,  were  sent  out, 
chiefly  in  ballast,  with  a  competent  number  of 
these  orders  on  board ;  by  means  of  which,  the 


99 

valuable  cargoes  of  produce  received  in  the  co- 
1-ony  were  ostensibly  acquired.  The  same  pre- 
tences were  also  adopted  by  some  Spanish  colo- 
nists of  Cuba. 

A  man  must  be  profoundly  ignorant  of  the  na- 
ture of  such  commodities,  and  of  the  colonial  trade 
in  general,  to  suppose  that  these  contracts  could 
be  sincere.  Such  are  the  varieties  in  the  quality, 
and,  consequently,  in  the  value  of  sugar  and  other 
West-India  produce ;  and  so  greatly  unequal  are 
different  parcels,  the  growth  even  of  the  same 
plantation  and  season,  to  each  other ;  that,  to  fix 
the  price  while  the  particular  quality  is  unknown, 
would  be  preposterous ;  and  would  place  the 
buyer  quite  at  the  mercy  of  the  seller,  or  his 
agents. — Besides,  from  the  quick  fluctuations  of 
price  in  the  European  markets,  such  prospective 
contracts  as  these,  would  be  downright  gaming ; 
unmixed  with  any  portion  of  sober  commercial 
calculation. — A  man  might  as  well  bargain  for 
English  omnium  in  Japan. 

Without  enumerating  any  more  of  these 
coarse  impostures,  I  would  remark,  that  the  re- 
sort to  them,  is  a  striking  proof  of  the  difficulty 
these  neutralizers  found  in  making  out  a  credible 
case ;  and  that  which  gave  occasion  for  them 
in  the  colonial  trade,  forms  alone,  a  strong  pre- 
sumption against  the  general  truth  of  their  claims. 
J  mean  the  known  fact,  that  the  cargoes  carried 


to  the  hostile  colonies,  in  general,  are  utterly  in* 
sufficient  to  pay  for  the  rich  returns.  In  the  trade 
of  the  sugar  islands,  especially,  if  the  whole  im- 
ports from  Europe  and  America  were  taken  col- 
lectively, they  would  hardlj^  be  equal  in  value  to 
one-tenth  part  of  the  exports. 

For  what  purpose,  it  may  be  reasonably  de- 
manded, should  the  planter  sell  more  of  his  pro- 
duce in  the  colony  than  is  requisite  to  pay  for  his 
supplies  ? — It  is  not  there,  that  his  debts  are  to  be 
paid,  or  his  savings  laid  by ;  but  in  the  mother 
country ;  and  it  is  in  that  country  also,  or  in 
some  part  of  Europe  alone,  that  his  produce  can 
be  advantageously  sold.  If,  then,  he  sells  more 
produce  in  the  colony,  than  will  serve  to  defray 
the  expenses  of  his  estate,  it  can  only  be  to  avoid 
the  risk  of  sending  it  specifically  on  his  own  ac- 
count, to  Europe. — But  if  a  fictitious  sale  will  al- 
most equally  avoid  that  risk,  it  is  obviously  a  far 
more  advantageous  expedient  than  the  other ;  for 
in  what  form  can  he  remit  the  proceeds,  that  of 
l>ilis  of  exchange,  excepted,  without  encounter- 
ing an  equal  danger  on  the  passage  ?  yet  in  tak*. 
ing  bills,  especially  from  such  persons  as  usually 
conduct  this  trade,  he  may  sustain  a  risk  more 
formidable  than  that  of  capture  and  discovery ; 
while  he  relinquishes  to  the  drawer,  the  benefit 
of  the  European  market. 
'^^  Brt,"  it  may  be  said,  "  these  claims  of  neu^ 


101 


*^  tral  property  have  often  been  established  by 
**  the  decrees  of  the  supreme  tribunal  of  prize 
"  — they  were  therefore  believed,  by  those  who 
"  were  the  most  competent  judges,  to  be  true." — 
I  admit  they  have  been  so  established,  and  even 
in  some  of  the  cases  which  I  have  instanced  as 
peculiarly  gross  ;  but  not  because  they  were  be- 
lieved— it  was  only  because  they  were  supported 
by  such  direct  and  positive  testimony,  as  judges 
bound  to  decide  according  to  the  evidence  before 
them,  are  not  at  liberty  to  reject. 

The  presumption  that  great  part  of  the  colo- 
nial produce  goes  to  Europe  on  account  of  the 
enemy,  is  strongly  fortified  by  the  frequency  of 
those  collusive  double  voyages,  the  nature  of 
which  has  been  fully  explained. 

Let  it  be  admitted,  that  a  real  neutral  specula- 
tor in  West-Indian  produce,  might  wish  to  buy  in 
the  colony,  as  well  as  to  sell  in  Europe ;  still 
there  seems  no  adequate  reason  for  his  choos- 
ing to  send  forward  to  the  latter,  at  a  considera- 
ble risk  in  the  ^vent  of  detection,  the  identical 
produce  which  he  bought  in  the  former,  after  it 
has  been  actually  landed  in  his  own  country ; 
when  he  might  commute  it,  by  sale  or  barter, 
for  other  produce  of  the  same  description,  which 
might  be  exported  with  perfect  security,  and 
without  the  expense  of  perjury  or  falsehood. 

On  the  other  hand,  supposing  the  property  to 


102 

remain  in  the  enemy  planter,  from  whom  it  was 
ostensibly  purchased,  the  obstinate  adherence  to 
these  double  voyages,  and  the  artifices  employed 
for  their  protection,  are  perfectly  natural.  To 
exchange  his  produce  in  the  American  market, 
would  be  a  trust  too  delicate  to  be  willingly  re- 
posed by  the  planter  in  his  neutralizing  agent ; 
and  besides,  the  identity  of  the  goods  shipped  in 
the  West-Indies,  with  those  which  shall  be  ulti- 
mately delivered  to  himself  or  his  consignee  in 
Europe,  must  be  essential  to  his  satisfaction  and 
security ;  as  well  as  to  the  obtaining  those  abate- 
ments or  privileges  on  the  importation  into  the 
mother  country,  to  which  the  produce  of  its 
own  colonies  are  entitled. 

After  all,  let  it  not  be  supposed  that  the  impor- 
tant conclusions  to  which  1  reason,  depend  on 
the  fact,  that  the  trade  in  question  is  carried  on 
chiefly,  or  in  some  degree,  on  account  of  our 
enemies.  Were  the  contrary  conceded,  very  lit- 
tle, if  any,  deduction  need,  on  that  score;  be 
made  from  the  sum  of  the  mischiefs  here  as- 
cribed to  the  encroachments  of  the  neutral  flag. 

If  the  hostile  colonies  are  supplied  with  all 
necessary  imports,  and  their  produce  finds  its 
way  to  marketj  the  enemy  is  effectually  relieved 
from  the  chief  pressure  of  the  war  ;  even  though 
both  branches  of  the  trade  should  pass  into  fo- 
reign hands,  in  reality,  as  well  as  in  form ,  nor 


103 


is  this  always,  perhaps,  the  least  advantageous 
course. 

Let  it  be  supposed,  that  the  neutral  merchants 
really  buy  on  their  own  account,  at  Martinique 
and  the  Havannah,  the  sugars  which  they  sell  at 
Bourdeaux  and  at  Cadiz.  In  that  case,  their  in- 
ducement is  found  in  the  hope  of  a  commercial 
profit,  instead  of  a  factor's  commission;  and  it 
evidently  depends  on  the  average  extent  of  that 
profit,  compared  with  the  ordinary  commission 
on  neutralization,  whether  the  enemy  is  less  ad- 
vantageously assisted  in  this  mode,  than  the 
other. 

Let  the  common  commission,  for  instance,  be 
supposed  to  be  5  per  cent. :  then,  if  sugars 
bought  for  1000  dollars  at  the  Havannah,  nett, 
on  an  average,  1050  dollars,  clear  of  freight  and 
all  other  expenses,  in  the  market  of  Cadiz,  it  is 
indifferent  between  the  enemy  and  the  neutral 
merchant,  whether  the  latter  imports  on  his  own 
account,  or  as  agent  for  a  Spanish  subject.  The 
service  done  to  the  individual  enemy,  and  to  the 
hostile  state,  is,  in  both  cases,  exactly  the  same  ^ 
and  so  is  the  detriment  sustained  by  the  adverse 
belligerent,  against  whom  the  commerce  of  the  co- 
lony was  protected. 

Is  it,  then,  likely,  that  neutrals  trading  on  their 
own  account,  would  obtain  a  larger  average  pro- 
fit, than  the  amount  ofaneutralizins:  commission? 


104 

— Rather,  I  conceive,  the  reverse :  for  it  is  the 
natural  and  speedy  effect  of  competition,  id 
every  branch  of  trade,  to  reduce  the  average 
profits  of  the  adventurers,  taken  collectively,  to 
the  lowest  rate  at  which  any  competitor  can  af- 
ford to  prosecute  the  business  ;  and  even  below 
that  level.  More  especially  is  this  the  event, 
when  the  gaintare  very  precarious,  and  very  un- 
equally divided :  for  the  gaming  propensity,  in- 
duces men  to  give  for  chances  in  commerce,  as 
well  as  in  the  lottery,  much  more  than  they  are 
intrinsically  worth. — Now,  the  enemy  who  ex- 
ports from  the  colony,  and  imports  into  the  mo- 
ther country,  produce  of  his  own  growth,  paying 
a  neutralizing  coinmission  on  the  carriage,  is  a 
competitor  with  the  genuine  neutral  speculator 
in  the  same  market,  on  equal  terms,  the  difference 
of  that  commission  excepted;  and  as  the  planter, 
in  sending  home  his  own  produce,  looks  to  no 
mercantile  gain  on  the  voyage,  but  merely  to 
the  remittance  of  his  property,  the  commission 
must  soon  become  the  measure  of  the  average 
profit  to  neutral  importers  in  general ;  and  the 
gains  of  the  speculator,  will  even  have  a  ten- 
dency to  fall  below,  though  they  will  not  perma- 
nently exceed,  that  standard.  The  commission 
will  also  feel  the  depreciating  ellect  of  (competi- 
tion ;  so  that  this  regulator  will,  itself,  progres- 
sively  decline;    but    its    fall   will,  at   the  same 


105 

time,  further  depress  the  speculator's  profit,  and 
in  an  equal  degree. 

If  this  reasoning,  which  seems  to  stand  on  the 
plainest  principles  of  commercial  arithmetic,  be 
just,  the  profits  of  the  genuine  neutral  merchants 
in  this  trade,  must  at  present  be  very  low  :  for  let 
it  be  considered,  that  it  has  now  been  prosecuted 
by  every  neutral  nation,  no  less  than  twelve 
years  ;  a  brief  interruption  during  the  late  peace 
excepted  s  so  that  competition  has  had  ample 
time  to  work  its  natural  effects.  The  enemy, 
probably  therefore,  is  a  gainer  at  present,  rather 
than  a  loser,  when  delivered  from  the  necessity 
of  being  his  own  exporter  and  importer,  by  a 
real  sale  to,  and  repurchase  from,  the  neutral 
merchant. 

That  this  conxmerce,  however  conducted,  is 
not  a  very  costly  vehicle  for  the  colonial  produce 
of  a  belligerent  inferior  at  sea,  is  manifest  from 
a  single  and  highly  important  fact,  to  which  I 
would  next  particularly  call  the  reader's  atten- 
tion. 

The  produce  of  the  JVest-Indies,  sells  cheaper  at 
present,  clear  of  duties,  in  the  ports  of  our  enemies, 
than  in  our  own  *. 

*  This  statement  also  has  reference  to  the  month  of 'August  last,  since 
which  period,  I  believe,  the  late  decisions  in  our  prize  courts  have  oc- 
casioned a  material  change.  At  that  time,  and  for  many  preceding 
months,  it  was  generally  a  losing  game  t«   export  West-India  produce 

P 


106 

Though  the  preceding  statements  and  calcula^ 
tions  naturally  lead  to  this  result ;  it  will,  perhaps, 
be  regarded  with  some  astonishment.  But  the 
emotions  that  it  ought  to  excite,  are  rather  those 
of  indignation  and  alarm. 

We  defend  our  colonies  at  a  vast  expense — we 
maintain,  at  a  still  greater  expense,  an  irresis- 
tible navy;  we  chase  the  flag  of  every  enemy 
from  every  sea;  and  at  the  same  moment,  the 
hostile  colonies  are  able,  from  the  superior  safety 
and  cheapness  of  their  new-found  navigation, 
to  undersell  us  in  the  continental  markets  of  Eu- 
rope. 

Where  is  the  partial  compensation  now,  that 
our  planters  used  to  fmd,  for  the  heavy  burthens 
and  dangers  of  war  ?  If  the  cost  of  their  supplies 
were  enormously  enhanced,  if  war  taxes  pressed 
them  hard,  if  freight  and  insurance  were  doubled 
or  trebled,  if  their  interior  defence  became  ex- 
pensive as  well  as  laborious,  and  if  they  were 
sometimes  invaded  or  plundered  by  a  hostile 
force,  still  their  rivals  and  enemies  in  the  neigh- 
bouring islands  were  in  no  capacity  to  mock  at. 


from  this  coui)try  to  Amsterdam  or  Flanders,  even  when  the  whole  duty 
was  drawn  back  ;  for  tJic  import«»r  of  French  and  Spanish  produce  of  a  like 
description,  could  afford  to  sell  on  cheaper  terms  ;  yet  the  latter  had  paid 
considerable  duties  in  the  colonies  it  came  from,  which  bad  not  been 
drawn  back. 


107 

or  profit  by,  these  disasters.  On  the  contrarj, 
the  superior  pressure  of  the  war  upon  the  hos- 
tile colonies,  insured  to  our  own,  the  benefit  of 
markets  more  than  commonly  advantageous. 
While  the  benefit  of  the  drawback  gave  them  at 
least  equality  with  their  rivals,  in  the  foreign 
and  neutral  markets  of  Europe,  in  regard  to  fiscal 
charges ;  in  other  respects  the  differences  were 
all  in  their  favour.  The  foreign  sales,  therefore, 
were  highly  .beneficial;  and  the  home-market,  re- 
lieved by  a  copious  exportation  from  all  tempo- 
rary repletions,  gave  them  in  its  large  and  ever 
advancing  prices,  some  indemnity  for  the  evils  of 
the  war. 

By  the  present  unprecedented  and  artificial 
state  of  things,  this  compensation  has  been  nar- 
rowed, and  is  likely  to  be  totally  lost.  Much  of 
the  embarrassment  under  which  our  West-India 
merchants  and  planters  have  laboured,  and  much 
of  that  silently  progressive  ruin  in  our  old 
colonies,  the  nature  and  extent  of  which  are 
too  little  known  in  England,  may  be  traced  per- 
haps to  this  singular  source.  By  circumstances 
which  it  would  be  too  digressive  to  explain,  the 
main  evil  has  been  much  retarded  in  its  progress, 
and  is  only  now  beginning  to  operate  with  its  na- 
tural force ;  but,  unless  the^  cau;se  is  removed,  it 
will  soon  be  severely  felt. 
I  am  well  informed,  that  the  business  pf  the 


108 

sugar  refiner,  the  great  customer  of  the  West-In- 
dia merchant,  has,  of  late,  been  very  unsuccess- 
ful. Instead  of  obtaining  a  large  annual  profit  as 
formerly,  his  accounts  for  the  last  season  have 
beeti  wound  up  with  a  serious  loss. 

A  symptom  more  clearly  indicatory  than  this, 
of  the  ill  effects  which  I  wish  to  expose,  cannot 
be  required. — From  what  sources  result  the  chief 
gains  of  the  sugar  refineV  ?  From  an  advance 
pending  his  process,  in  the  prices,  of  the  raw, 
and,  of  course,  of  the  refined  commodity,  and 
this  is  chiefly  occasioned  by  an  increase  in  the 
difference  of  price  between  the  home  and  the  fo- 
reign market,  when  that  difference  is  favourable 
to  exportation :  for  the  foreign  in  great  measure 
regulates  the  home  demand.  When,  therefore, 
the  price  of  sugar  in  the  continental  markets  is 
progressively  declining,  in  the  proportion  it  bears 
to  the  existing  price  in  this  country,  which,  of 
course,  will  naturally  happen  when  the  supply 
from  the  foreign  colonies  is  progi^essively  either 
enlarged  or  cheapened,  the  British  refiner  will 
find,  as  he  has  lately  done,  a  loss  instead  of  a 
profit  on  his  business.  The  consequences  of  such 
a  progress,  if  continued,  are  not  less  obvious  than 
alarming. 

It  appears,  then,  on  the  whole,  that  our  ene- 
mies  carry  on   their    colonial   commerce  under 


109 

the  neutral  flag,  cheaply  as  well  as  safely ;  that 
they  are  enabled,  not  only  to  elude  our  hos- 
tilities, but  to  rival  our  merchants  and  planters, 
in  the  European  markets  ;  and  that  their  compa- 
rative, as  well  as  positive  advantages,  are  such, 
as  to  injure  our  manufacturers,  and  threaten  our 
colonies  with  ruin. 

That  the  hostile  treasuries  are  fed  by  the 
same  means  with  a  copious  stream  of  revenue, 
without  any  apparent  pressure  on  the  subject; 
a  revenue  which  otherwise  would  be  cut  off 
by  the  war,  or  even  turned  into  our  own  cof- 
fers, is  a  most  obvious  and  vexatious  conse- 
quence. Without  the  charge  of  detending  his 
colonies,  or  their  trade,  by  a  single  squadron  or 
convoy,  the  enemy  receives  nearly  all  the  tribute 
from  them,  that  they  would  yield  under  the  most 
expensive  protection. 

Let  it  not  be  supposed,  that  even  such  produce 
as  is  imported  bona  fide  into  neutral  countries, 
and  sold  there  without  re-shipment,  fails  to  yield 
its  portion  of  revenue  to  the  hostile  state. 

To  prevent  such  a  loss,  our  enemies  have  had 
recourse  to  various  expedients  ;  but  chiefly  to 
those,  of  either  charging  and  receiving  duties  in 
the  colony,  on  the  exportation  of  the  produce 
from  thence  3  or  taking  bonds  from  persons  resi- 
dent in  the  mother  country,  in  respect  of  every 
ship  clearing  out  for^  or  intended  to  carry  produce 


no 


from  the  colonies,  with  condition  either  to  land 
such  produce  in  a  port  of  the  mother  country,  or 
pay  the  duties  there . 

Sometimes,  in  order  to  encourage  the  perform- 
ance of  engagements  to  import  into  the  mother 
country,  which  the  proprietor,  though  an  ene- 
my, might,  for  greater  safety,  wish  to  violate,  the 
bond  has  been  conditioned  for  payment  of  double 
tonnage  or  duties,  in  the  event  of  the  cargo  be- 
ing landed  in  any  foreign  port  *. 

But  Bonaparte  finding,  I  suppose,  that  the 
best  way  of  securing  an  importation  into  France, 
was  the  actual  previous  payment  of  the  whole 
French  import  duties,  appears  now  to  have  gene- 
rally prescribed  that  course.  By  custom-house 
certificates,  found  on  board  a  Gallo-American 
East-Indiaman,  from  the  isle  of  France,  lately 
'condemned  in  the  Admiralty,  it  appeared,  that 
the  proprietors  had  actually  paid  all  the  French 
import  duties  in  advance,  in  the  colony,  and 
were,  therefore,  to  be  allowed  to  import  the  cargo 
into  Nantz,  duty  free.  Yet  this  ship,  as  usual, 
was  ostensibly  destined  for  New- York  f. 

Of  the  Spanish  treasure  shipped  from  South 
America,  a  great  part   may    be    reasonably  re- 

*  Cases  of  the  Vrow  MargaretU,  Marcusson  ,•  Speculation,  Roe- 
lofs,  &c.  at  the  Cockpit,  1801, 

f  Case  of  the  Commerce,  Park,  master,  at  the  Admiralty,  August, 
1805. 


Ill 

garded  as  nett  revenue  passing  on  the  king*:^ 
account ;  and  from  his  treasury,  it  is,  no  doubt, 
copiously  issued  to  supply  the  war  chest  of 
Bonaparte.  Nor  is  his  Spanish  majesty  at  a  loss 
to  convert  into  specie,  and  draw  over  to  Europe, 
those  more  cumbrous  subjects  of  revenue,  which 
he  receives  beyond  the  Atlantic  -,  or  to  commute 
them  there,  in  such  a  manner  as  may  serve  for 
the  support  of  the  colonial  government,  by  the  aid 
of  his  neutral  merchants.  To  a  single  commer- 
cial house,  he  sold,  or  pretended  to  sell,  all  the  to- 
bacco in  the  royal  warehouses  in  three  of  his 
South  American  provinces,  for  payment  in  dol- 
lars, or  in  such  goods  as  could  easily  and  advan- 
tageously be  converted  into  specie  in  that  coun- 
try*. 

After  attending  to  these  facts,  it  will  not  be 
easy  to  discover  in  what  way  the  hostile  govern- 
ments feel  the  pressure  of  the  war,  in  regard  to 
their  colonial  commerce. 

The  private  merchants,  even  scarcely  seem  to 
sustain  any  serious  loss,  except  that  their  ships 
are  unemployed.  But  transfers,  real  or  ostensi- 
ble, to  neutrals,  have,  for  the  most  part,  obviated 
this  inconvenience :  and  the  government  itself 
has,  no  doubt,  been  a  liberal  freighter,  or  pur- 
chaser, of  such   disengaged   native   bottoms   as 

*  Cas«  of  the  Anna  Catbarinaj  ^  Robigson,  107. 


112 

were  fit  for  the  invasion  of  England ;  a  service 
for  which  our  neutral  friends  have  obligingly  set 
them  at  leisure.  The  usurper,  therefore,  might 
perhaps  be  as  popular  among  his  merchants,  as 
he  seems  anxious  to  be,  if  it  were  not  for  those 
naval  blockades,  against  which  he  is  incessantly 
raving.  If  the  British  courts  of  admiralty  would 
in  that  respect  obligingly  adopt  his  new  code  of 
maritime  law,  the  commerce  of  France  might 
cease  to  labour  under  any  uneasy  restraint. 


Hitherto,  we  have  considered  the  abuse  of  neu- 
tral rights,  chiefly,  as  a  protection  unduly  imparted 
to  our  enemies,  in  respect  of  their  colonial  inte- 
rests, their  trade,  and  commercial  revenues. 

Were  this  great  frustration  of  our  maritime 
efforts  in  the  war,  the  only  prejudice  we  sustain, 
the  evil  would  be  sufficiently  great.  It  would 
still  be  a  wrong  highly  dangerous  to  our  future 
safety,  and  adverse  to  the  best  hopes  of  our  al- 
lies; for  to  protect  the  financial  means  of  Bona- 
parte and  his  confederates,  is  to  nourish  a  mon- 
ster that  threatens  desolation,  not  to  England  on- 
ly, but  to  Europe. 

The  mischief,  however,  by  no  means  termi- 
nates in  sustaining  the  French  exchequer ;  it 
strikes  in  various  directions  at  the  very  vrtals  of 
our  national  security ;  it  tends  powerfully  and  di- 


113 

rectly  to  the  depression  of  our  maritime  power, 
and  to  the  exaltation  of  the  navy  of  France. 

I^et  it  be  considered,  in  the  first  place,  that  by 
this  licentious  use  of  the  neutral  flags,  the  enemy 
is  enabled  to  employ  his  whole  military  marine, 
in  purposes  of  offensive  war. 

He  is  not  obliged  to  maintain  a  squadron,  or  a 
ship,  for  the  defence  of  his  colonial  ports ;  nor 
does  he,  in  fact,  station  so  much  as  a  frigate,  in 
the  East  or  West-Indies,  except  for  the  purpose 
of  cruizing  against  our  commerce.  The  nume- 
rous and  frequent  detachments  of  the  convoy 
service,  are  also  totally  saved. 

While  a  great  dispersion  of  his  maritime  force, 
and  the  consequent  risk  of  its  defeat  and  cap- 
ture, in  detail,  are  thus  avoided,  he  obtains  by  its 
concentration  near  the  seat  of  empire  a  most  for- 
midable advantage  -,  since  the  British  navy  has  to 
guard  our  colonies,  and  our  commerce,  in  all  its 
branches,  and  is,  consequently,  widely  dispersed 
in  every  quarter  of  the  globe. 

During  the  last  war,  such  considerations  might 
seem  of  little  moment,  because  the  united  ma- 
rine of  France  and  her  confederates,  was  reduced 
to  so  very  feeble  a  state,  and  so  little  effort  was 
made  for  its  restoration,  that  no  advantage  of  this 
kind  could  raise  it  from  contempt ;  much  less 
render  it  a  subject  of  serious  apprehension. 

But  nov\s  the  case  is  widely  different.  The  re- 
Q 


114 

establishment  of  the  French  navy,  and  those  of 
Spain  and  Holland,  is  a  work  on  which  Bona- 
parte is  not  only  eagerly  intent;  but  in  which 
he  has  already  made  a  very  alarming  progress. 
Already,  the  great  inferiority  of  the  confederates 
in  point  of  actual  force,  has  begun  to  disappear  ; 
and  so  vast  are  their  means  of  naval  structure  and 
equipment,  that  except  through  the  precarious 
diversion  of  the  approaching  continental  war,  we 
cannot  long  expect  to  be  superior  to  their  united 
navies  in  the  number  of  our  ships,  though  we 
may  hope  long  to  be  so,  in  the  skill  and  bravery 
of  our  seamen. 

On  our  own  side,  also,  I  admit,  improvement 
is  to  be  expected ;  for  our  Admiralty  is  hap- 
pily placed  under  the  auspices  of  a  most  able 
and  active  minister,  who  is  indefatigable  in  his 
efforts  for  the  increase  of  the  navy ;  and  whose 
comprehensive  knowledge  of  the  whole  business 
of  the  marine  department,  in  all  its  ramifications, 
peculiarly  well  qualifies  him  for  that  momentous 
work. 

The  venerable  age  of  Lord  Barham  has  been 
supposed  to  be  a  drawback  on  his  qualifications 
for  office,  by  those  only  who  are  ignorant  of  his 
still  energetic  powers,  both  of  body  and  mind. 
It  may  even  be  truly  said,  that  the  lapse  of  years, 
during  which  his  knowledge  of  the  civil  business 
of  the  Admiralty  has  been  matured  by  observa- 


115 

tion  and  experience,  has  made  him  the  fitter  for 
his  present  most  arduous  station.  He  resembles 
the  old,  but  sound  and  healthy  oak,  which  time 
has  qualified  for  the  most  important  uses  of  our 
navy,  by  enlarging  its  girth  and  its  dimensions, 
without  having  at  all  impaired  its  strength  or 
elasticity. 

In  calculating,  therefore,  on  the  effect  of  the 
enemy's  exertions,  I  allow  for  every  possible 
counteraction  in  our  own.  I  suppose  that  not. 
one  ship  in  our  public  dock-yards,  or  in  those  of 
the  merchants,  which  is  fit  to  receive  the  keel  of 
a  man  of  war,  will  be  left  unoccupied  by  the 
Admiralty,  except  from  the  want  of  means  to 
employ  it.  But  there  are  limits  to  the  power  of 
rapidly  increasing  our  navy,  of  which  the  public 
at  large  is  not  perhaps  fully  aware.  All  the 
knowledge  and  activity  of  Lord  Barham  cannot : 
immediately  replenish  our  magazines  with  cer- 
tain materials  necessary  in  the  construction  of 
large  ships,  of  which  there  is  a  great  and  in- 
creasing scarcity,  not  only  in  England,  but  in 
every  other  maritime  country ;  and  which  nature 
can  but  slowly  re-produce. 

Bonaparte,  from  the  immense  extent  of  those 
European  regions,  which  are  now  either  placed 
under  his  yoke,  or  subjected  to  his  irresistible 
influence,  and  from  the  effects  of  that  commerce, 
falselv  called  neutral,  which  we  fatallv  tolerate, 


116 

is  well  supplied  with  the  largest  and  best  timber, 
and  with  abundance  of  all  other  materials  for 
ship-building  ;  especially  in  his  northern  ports — 
Witness  the  grand  scale  of  his  preparations  at 
Antwerp ;  where  he  has  at  this  moment  on  the 
stocks,  eight  ships  of  the  line,  and  many  of  infer 
rior  dimensions.  In  this  new  port,  the  destined 
rival  of  Brest  and  Toulon,  he  is  rapidly  forming 
large  naval  magazines,  which  the  interior  navi- 
gation alone  may  very  copiously  supply;  and 
which  he  purchases  in  the  countries  of  the  North, 
chiefly  with  the  wine  and  brandy  of  France,  and 
with  the  produce  of  the  hostile  colonies,  carried 
in  neutral  l^ottoms.  I  am  well  informed,  that 
the  naval  stores  which  he  purchased  in  the  Baltic 
alone,  in  the  year  1804,  amounted  in  value  to 
eighty  millions  of  livres.  In  short,  he  is,  con- 
formably to  the  boast  already  quoted,  employing 
all  the  resources  of  his  power  and  his  policy,  for 
the  augmentation  of  his  marine ;  and  has  not  in- 
credibly declared,  that  before  the  commencement 
of  a  new  year,  he  would  add  thirty  line-of-battle 
ships  to  the  navy  of  France. 

It  is  not  easy  to  suppose,  that  the  utmost  exer- 
tions of  our  government  can  enable  us  to  keep  pace 
in  the  multiplication  of  ships,  with  all  our  united 
enemies  ;  especially  while  they  are  enabled,  by  the 
neutralizing  system,  to  preserve  all  the  men-of- 
war  they  progressively  acquire ;   keeping   them 


117 

safely  in  port,  until  deemed  numerous  enough 
to  enter  on  offensive  operations.  Even  when  that 
critical  period  arrives,  they  will,  no  doubt,  still 
choose  to  commit  their  commerce  to  the  safe  keep- 
ing of  their  neutral  friends ;  and  not  hoist  again 
their  mercantile  flags,  till  they  have  attempted  to 
overpower  by  concentrated  attacks,  the  scattered 
navy  of  England. 

There  is,  however,  another  grand  requisite  of 
naval  war,  not  less  essential  than  ships  ;  and  that 
is,  a  competent  body  of  seamen  to  man  them. 

Here  also  the  increase  of  our  navy  beyond  or- 
dinary bounds,  is  found  to  be  no  easy  work,  and 
here  Bonaparte,  happily  for  us,  is  not  less  at  a 
loss ;  but  that  pestilent  source  of  evils,  the  abuse 
of  neutral  rights,  in  this  most  momentous  point 
also,  largely  assists  our  enemies,  and  impairs  our 
maritime  strength. 

The  worst  consequence,  perhaps,  of  the  in- 
dependence and  growing  commerce  of  Ame- 
rica, is  the  seduction  of  our  seamen.  We  hear 
continually  of  clamours  in  that  country,  on  the 
score  of  its  sailors  being  pressed  at  sea  by  our 
frigates.  But  when,  and  how,  have  these  sailors 
become  Americans  ? — By  engaging  in  her  mer- 
chant service  during  the  last  and  the  present  war  ; 
and  sometimes  by  obtaining  that  formal  natural- 
ization, which  is  gratuitously  given,  after  they 
have  sailed  tw^o  years  from  an   American  port. 


118 

If  those  who  by  birth,  and  by  residence  and  em- 
pJo^Tnent,  prior  to  1793,  were  confessedly  British, 
ought  still  to  be  regarded  as  his  Majesty's  subjects, 
a  very  considerable  part  of  the  navigators  of  Ame- 
rican ships,  are  such  at  this  moment;  though, un- 
fortunately, they  are  not  easily  distinguished  from 
genuine  American  seamen. 

This  is  a  growing,  as  well  as  a  tremendous  evil ; 
the  full  consideration  of  which,  would  lead  me 
too  far  from  the  main  object  of  these  sheets. 
I  must  confine  myself  to  its  immediate  connex- 
ion with  the  abuse  of  neutral  rights ;  and  con- 
tent myself  with  merely  hinting  in  regard  to  its 
more  comprehensive  relations,  that  it  is  a  subject 
on  which  our  municipal  code  is  extremely  de- 
fective. 

The  unity  of  language,  and  the  close  affmity 
of  manners,  betweeen  English  and  American 
seamen,  are  the  strong  inducements  with  our 
sailors,  for  preferring  the  service  of  that  countrj'', 
to  any  other  foreign  employment ;  or,  to  speak 
more  correctly,  these  circumstances  remove  from 
the  American  service,  in  the  minds  of  our  sailors, 
those  subjects  of  aversion  which  they  find  in 
other  foreign  ships ;  and  which  formerly  coun- 
teracted, effectually,  the  general  motives  to  de-. 
sert  from,  or  avoid,  the  naval  service  of  their 
country. 

What  these  motives  are,  I   need. not  explain. 


119 

They  are  strong,  and  not  easy  to  be  removed  ; 
though  they  might  perhaps  be  palliated,  by 
alterations  in  our  naval  system ;  but  the  more 
difficult  it  is  to  remove  this  dangerous  propensity 
in  our  seamen;  the  more  mischievous,  obviously, 
is  any  new  combination,  which  increases  the 
disposition  itself,  or  facilitates  its  indulgence. 
If  we  cannot  remove  the  general  causes  of  pre- 
dilection for  the  American  service,  or  the  dif- 
ficulty of  detecting  and  reclaiming  British  sea- 
men when  engaged  in  it ;  it  is,  therefore,  the  more 
unwise,  to  allow  the  merchants  of  that  country, 
and  other  neutrals,  to  encroach  on  our  maritime 
rights  in  time  of  war ;  because  we  thereby  greatly 
and  suddenly,  increase  their  demand  for  mariners 
in  general ;  and  enlarge  their  means,  as  well  as 
their  motives,  for  seducing  the  sailors  of  Great- 
Britain. 

There  is  no  way  of  ascertaining,  how  many 
seamen  were  in  the  employ  of  the  powers  at 
present  neutral,  at  the  breaking  out  of  the  last 
war  :  and  how  many  at  this  time  navigate  under 
their  flags;  but  could  these  data  be  obtained, 
I  doubt  not,  it  would  appear,  that  they  have 
been  multiplied  at  least  tenfold*;    and  to  the 


*  The  sliips  and  ressels  of  East  Fricsland,  of  100  tons  burthen, 
and  upwards,  prior  to  the  present  war,  were  estimated  at  )50;  now 
they  are  supposed  greatly  to  exceed  2000. 


.increase,  whatever  be  its  amount,  the  relaxation 
of  our  belligerent  rights  has,  certainly,  in  a  great 
degree,  contributed. 

The  legal  and  ordinary  enlargement  of  neutral 
commerce,  in  time  of  war,  would,  indeed,  have 
added  greatly  to  the  stock  of  American,  as  well  as 
of  Prussian  and  Danish  mariners  ;  but  when  the 
great  magnitude  and  value  of  the  colonial  trade 
are  considered,  and  the  many  branches  of  naviga- 
tion that,  directly  or  indirectly,  spring  from  it ; 
the  admission  into  that  commerce  may,  perhaps, 
be  fairly  estimated  to  have  given  to  those  neu- 
tral nations  in  general,  but  pre-eminently  to 
America,  two-thirds  of  the  whole  actual  increase 
in  their  shipping.  This  extensive  trade,  it  may 
further  be  observed,  has,  in  the  medium  length 
of  the  voyages,  and  other  known  circumstances, 
peculiar  attractions  for  our  seamen ;  and,  what 
is  still  morQ  important,  it  enables  the  merchant, 
by  the  richness  of  the  cargoes  in  general,  to  earn  a 
high  neutralizing  freight,  and  consequently  to  of- 
fer a  tempting  rate  of  wages. 

It  is  truly  vexatious  to  reflect,  that,  by  this 
abdication  of  our  belligerent  rights,  we  not  only 
give  up  the  best  means  of  annoying  the  eneni}-, 
but  raise  up,  at  the  same  time,  a  crowd  of  dan- 
gerous rivals  for  the  seduction  of  our  sailors, 
and  put  bribes  into  their  hands  for  the  purpose. 
We  not  only  allow  the  trade  of  the  hostile  colo- 


115 

rectly  to  the  depression  of  our  maritime  power, 
and  to  the  exaltation  of  the  navy  of  France. 

I^et  it  be  considered,  in  the  first  place,  that  by 
this  licentious  use  of  the  neutral  flags,  the  enemy 
is  enabled  to  employ  his  whole  military  marine, 
in  purposes  of  offensive  war. 

He  is  not  obliged  to  maintain  a  squadron,  or  a 
ship,  for  the  defence  of  his  colonial  ports  -,  nor 
does  he,  in  fact, .  station  so  much  as  a  frigate,  in 
the  East  or  West-Indies,  except  for  the  purpose 
of  cruizing  against  our  commerce.  The  nume- 
rous and  frequent  detachments  of  the  convoy 
service,  are  also  totally  saved. 

While  a  great  dispersion  of  his  maritime  force, 
and  the  consequent  risk  of  its  defeat  and  cap- 
ture, in  detail,  are  thus  avoided,  he  obtains  by  its 
concentration  near  the  seat  of  empire  a  most  for- 
midable advantage  -,  since  the  British  navy  has  to 
guard  our  colonies,  and  our  commerce,  in  all  its 
branches,  and  is,  consequently,  widely  dispersed 
in  every  quarter  of  the  globe. 

.  During  the  last  war,  such  considerations  might 
seem  of  little  moment,  because  the  united  ma- 
rine of  France  and  her  confederates,  was  reduced 
to  so  very  feeble  a  state,  and  so  little  effort  was 
made  for  its  restoration,  that  no  advantage  of  this 
kind  could  raise  it  from  contempt ;  much  less 
render  it  a  subject  of  serious  apprehension. 

But  now,  the  case  is  widely  different.     The  re- 
Q 


122 

crowded  with  the  mariners  of  France  and  Spain^ 
taken  for  the  most  part  on  board  of  their  mer- 
chantmen 5  but  now,  this  drawback  on  their  ma- 
ritime resources,  is  wholly  avoided.  Except  at 
the  commencement  of  hostilities,  we  make  not 
a  single  prisoner  of  war  in  any  commercial  bot- 
tom. As  to  their  ships  of  war,  they  are  so  rare- 
ly to  be  found  out  of  port,  except  when  making 
depredations  on  our  commerce,  in  the  absence 
of  any  protecting  force,  that  if  the  present  sys- 
tem continues  much  longer,  the  British  seamen, 
prisoners  of  war  in  hostile  countries,  will  far  out* 
number  their  enemies  of  the  same  description,  in 
our  hands. 

In  the  East  and  West-Indies,  the  effects  of  these 
advantages,  on  the  side  of  the  enemy,  begin  al- 
ready to  be  severely  felt.  Bonaparte  has  often, 
and  not  untruly,  boasted,  that  the  injury  done  to 
our  commerce  by  the  privateers  of  the  Isle  of 
France,  of  Martinique,  and  Guadaloupe,  has 
been  extremely  great.  He  might  also  have 
praised  his  good  allies  of  Cuba,  for  equal  acti- 
vity. The  little  port  of  Baracoa  alone,  on  the 
east  end  of  that  island,  has  no  less  than  twelve 
privateers,  who  are  continually  annoying  our 
trade  in  the  Windward  Passage  *.     Cura9oa  also, 

*  See  an  authentic  account  of  their  particular  descriptions  and  force 
in  the  London  papers  of  September  L7th,  1805. 


123 

and  the  harbour  of  S^nto  Domingo,  are  become 
most  troublesome  neighbours  to  Jamaica. 

Can  we  wonder  that  the  colonial  ports  should 
furnish  so  many  cruizers  ?  It  will  be  a  much 
greater  cause  of  surprise,  if  they  should  not  soon 
be  multiplied  tenfold.  Nothing  but  the  small  de- 
gree of  encouragement  given  by  the  Spanish  go- 
vernment to  offensive  enterprises  during  th€  last 
war,  and  the  known  state  of  the  French  colonies 
at  that  period,  could  have  saved  our  merchants 
and  underwriters,  from  sooner  smarting  in  this 
way  very  severely,  through  our  complaisance  to 
the  neutral  flag. 

Let  it  be  considered,  that  the  Creole  seamen 
domiciled  in  the  hostile  colonies,  who  are  em- 
ployed in  time  of  peace  in  what  may  be  called 
the  interior  navigation  of  the  West-Indies,  and 
the  mariners  of  the  isles  of  France  and  Bourbon, 
who  usually  pursue  their  occupation  in  the  orien- 
tal seas,  can  now  have  no  civil  employment  in 
those  regions  under  their  own  flags ;  for  the  in- 
tercourse between  the  different  colonies  of  the 
same  state,  as  well  as  the  colonial  traffic  with 
neighbouring  foreigners,  is,  like  the  intercourse 
with  Europe,  carried  on  wholly  in  neutral  ves- 
sels. 

These  seamen,  though  pretty  numerous,  espe- 
cially in  the  Spanish  settlements,  very  rarely  en- 
gage under  a  foreign  commercial  flag ;  of  which 


1^4 

their  religious  prejudices  as  bigotted  papists,  and 
their  personal  insecurity,  as  being  mostly  of  Afri- 
can extraction,  are  probably  the  principal  causes. 
The  entering  on  board  privateers  therefore,  for 
the  purpose  of  cruizing  against  our  commerce  in 
the  seas  which  they  usually  navigate,  is  with  them 
a  necessary,  as  well  as  lucrative  occupation. 

If  it  be  asked,  how  are  a  sufiicient  number  of 
vessels  of  war,  and  the  means  of  equipping 
them,  procured  in  the  colonial  ports  of  the  ene- 
my ?  I  answer,  that  many  of  our  merchant  ships, 
which  they  take,  are  easily  adapted  to  the  pri- 
vateering service;  and  that  though  we  have  not 
yet  allowed  neutrals  to  carry  naval  stores  to  the 
enemy,  a  sufficient  quantity  of  them  are  clandes- 
tinely introduced  by  those  obliging  friends,  under 
cover  of  their  general  trade.  This  is  another  col- 
lateral ill  effect  of  our  fatal  indulgence  to  neutral 
commerce ;  for  it  is  easy  to  conceal  under  a  gene- 
ral cargo  of  permitted  goods,  small  parcels  of  a 
contraband  kind  ;  and  so  extensive  is  the  trade  of 
the  colonies  in  proportion  to  their  demand  of  na- 
val stores,  that  contributions  from  each  neutral 
ship  that  arrives,  small  enough  to  pass  as  part  of 
her  own  provision  for  the  voyage,  will  make  up 
an  adequate  total. 

But  so  great  has  been  the  audacity  of  the  neu- 
tral merchants,  that  they  have  actually  sent  ships 
constructed  solely  for  the  purposes  of  war,  and 


125 

pierced  for  the  reception  of  guns,  to  the  Havan- 
nah,  and  other  ports  of  our  enemies,  for  sale  : 
and  though  it  may  astonish  the  reader,  American 
claims  for  such  vessels,  when  taken  on  the  voy- 
age, have  been  pertinaciously  prosecuted,  not 
only  in  our  vice-admiralty  courts,  but  afterward 
in  the  court  of  appeals  *.  The  argument  was, 
that,  though  by  our  treaty  with  America,  the 
materials  of  naval  architecture  are  prohibited 
goods,  yet  ships  ready  built,  not  being  expressly 
enumerated  in  the  contraband  catalogue,  might 
be  lawfully  sent  to  our  enemies,  whether  for  car- 
riage or  sale. 

Let  us  next  regard  this  spurious  neutral  com- 
merce in  another  view,  as  a  great  discourage- 
ment to  our  naval  service. 

The  wise,  liberal,  and  efficacious  policy  of  this 
country,  has  been,  to  vest  the  property  of  mari- 
time prizes  wholly  in  the  captors ;  and  hence, 
much  of  the  vigilance,  activity,  and  enterprise, 
that  have  so  long  characterized  the  British  navy. 

Let  us  give  full  credit  to  our  gallant  officers, 
for  that  disinterested  patriotism,  and  that  love  of 
glory,  which  ought  to  be  the  main  springs  of  mi- 
litary character,  and  which  they  certainly  pos- 
sess in  a  most  eminent  degree.     But  it  would  be 


*  Case    of   the    Brutus,    Rutherford,  master,   at  the    Cockpit,  July, 
1304* 


126 

romantic  and  absurd,  to  suppose  that  they  do  not 
feel  the  value  of  that  additional  encouragement, 
which  his  Majesty  and  the  legislature  hold  out  to 
them,  in  giving  them  the  benefit  of  the  captures 
they  make.  What  else  is  to  enable  the  veteran 
naval  officer,  to  enjoy  in  the  evening  of  his  life, 
the  comforts  of  an  easy  income ;  the  father  to 
provide  for  his  children ;  or  the  husband  for  an 
affectionate  wife,  who,  from  the  risks  he  runs  in 
the  service  of  his  country,  is  peculiarly  likely  to 
survive  him  ?  By  what  other  means,  can  a  victo- 
rious admiral,  when  raised  as  a  reward  of  his  il- 
lustrious actions,  to  civil  and  hereditary  honours, 
hope  to  support  his  well  earned  rank,  and  provide 
for  an  ennobled  posterity  ?  The  pension  he  may  ob- 
tain will  be  temporary,  and  scarcely  adequate  even 
to  his  own  support,  in  his  new  and  elevated  sta- 
tion. It  is  from  the  enemies  of  his  country, 
therefore,  that  he  hopes  to  wrest  the  means  of 
comfortably  sustaining  those  honours,  which  he 
has  gained  at  their  expense. 

As  to  the  common  seamen  and  mariners,  the 
natural  motives  of  dislike  to  the  naval  service, 
are  in  their  breasts  far  more  effectually  combated 
by  the  hope  of  prize  money,  than  by  all  the 
other  inducements  that  are,  or  can  be  proposed 
to  them.  The  nautical  character  is  peculiarly 
of  a  kind  to  be  influenced  by  such  dazzling, 
but  precarious  prospects.    They  reason,  however. 


127 

and  calculate  On  the  chances  and  the  value  of 
success  ;  witness  the  proverbial  remark,  that  a 
Spanish  war  is  the  best  mean  of  manning  our 
navy. 

Never,  surely,  was  the  encouragement  of  our 
naval  service  more  important  than  at  the  present 
period ;  and  never  were  the  rewards  of  that  ser- 
vice more  meritoriously  or  gloriously  earned.^ — 
Yet  what  are  now  the  rational  hopes  of  our  sea- 
men, in  regard  to  the  benefit  of  prizes  ?  On 
whatever  station  they  may  be  placed,  and  what- 
ever sea  they  may  be  crossing,  they  look  out  in 
vain  for  any  subject  of  safe  and  uncontested  cap- 
ture. 

Are  they  sent  to  the  East  or  West-Indies  ? 
These,  though  sickly,  used  to  be  lucrative  sta- 
tions y  especially  in  a  war  with  Spain :  but  now 
the  rich  exports  of  the  hostile  colonies  present  to 
them  only  the  cup  of  Tantalus.  Thej'  see  the 
same  valuable  cargoes  passing  continually  under 
their  sterns,  which  used  formerly  to  make  the  for- 
tunes of  the  captors ;  but  the  ensigns  of  neu- 
trality now  wave  over  them  all,  and  prohibit  a 
seizure. 

Do  they,  in  concert  with  the  land  forces,  at- 
tack and  conquer  a  hostile  island  ?  The  reward  of 
their  successful  valour  is  still  wrested  from  them 
in  the  same  vexatious  way.      They  fmd  none  but 


128 

neutral  flags  in  the  harbour,  and  none  but  pro- 
perty alleged  to  be  neutral  afloat  *. 

In  short,  except  a  small  privateer  or  two,  of 
little  more  value  than  may  suffice  to  pay  the 
charges  of  condemnation  and  sale,  the  richest 
seas  of  the  globe,  though  bordered  and  thickly 
studded  with  the  most  flourishing  colonies  of  our 
enemies,  have  no  safe  booty  to  yield  to  the  sea- 
men of  the  British  navy.  It  is  painful  to  reflect, 
that  these  brave  men  lose  the  ancient  fruits  of 
distant  service,  while  enduring  more  than  its  or- 
dinary hardships.  In  the  AVest-Indies,  particu- 
larly, they  suffer  far  more  by  the  ravages  of  dis- 
ease, than  when  the  Spanish  galleons,  and  the 
convoys  from  the  French  Antilles,  consoled  them 
and  rallied  their  spirits.  Then  too,  victory,  either 
in  possession  or  prospect,  often  enlivened  that 
languid  service,  and  reanimated  the  sickly  crews ; 
but  now,  they  meet  no  enemy  worthy  of  their 
valour.  Their  only,  but  most  disheartening  foes, 
are  the  fever  and  the  neutral  flag. 

If  we  look  nearer  home,  the  reverse,  in  the 
situation  of  our  seamen,  is  not  less  singular  or 
discouraging.     The  Mediterranean,   the  Bay  of 


*  The  merchantmen  taken  by  Lord  St,  Vincent  and  Sir  Charles 
Grey,  at  Martinique  and  Guadaloupe,  were  all  of  this  description, 
and,   with   their  cargoes,  were  ultimately   restored. 


Biscay,  the  Channel,  the  German  Ocean,  are 
covered  with  the  exports  of  Spain,  Holland,  and 
France,  and  their  colonies,  and  with  shipping 
bound  to  their  ports  ;  but  where  are  the  prizes  of 
war  ?  Our  cruizers  search  for  them  in  vain, 
even  on  the  hostile  coasts  ; — for  even  there,  ves- 
sels, impudently  called  neutral,  conduct,  for  the 
most  part,  that  domestic  intercourse  between  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  same  hostile  kingdom,  which 
is  called  the  coasting  trade. 

The  examination  of  our  disguised  enemies  at  sea 
is  become  every  where,  in  general,  a  fruitless  task  ; 
since  they  are  grown  far  too  expert  to  be  detected 
by  such  a  scrutiny  as  can  be  made  by  a  visiting  of- 
ficer on  shipboard.  Yet,  if  they  iare  sent  into  port, 
it  is  at  the  captors'  peril.  Should,  however,  a  com- 
manding officer,  relying  on  the  notoriety  of  some 
fraudulent  practice,  or  on  private  information, 
venture  to  take  that  course,  he  and  his  ship- 
mates well  know  the  difficulties  they  will  have 
to  encounter  in  obtaining  a  condemnation  -,  and 
that  after  a  tedious  contest  in  the  original  and 
appellate  jurisdiction,  they  are  likely  at  last  to  sit 
down  with  the  loss  of  their  expenses  and  costs. 

The  consequence  naturally  is,  that  but  a  very 
few  of  those  pseudo  neutrals,  which  are  met  with 
and  examined  at  sea,  are  brought  in  for  judicial 
inquiry ;  and  that  a  still  smaller  proportion  of 
them,  are  prosecuted  as  prize  ;  though  the  law 

s 


130 

officers  of  the  crown  in  the  Admiralty,  in  a  great 
majority  of  the  cases  they  examine,  have  scarcely 
a  doubt  that  the  property  is  hostile.     They  know 
by  experience  the  fraudulent  nature  of  the  pa- 
pers ;  but  they  know  also  the  artful  and  elabo- 
rate perjury  by  which  those  papers  will  be  sup- 
ported, and  which,  however  unsatisfactory  out  of 
court,  it  will  be  impossible  judicially  to  resist. — 
Even  when  discoveries  are  made,  such  as  will 
clearly  justify  a  prosecution,  the  practice  of  let- 
ting  in   explanatory    affidavits   on   the    part   of 
claimants,  for  the  most  part  secures  an  ultimate 
acquittal,  and  frustrates  the  hopes  of  the  captors. 
At  the  best,  as  every  bottom,  and  every  bale  of 
goods,  is  now  infallibly  claimed  by  the  neutraliz- 
ing agents,  and  every  claim,  however  clear  the 
detection  of  its  falsehood   may    be,   is    pertina- 
ciously prosecuted,  the  rare  event  of  a  final  con- 
demnation can  only  be  obtained  through  the  me- 
dium of  a  long  contest  at  law — an  evil  peculiar- 
ly unpleasant  to  the  sanguine  mind  of  a  sailor. 
It  may  be  safely  affirmed,  that  one  prize  taken, 
as  in  former  wars,  under  the  colours  of  an  ene- 
my, and  therefore  promptlj^  condemned  and  dis- 
tributed without  litigation,  would    do    more  to- 
wards   the   encouragement    of    our    navy,    than 
three   prizes  of  equal    value,    tardily,   and   with 
difficulty  secured,  as  at  present,  by  the  detection 
of  neutral  impostures. 


131 

Almost  the  only  class  of  captures,  on  which 
our  seamen  can  now  with  any  safety  rely,  are 
those  which  are  founded  on  the  breach  of  a  block- 
ade. Even  those,  however,  are  rarely  adjudged 
without  an  obstinate  litigation  in  the  Admiralty, 
if  not  also  in  the  superior  court.  But  the  ordina- 
ry value  of  such  prizes  is  small,  and,  on  the 
whole,  they  are  so  far  from  making  any  amends 
to  our  navy  at  large  for  the  loss  of  its  legitimate 
prey  in  the  colonial  trade,  that  they  are  a  very  in- 
adequate recompense  to  the  squadrons  employed 
in  the  blockades,  for  the  extraordinary  severity 
of  that  service.  Here  also,  a  war,  barren  of  gain, 
js  peculiarly  productive  of  hardships,  and  priva- 
tions to  our  gallant  defenders. 

These  discouragements  have  been  very  pa- 
tiently borne  :  our  loyal  and  generous  tars  well 
know  the  difficulties  of  their  country,  and  are 
content  to  defend  it  under  every  disadvantage 
that  the  exigencies  of  the  times  may  impose  on 
them.  But  if  the  present  commerce  with  the  hos- 
tile colonies  be  plainly  such  as  we  have  a  right  to 
interdict,  and  if  the  great  national  considerations 
before  suggested,  concur  in  calling  for  its  prohi- 
bition, the  interests  of  our  gallant  officers  and 
seamen  may  most  reasonably  fortify  the  call. — 
They  ought  not,  without  a  clear  obligation  of 
national  duty,  or  a  plain  and  strong  preponde- 
rance of  public  good,  to  be  shut  out  from  their 


132 

ancient  advantages,  to  be  jostled  by  evrry  neu- 
tral in  the  chase  of  their  lawful  game,  and  to 
sit  down  in  poverty  at  the  next  peace,  after  sus- 
taining, during  two  long  wars,  the  dominion  of 
the  sea  against  three  of  the  wealthiest  of  commer- 
cial nations. 

Far  different  is  the  case  with  the  navy  of  our 
enemies. 

The  field  of  capture  to  them  is  entirely  open, 
and  as  fertile  as  British  commerce  can  make  it. 
Whatever  enterprise  or  courage  they  display, 
has  the  promise  of  a  brilliant  reward  ;  and  even 
when  flying  from  the  name  of  Nelson  with  near- 
ly double  his  force,  they  could  stumble  on  and 
seize  a  rich  West-India  convoy  in  their  way. — 
Unless  their  cowardly  haste  really  led  them  to 
destroy  the  booty,  they  may  boast,  perhaps,  of 
commercial  spoils  more  valuable  than  the  hero, 
who  intrepidly  pursued  them,  has  met  with  in 
both  his  wars. 

If  France  persists  in  her  new  system,  if  she 
does  not  again  quite  abandon  the  sea  to  us,  this 
strange  and  most  unnatural  contrast  will  have 
serious  effects.  Our  navy  will  still  be  loyal  and 
active,  but  the  difliculty  of  adding  to  its  force 
will  be  formidably  increased ;  wliile  the  enemy, 
when  he  begins  in  earnest  to  assail  our  com- 
merce, will  be  powerfully  assisted  in  manning 
Ins  ships,  by  the  prospect  of  lucrative  captures. 


133 

The  sea  abovmds  with  adventurers,  who  have  no 
settled  national  character,  and  these  men,  in  ge- 
neral, will  naturally  flock  to  his  standard. 

Already  the  injurious  inlluence  of  this  cause  ill 
one  species  of  maritime  war,  is  very  visible. 

From  the  days  of  Elizabeth  to  the  present 
time,  much  has  always  been  done  to  the  annoy- 
ance of  our  commercial  enemies  by  the  enter- 
prise of  private  subjects.  Our  own  commerce, 
at  the  same  time,  has  derived  no  inconsiderable, 
though  an  accidental  protection  from  the  same 
source  -,  since  the  hostile  cruizers  have  been  kept 
in  check,  or  taken,  and  our  merchantmen,  when 
captured,  often  rescued  from  the  enemy  by  our 
private  ships  of  w^ar. 

But  the  unparalleled  licence  of  the  neutral  flag 
has  so  discouraged  privateering,  that  the  prac- 
tice of  it  is  nearly  extinguished.  It  may  be  safe- 
ly aflirmed,  that  in  any  war  with  Spain,  prior  to 
the  last,  one  of  our  vice-admiralty  courts  alone, 
could  have  produced  a  longer  list  of  commis- 
sions, taken  out,  not  for  armed  merchantmen, 
but  for  efficient  privateers,  than  all  those  judica- 
tures and  the  High  Court  of  Admiralty  together 
can  now  collectively  furnish.  llie  decline  of 
this  cheap  and  useful,  though  inferior,  species  of 
marine,  is  so  natural  an  eflect  of  the  great  sur- 
render which  has  been  made  of  our  belligerent 
rights,  that  the  only  ground   of  surprise    is,  tu 


134 

find  a  single  cruizer  still  in  commission.  Few 
though  they  now  are,  and  very  inconsiderable  in 
force,  their  owners  can  only  be  influenced  by  that 
excessive  spirit  of  adventure,  which  will  sometimes 
prompt  men  to  play  the  most  disadvantageous  and 
ruinous  game. 

The  enemy,  on  the  other  hand,  abounds,  as 
has  been  already  noticed,  in  this  irregular  species 
of  force. 

In  no  former  war,  perhaps,  were  so  many  pri- 
vateers fitted  out  from  the  colonies  of  France 
and  Spain  as  now ;  and  their  number  is  daily  in- 
creasing ;  for,  not  only  the  mariners  of  those  co- 
lonies, but  all  the  freebooters  in  their  neighbour- 
hood, are  easily  induced  to  man  them.  They 
are,  in  general,  very  small ;  but  the  fitter  on  that 
account,  in  the  West-India  seas,  and  in  the  nar- 
row channels  of  the  Antilles,  to  escape  from  the 
pursuit  of  our  frigates  ;  nor  are  they  the  less  able 
to  seize  on  our  merchantmen,  who,  having  now 
nothing  better  than  an  escape,  to  expect  from  the 
expense  of  carrying  guns,  and  a  letter  of  marque, 
are  generally  quite  defenceless.  The  navigation 
of  those  seas  was,  perhaps,  never  so  dangerous  to 
British  merchantmen  sailing  without  convoy,  as 
at  present ;  and  even  our  packets,  are  sometimes 
taken  by  French  privateers  on  their  passage  from 
k^^and  to  island.  ' 

luc  catalogue  of  evils  produced  by  the  same 


135 

mischievous  cause,  might  be  still  further  en- 
larged. 

I  might  show  in  it  a  powerful  inducement  to 
that  selfish  neutrality,  by  which  one,  at  least,  of 
the  continental  states,  has  enhanced  the  common 
danger  of  Europe.  The  vain  glory  and  the  po- 
pularity attendant  on  a  vast,  though  visionary, 
enlargement  of  commerce,  may  naturally  have 
charms  for  a  monarch  not  ambitious  of  more  so- 
lid renown. 

I  might  also  notice  the  great  discouragement 
given  to  various  important  branches  of  our  own 
exterior  commerce  ;  and,  above  all,  might  insist 
on  the  permanent  detriment  likely  to  be  sus- 
tained by  our  commercial  marine.  The  forced 
artificial  growth  of  neutral  shipping,  both  sup- 
posititious and  real,  will,  no  doubt,  shrink  back 
again  in  great  measure,  at  a  peace,  but  will  not 
be  entirely  lost. 

In  America,  especially,  the  vast  excrescence  is 
daily  absorbed  into,  and  enlarges  the  natural  bo- 
dy, which,  in  various  quarters,  is  peculiarly  likely 
to  displace,  by  its  extended  dimensions,  the  mari- 
time interests  of  England. 

Where  is  the  political  providence,  which  dic- 
tated that  wise  measure,  the  Register  Act  of 
Lord  Liverpool  ?  He  justly  called  the  naviga- 
tion act,  "  a  noble  strain  of  commercial  policy. 


136 

"  and  one  which  alone  had  fortunately  out- 
"  weighed  all  our  national  follies  and  extrava- 
*^  gancies  *."  Though  no  indiscriminate  ad- 
mirer of  his  lordship's  commercial  principles,  I 
do  him  the  justice  to  say,  that  the  act  known  by 
his  name,  was  an  essential  and  well-timed  sup- 
port to  the  great  law  he  justly  celebrates ;  and 
the  best  preventive  that  human  ingenuity  could 
have  devised  of  that  decay,  with  which  our 
navigation  was  threatened  by  the  independency 
of  America. 

But  vain  was  this  and  every  other  effort  to 
guard  our  maritime  interests  by  law,  if,  by  a  sur- 
render of  our  belligerent  rights,  the  carrying 
trade  of  the  globe  is  to  be  thrown  into  the  hands 
of  our  rivals ;  and  a  hot-bed  made  for  the  na- 
vigation of  America,  at  the  cost  of  the  British 
navy. 

In  the  contemplation,  however,  of  those  nearer 
and  more  fatal  consequences,  the  utter  frustra- 
tion of  our  hostilities  against  the  commerce  and 
revenue  of  France,  and  the  danger  of  losing  our 
superiority  at  sea,  during  this  momentous  contest, 
all  minor  and  distant  evils  lose  their  terrors.  I 
will,  therefore,  search  no  further  into  the  extent 
of  this  baneful  and  prolific  mischief 

*  Discourse  on  the  Conduct  o)  tl<(  .  .ov<  inrneni.  oi  (.inat-liiilain,  t» 
respect  t«  Neutral  Nations. 


137 


2.  Of  the  Remedy  for  these  Evils,  and  the  Right  of 
applying  it. 

For  that  grand  evil,  which  it  is  my  main  object 
to  consider,  and  which  is  one  great  source  of  all 
the  rest,  the  remedy  is  sufficiently  obvious. 

If  neutrals  have  no  right,  but  through  our  own 
gratuitous  concession,  to  carry  on  the  colonial 
trade  of  our  enemies,  we  may,  after  a  reasonable 
notice,  withdraw  that  ruinous  indulgence;  and, 
meantime,  hold  those  who  claim  the  benefit  of  it, 
to  a  strict  compliance  with  its  terms.  If,  after 
the  revocation  of  the  licence,  the  commerce  shall 
be  still  continued,  we  may  justifiably  punish  the 
violaters  of  our  belligerent  rights,  by  the  seizure 
and  confiscation  of  such  ships  as  shall  be  found 
engaged  in  the  offence,  together  with  their  car- 
goes. 

That  this  is  an  allowable  course,  will  hot  be 
disputed,  by  those  who  admit  the  trade  to  be 
illegal.  It  is  the  present  mode  of  proceeding 
against  such  neutrals  as  are  detected  in  voyages 
still  held  to  be  prohibited ;  and  has,  in  their  case, 
I  believe,  ceased  to  occasion  complaint,  by  the 
states  to  which  they  belong. 

This  remedy  also,  cannot  fail  to  be  effectual. 
There  will  be-  no  room  for  fictitious  pretences, 

T 


138 

when  the  immediate  voyage  itself,  in  respect  to 
the  place  of  departure,  or  destination,  is  a  suffi- 
cient cause  of  forfeiture ;  for  the  illegal  fact  must 
be  known  to  every  man  on  board,  must  appear 
from  the  papers,  unless  all  the  public,  as  well  as 
private  instruments  are  fictitious,  and  besides, 
would,  for  the  most  part,  be  discoverable,  not 
only  from  the  place  of  capture,  and  the  course  the 
ship  is  steering,  but  from  the  nature  of  the  cargo 
on  board. 

The  use,  therefore,  of  neutral  bottoms,  in  the  ' 
colonial  trade,  would  soon  be  found  by  our  ene- 
mies, to  yield  them  no  protection.  They  would 
hoist  again  their  own  commercial  colours;  and 
either  restore  to  us  all  the  fair  fruits  of  an  un- 
resisted naval  superiority,  or,  by  sending  out 
convoys  for  the  protection  of  their  trade,  open 
to  us  again  that  ancient  field  of  offensive  war, 
in  which  we  are  sure  to  be  victorious.  Our 
seamen  would  be  enriched,  our  imports  would 
be  very  largely  increased,  and  every  western 
breeze  would  waft  into  the  channel,  not  a  neu- 
tral sail  or  two,  to  furnish  diplomatic  squabbles, 
and  litigation  in  the  admiralty,  but  numerous 
and  valuable  prizes,  and  sometimes  entire  fleets 
of  merchantmen,  with  their  convoys,  taken  from 
open  enemies,  and  under  hostile  colours.  The 
captive  flags  of  France,  Holland,  and  Spain, 
would  again  be   incessantly  seen,  at  Plymouth 


139 

and  Spithead,  clrooping  below  the  British  en- 
signs s  and  the  spectacle  would  recruit  for 
Dur  navy,  far  better  than  the  most  liberal  boun- 
ties. 

Then  too,  the  enemy  would  be  often  obliged  to 
hazard  his  squadrons,  and  fleets,  for  the  relief  of 
his  colonies,  as  was  usual  in  former  wars  -,  and 
the  known  partiality  of  Bonaparte  to  these  pos- 
sessions, especially  to  the  Windward  Antilles, 
would  perhaps  induce  him  to  incur  risks  for  their 
protection,  greater  than  those  which  their  value 
in  a  national  view,  might  warrant. 

Here  dwell  the  native  and  nearest  connexions 
of  his  august  consort;  and  at  Martinique,  her 
imperial  highness  the  empress  mother,  ci-devant 
Madame  Lapagerie,  has  a  court,  and  all  the  other 
splendid  appendages  of  royalty,  to  the  great  local 
exaltation  of  that  illustrious  house. 

At  Guadaloupe  too,  it  is  said,  the  emperor 
owns,  in  right  of  his  consort,  a  flourishing  planta- 
tion, the  only  dowry  she  has  brought  to  the  throne 
of  the  Bourbons  -,  except  a  gang  of  negroes,  im- 
proved in  number,  no  doubt,  since  the  restitu- 
tion of  the  slave  trade.  Their  fate  has  been 
directly  the  reverse  of  that  of  the  Koman  slaves, 
who  were  always  enfranchised  on  the  elevation  oC 
their  lord  to  the  purple ;    but  though  they  do  no^ 

"  Pursue  the  triumph,  and  partake  the  gale," 


140 

they  are  cherished,  with  the  rest  of  the  patrimony 
in  the  Antilles,  perhaps,  with  the  providence  of 
the  visier  Alibeg,  when  he  preserved  his  shep- 
herd's pipe  and  crook;  and  may  they  be  an 
equal  consolation  on  a  descent  from  imperial 
fortunes  !  For  my  part,  I  see  not  why  Bona- 
parte should  not  be  as  happy  on  his  wife's  estate 
at  Guadaloupe,  as  Dionysius  in  his  school  at 
Athens. 

I  would  ask  the  reader's  pardon  for  detaining 
him  with  such  trifles,  if  it  were  not  for  the 
secret  connexion  they  may  have  with  the  af- 
fairs of  nations.  I  offer  it  as  a  serious  opinion, 
that  the  court,  the  revenues,  and  feelings  of  the 
Lapageries,  give  to  Martinique  and  Guada- 
loupe, at  present,  much  adventitious  importance ; 
and  I  will  even  hazard  a  conjecture,  that  they 
had  some  share  in  producing  the  only  great  ma- 
ritime enterprise  of  the  war,  the  strange  expedi- 
tion to  the  Windward  Islands.  Martinique  was 
strongly  reinforced,  the  Diamond  Rock  was 
retaken,  troops  and  arms  were  landed  at  Guada- 
loupe, and  the  combined  fleets  returned.  Such 
were  the  effects  of  an  enterprise,  in  which  so 
much  was  hazarded ;  and  Europe  had  been  at  a 
loss    to    discover    unaccomplished   objects,   less 

isproportionate  to  the  means  employed.  Per- 
liM)s,  if  we  knew  the  force  of  local  predilections 
in  the  breast  of  the  empress,  and  the  influence 


141 

of  this  Juno  and  her  friends  in  the  councils  of  the 
French  Olympus,  the  wanderings  of  the  Toulon, 
like  those  of  the  Trojan,  fleet,  would,  if  not  quite 
explained,  be  rendered  less  mysterious. 

At  least,  however,  the  real  importance  of  these, 
and  the  other  hostile  colonies,  would  compel  the 
enemy  to  expose  his  marine  frequently  in  their 
defence,  when  the  rampart  of  neutral  navigation 
no  longer  protected  them  from  urgent  distress 
and  ruin.  We  should  therefore,  by  the  measure 
I  have  proposed,  not  only  remedy  most  of  the 
great  and  complicated  evils  which  have  been 
noticed,  but  restore  to  our  navy  the  chance  of 
frequently  finding  a  hostile  fleet  to  combat,  and 
to  conquer. 

In  a  word,  by  restoring  the  colonial  trade  of 
our  enemies  to  its  proper  shape,  and  its  native 
channels,  we  should  recover  very  much,  though 
by  no  means  all,  of  those  natural  advantages  in 
the  war,  which  a  belligerent,  so  decidedly  supe- 
rior at  sea,  ought  justly  to  enjoy;  but  which 
are  at  present  most  strangely  reversed. 


But  is  this  a  case  in  which  we  have  a  right  to 
any  remedy  at  all  r  In  other  words,  is  not  the 
engaging  in  the  colonial  trade  of  our  enemies 
lawful  to  neutral  merchants,  independently  of  the 
permission  given  by  the  royal  instructions ;  and 


142 

iire  not  the  evils  which  have  been  shown  to  arise 
from  the  practice,  such  as  we  are  bound  to  sub- 
mit to,  as  flowing  from  the  exercise  of  a  right 
which  we  cannot  justly  restrain  ?  In  short, 
is  not  this  mischief,  in  the  language  of  lawyers, 
*^  damnum  absque  injuria  F' 

This,  if  attended  with  doubt,  would  be  in- 
deed a  most  important  question.  If  it  cannot  be 
satisfactorily  answered  on  the  part  of  our  country^ 
there  should  be  an  end  to  every  thought  of  re- 
sistance, if  not  also  to  complaint.  In  that  case, 
let  the  noble  conduct  of  the  Athenian  people,  on 
a  well  known  occasion,  be  a  pattern  for  our  own. 
Nothing  can  be  more  advantageous  for  us,  than 
the  suppression  of  this  commerce ,  but  if,  ^like 
the  advice  censured  by  Aristides,  it  requires  a 
breach  of  justice,  let  us  inflexibly  abstain. 

AVould  to  God,  (for  that  sacred  name  may  be 
allowably  invoked  in  behalf  of  the  virtue  he  loves,) 
would  to  God,  I  say,  that  nations  always  prized 
the  obligations  of  moral  duty,  far  beyond  every 
specious  advantage,  however  great,  that  opposed 
them  y  however  seemingly  essential  even  to  the 
care  of  self-preservation.  The  sacrifice,  though 
noble  in  design,  would  in  its  effect,  not  be  costly  ^ 
for  never  in  the  atTairs  of  nations,  was  solid  secu- 
rity, or  true  prosperity,  purchased  at  the  cost  of 
virtuous  principle.  The  page  of  history,  if  care- 
fully read  for  the  purpose,  would  establish  this 


us 

important  truth,  and  teach  us  to  deride  those 
shallow  and  unprincipled  statesmen,  who  dream 
to  the  contrary ;  though,  like  Caiaphas,  a  great 
master  of  their  school,  they  are  vain  of  their  per- 
nicious counsels,  and  say  disdainfully  to  others, 
"  Ye  know  nothing  at  all." 

But  in  this  case,  moral  right  and  visible  expe- 
diency, will  be  found  entirely  to  harmonise. 

The  neutral  powers,  it  should  first  be  observed, 
have  all  assented  to  the  rule  of  the  war  17^6,  in 
point  of  principle,  by  submitting  to  its  partial  ap- 
plication. 

Their  ships,  when  taken  in  a  direct  voyage 
to  or  from  the  hostile  countries  and  their  colo- 
nies, or  in  a  trade  between  the  latter  and  any 
other  neutral  country  but  their  own,  have  been 
always  condemned  by  our  prize  courts,  both  in 
the  last  and  the  present  war :  and  the  practice, 
during  many  years,  has  ceased  to  occasion  com- 
plaint. Yet  these  restrictions  can  be  warranted 
by  no  other  principle,  than  that  on  which  they 
were  expressly  founded,  "  the  unlawfulness  of 
trading  with  the  colonies  of  a  belligerent  in 
time  of  war,  in  a  way  not  permitted  in  time  of 
peace.'* 

On  what  other  principle  than  this,  could  Great- 
Britain  be  allowed  to  say  to  a  Dane  or  an  Ame- 
rican, the  owner  of  produce  bought  in  a  hos- 
tile colony,  and  passing  on  the  high  seas  under 


144 

his  own  flag,  in  the  one  case,  "  You  shall  not 
"  carry  it  to  America ;"  in  the  other,  "  You  shall 
"  not  carry  it  to  Europe  r"  The  right  can  plain- 
ly stand  on  no  other  foundation  than  this,  that 
Great-Britain  might  lawfully  have  prohibited  the 
taking  the  cargo  on  board  at  the  place  of  ship- 
ment, on  any  destination  whatever  ;  and,  conse- 
quently, in  waving  the  general  prohibition,  she. 
had  a  right  to  prescribe  to  what  places  it  should 
be  carried. 

If  I  should  dictate  to  a  neighbour,  that  in 
crossing  a  certain  field  which  lay  between  our 
respective  tenements,  he  and  his  servants  should 
confine  themselves  to  a  certain  path  which  I 
had  marked  out  for  the  purpose,  and  if  he 
should  for  years  comply  with  the  restriction,  or 
submit  to  be  treated  as  a  trespasser  whenever  he 
deviated  from  it ;  I  might,  consistently  enough, 
if  I  found  the  passage  a  nuisance,  shut  it  up  alto- 
gether :  but  it  would  be  grossly  inconsistent  in 
him,  thereupon  to  deny  my  right  to  the  field,  and 
pretend  that  it  was  common  land. 

Should  it,  however,  be  thought  that  the  tacit 
admission  of  the  principle,  ought  not  to  preclude 
the  neutral  powers  from  disputing,  though  in- 
consistently in  point  of  theory,  a  practical  ap- 
plication of  it,  more  extensive  than  that  in  which 
they  have  so  lon^  acquiesced,  it  must  at  least 
be  admitted,  that  in  rciverting  to  the  rule  of  the 


145 

war  1756,  Great-Britain  would  have  to  assert  no 
new  claim  of  right ;  and  would  be  only  bound  to 
assign  a  fair  reason  for  withdrawing  a  voluntary 
modification  of  its  use. 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  we  may  truly  allege  as 
a  reason  for  withdrawing  the  indulgence,  that  it 
has  been  very  grossly  abused :  and  in  the  next 
place,  what  is  enough  to  create  a  right,  and  much 
more  to  defend  the  strict  use  of  a  right  already  ex- 
isting, that  self-preservation  demands  from  us  the 
revocation  of  the  licence  we  gave. 

It  would  be  a  most  extraordinary  and  unpre- 
cedented situation  for  two  friendly  powers  to  stand 
in,  if  the  one  had  a  right  to  do  any  thing  which 
is  destructive  to  the  other.  Yet,  since  the  trade 
in  question  has  been  shown  to  be  ruinous  to  our 
hopes  in  the  war,  and  may  eventually  give  a 
superiority  at  sea,  to  an  enemy  already  enormous- 
ly superior  to  us  in  land  forces,  and  bent  on  our 
destruction,  either  the  neutral  powers  and  Great- 
Britain  stand  in  that  strange  predicament  in  rela- 
tion to  each  other,  or  we  have  a  right  to  restrain 
this  trade.  If  we  have  no  such  right,  then 
those  states  with  whom  we  are  in  perfect  friend- 
chip,  have  a  right  to  persetere  in  conduct,  which 
may,  in  its  natural  consequences,  make  England 
a  province  of  France. 

If  such  be  the  offices  of  peace  and  ^imity,  how 
V 


146 

differ  they  from  those  of  war  ?  The  harsh  rights 
of  war,  may,  indeed  be  exercised  in  a  different 
manner ;  but  their  extreme  extent,  is  to  inflict  on 
an  enemy  all  the  mischiefs  that  may  be  necessary 
to  his  subjugation  ;  and  I  do  not  see  how  these 
powers,  if  confederates  of  France,  could  contri- 
bute more  effectual  means  to  that  end,  than  those 
they  at  present  employ. 

Waving  then,  for  a  moment,  the  objections  that 
arise  to  this  commerce,  in  respect  of  its  origin 
and  objects,  and  supposing  both  to  be  unexcep- 
tionably  lawful ;  still,  if  its  further  prosecution 
be  inconsistent  with  our  safety,  the  obligations 
of  peace  and  amity,  call  on  the  neutral  powers  to 
abstain  from  it.  When  conflicting  rights  arise 
between  nations,  one  party  must  give  way,  or 
war  must  be  the  issue ;  a  right,  therefore,  which 
is  essential  to  the  existence  of  the  possessor, 
ought  to  prevail  over  one  which  is  not  of  such 
vital  importance.  Now,  the  neutral  powers  can 
i^ubsist  without  this  newly-acquired  commerce  ; 
but  Great-Britain  cannot  long  exist  as  a  nation, 
if  bereft  of  her  ancient  means  of  offensive  maritime 
v/ar. 

That  we  are  engaged  in  a  contest,  an  adverse 
i«sue  of  which  may  be  fatal  to  our  national  safety 
and  independence,  will  hardly  be  denied ;  if 
then   a  necessary  mean  of  preventing   such  an 


147 

issue  be  the  cutting  off  of  the  colonial  resources 
of  our  enemies,  to  dispute  our  right  of  doing  so 
is,  in  effect,  to  dispute  the  right  of  self-defence. 

It  is  by  no  means  necessary,  however,  to  resort 
to  this  primary  law  of  nature  and  nations ;  for 
in  truth  there  are,  in  the  case  before  us,  no  con- 
flicting rights.  Should  we  even  consent  to  wave 
the  ground  of  precedent  and  acquiescence,  and 
examine  in  the  fullest  manner  the  original  me- 
rits of  this  question,  there  will  be  found  clear 
belligerent  right,  on  the  one  side,  and  nothing 
but  palpable  encroachment  on  the  other. 

The  true  principles  on  which  the  rule  of  the 
war  1756  was  founded,  have  been  already  stated 
and  enforced,  in  a  manner  which  it  would  be  easy 
to  amplify,  but  difficult  to  improve*. 

I  will  not  hazard  such  an  attempt  s  but  rather 
content  myself  with  considering  briefly,  the  most 
specious  objections  that  have  been  offered  on  the 
other  side. 

To  the  vague  general  invectives  of  the  French 
government  on  this  subject,  no  serious  reply  can 
be  due.  Bonaparte  declaims  on  the  maritime 
despotism  of  England,  with  the  same  good  grace, 
with  which  he  imputed  assassinating  principles 
to  the  Due  D'Enghein,  perfidy  to  Toussaint,  and 
ambition  to  the  House  of  Austria.     It  is  his  pe- 

*  See  «upva,  p.  13  to  16. 


tuliar  style,  in  all  cases,  not  merely  to  defame  his 
enemies,  but  to  impute  to  them  the  very  crimes, 
which  he  is  himself,  at  the  same  moment,  per- 
petrating ;  and  of  which  they  are  the  intended 
victims.  He  is  quite  in  character,  therefore, 
when  he  accuses  us  of  trampling  on  the  mari- 
time rights  of  other  nations,  while  he,  by  the  aid 
of  those  very  nations,  is  subverting  our  own. 

He  calls  us  the  "  tyrants  of  the  sea;**  but 
if  the  throne  is  ours,  he  has  filched  away  the 
sceptre;  and  our  naval  diadem,  like  his  own 
iron  crown  of  Lombardy,  is,  in  a  commercial 
view,  cumbersome  and  worthless.  This  empire 
is  not  like  his  own ;  for  the  imperial  family  are 
less  favoured  in  it  than  their  enemies.  We 
traverse  the  ocean  at  a  greater  charge,  even  for 
security  on  the  passage,  than  those  who  have  no 
share  in  the  domain. 

The  usurper^s  favourite  topic,  of  late,  has  been 
the  liberty  of  navigation :  he  would  be  thought 
the  champion  of  the  common  rights  of  all  mari- 
time states.  What!  has  he  forgot,  or  does  he 
expect  Europe  or  America  to  forget,  the  recent 
conduct  of  France  ?  Nothing,  it  is  obvious,  but 
his  own  crafty  policy,  prevents  his  recurring,  at 
this  moment,  to  the  full  extent  of  that  extrava- 
gant pretension  on  which  the  neutral  powers 
were  so  shamefully  plundered  during  the  last 
war;  and  for  a   release   of  which  his   minister. 


149 

M.  Talleyrand,  demanded  "  heaiicoup  de  Vargenf* 
of  America — I  mean  the  monstrous  pretension 
of  a  right  to  confiscate  every  neutral  ship  and 
cargo,  in  which  one  bale  of  English  merchandize 
was  found. 

Yes  !  he  will  clamour  for  the  freedom  of  the 
seas,  as  he  did  for  the  freedom  of  France,  till 
his  neutralizing  friends  shall  have  placed  him  in 
a  condition  to  destroy  it.  But  should  his  marine 
be  ever  restored  by  their  means,  they  will  feel, 
as  Frenchmen  have  done,  the  heavy  yoke  of  a 
jealous  new-erected  despotism,  instead  of  those 
mild  and  ancient  laws,  which  they  were  foolishly 
persuaded  to  reject. 

The  only  liberty  which  this  impostor  will  for 
a  moment  patronise,  either  at  sea  or  on  shore, 
is  that  liberty  which  consists  solely  in  the  ab- 
sence of  order,  and  in  the  power  of  invading  with 
impunity  the  long-established  rights  of  others. 
It  is  a  jacobin  liberty  only  which  he  would  give 
to  navigation,  till  his  own  iron  bonds  for  it  are 
forged. 

I  decline  also  engaging  with  those  objectors, 
who,  without  copying  the  invectives  of  Bona- 
parte, dispute,  like  him,  our  right  to  suppress 
the  commerce  in  question,  on  principles  that 
impeach  the  practice  of  maritime  capture  at 
large  *. 

*  If  tjii^  reader  wishes  to  bt  informed  of  the   full   extent  of  th€se 


Those  who  have  sublimated  their  imaginations 
so  far,  as  really  to  think  that  war  ought,  in  justice 
and  mercy,  to  be  banished  from  the  boisterous 
ocean,  that  it  may  prey  the  better  and  the  longer 
on  the  social  cities  or  quiet  plains  -,  are  not  likely 
to  descend  with  me  into  the  regions  of  sober  in- 
vest igat  ion. 

To  those  idolaters  of  the  neutral  flag  also  who 
hold  a  yard  of  bunting  on  the  poop  of  a  mer- 
chantman, more  sacred  than  the  veil  of  a  vestal, 
I  have  nothing  to  oft'er.  If  this  inviolable  em- 
blem, ought  absolutely  to  arrest  the  arms  of  con- 
tending nations,  and  preserve,  in  all  cases,  the 
contents  of  its  sanctuary  from  capture ;  it  may 
with  equal  reason,  I  admit,  receive  under  its  safe- 
guard the  colonial  commerce,  as  the  general  pro- 
perty, of  a  belligerent. 

But  there  are  some  champions  of  neutral  rights, 
who,  without  openly  contending  for  these  extra- 
vagant doctrines,  maintain  stoutly  that  neutral 
merchants  have  a  right  to  trade  with  the  powers 
at  war  wherever,  and  in  whatsoever  commodi- 
ties, they  please.  If  contraband  goods,  and 
blockaded  places  be  graciously  excepted,  this  is 
the  utmost  extent  of  their  abstinence.     All  other 


revolutionary  doctrinei,  he  may  find  them  compendiously  stated,  and 
ably  and  learnedly  refuted,  in  Mr.  Ward's  Treatise  on  the  Rights  and 
Duties  of  Belligerent  and  Neutral  Pwwcrs. 


151 

neutral  commerce,  they  hold  to  be  unquestioa- 
ably  legal.  f 

Such  persons  naturally  enough  quarrel  with 
the  rule  of  the  war  1756,  and  they  attempt  to  en- 
counter the  powerful  arguments  which  I  have 
quoted  on  its  behalf,  by  objecting, 

First — ^That  neutral  nations  always  suffer  in 
their  ordinary  trade  through  the  w  ars  of  those 
maritime  friends  with  whom  they  have  any  com- 
mercial relations  ;  and  therefore  may  be  reason- 
ably allowed  to  acquire  some  compensatory  ad- 
vantages on  the  other  hand,  by  the  opening  of 
new  branches  of  commerce. 

If  neutrals  were  really  losers  by  the  wars  of 
their  neighbours,  it  would,  perhaps,  be  fortunate 
for  mankind ;  and  would  give  them  no  right  to 
indemnify  themselves,  by  accepting  in  the  form 
of  commerce,  a  bribe  from  the  weaker  party,  to 
protect  him  from  the  arms  of  the  stronger.  But 
in  the  last  and  present  war  at  least,  this  pre- 
tence has  no  shadow  of  foundation.  Let  the 
neutral  powers  confess  that  their  late  vast  ap- 
parent increase  of  commerce,  is  fictitious, 
and  that  the  frauds  also  are  gratuitous ;  or  let 
them  admit  that  independently  of  the  trade  in 
question,  they  have  enormously  profited  by  wars, 
which  to  their  friends  have  been  highly  disastrous. 
There  is  no  escaping  from  this  dilemma. 

Tfie  neutral,  however,  has  many  fair  indemni- 


152 

ties,  without  any  trespass  on  belligerent  rights. — . 
The  comparative  cheapness  of  his  navigation, 
gives  him  in  every  open  market  a  decisive  advan- 
tage. In  the  commerce  of  other  neutral  coun- 
tries, he  cannot  fail  to  supplant  the  belligerents ; 
and  the  latter  will  naturally  give  him  the  carriage 
of  such  of  his  own  commodities  as  he  before 
usually  supplied  them  with,  partly  or  wholly 
through  their  own  navigation.  What  they  used 
formerly  to  buy  in  his  ports,  they  will  now  be 
content  to  purchase  from  him,  at  an  advanced 
price,  in  their  own. 

He  obtains  also  a  still  larger  increase  of  com- 
merce, by  purchasing  from  the  one  belligerent, 
and  selling  to  his  enemy,  the  merchandize  for 
which  in  time  of  peace  they  mutually  depended 
on  each  other.  The  decay  of  his  old  branches 
of  trade,  therefore,  if  any  such  decay  arises  from 
the  war,  is  on  the  whole  amply  compensated. 

It  has  further  been  objected,  "  that  allowing 
*^  the  acquisition  of  this  trade  to  be  a  gratu- 
*'  itous  benefit  to  neutrals,  arising  out  of  the 
*'  war,  they  obtain  it  by  the  gift  of  an  inde- 
''  pendent  nation,  to  which  at  the  moment  of 
*^  that  gift  it  still  belonged ;  and  therefore  may 
"  lawfully  accept  the  boon,  without  leave  of  the 
"  adverse  belligerent.  France,  it  is  said,  still  re- 
"  tains  possession  of  her  colonies :  and,  there- 
*'  for^,  has  a  clear  legislative  right  to  regulate 


153 

"  their  commerce.  Great-Britain  is  not  even  at- 
"  tempting  the  reduction  of  those  hostile  terri- 
"  tories ;  nor  are  our  ships  now  blockading  their 
"  ports ;  to  profit^  therefore,  by  the  change  in  their 
"  commercial  laws,  by  trading  with  them  when 
*'  invited  to  do  so,  is  not  a  violation  of  neutral- 
« ity." 

This  argument  is  plainly  evasive.  It  is  not 
the  right  of  a  belligerent  to  impart  a  benefit  of 
this  kind,  but  the  right  of  a  neutral  to  accept  it, 
that  is  the  point  in  controversy.  The  carrying 
of  contraband  to  the  enemy,  or  of  provisions  to  a 
besieged  place,  might  be  defended  in  the  same 
way  5  for  the  belligerent  has  an  undoubted  right 
to  buy  those  articles,  if  carried  to  him,  or  to  con- 
tract previously  for  their  transmission  by  the 
neutral. 

But  the  belligerent  has  one  set  of  obligations, 
and  his  neutral  friend  has  another,  of  a  very  dif- 
ferent kind ;  it  is  fallacious,  therefore,  to  reason 
from  the  rights  of  the  one,  to  the  rights  or  duties 
of  the  other. 

If  the  legality  of  any  branch  of  commerce,  as 
between  the  enemy  and  a  neutral,  could  entitle  it 
to  protection  from  our  hostilities,  its  illegality, 
e  converso,  might  reasonably  subject  it  to  capture 
and  condemnation.  But  neutral  merchants  know 
to  their  great  advantage,  that  the  latter  is  not  the 
doctrine   of  the   British  prize   court*     Property 

X 


154 

to  an  immense  value  was  restored  dnring  the 
last  war,  which  was  avowedly  the  subject  of  a 
commerce  with  Spanish  territories,  contraband 
at  the  time  of  the  transaction,  by  the  law  of  Spain. 
If  our  belligerent  rights  cannot  be  enlarged  by 
any  regard  to  the  comm.ercial  law  of  the  enemy, 
considered  merely  as  such,  neither  can  they  be 
abridged  by  it. 

Did  the  transfer  in  question  create  no  preju- 
dice to  the  adverse  belligerent,  its  lawfulness 
could  not  be  disputed ;  but  if,  on  the  other 
hand,  its  direct  tendency  is  to  enable  our  enemy 
to  elude  our  lawful  hostilities,  and  to  deliver  him 
from  the  pressure  of  a  maritime  war,  and  if  these 
were  manifestly  his  only  objects  in  the  measure ; 
to  allege  the  right,  or  power  of  the  enemy,  to 
change  his  system,  in  justification  of  his  neutral 
accomplice,  is  to  offer  in  defence  of  a  wrongful 
act,  no  more  than  that  there  was  an  opportunity 
given  for  its  perpetration. 

It  is  quite  immaterial  to  the  question,  whether 
we  are  attempting  to  conquer  the  hostile  colonies, 
or  what  is  more  doubtful  perhaps,  whether  we 
might  not  successfully  have  made  such  attempts, 
if  not  prevented  by  the  effects  of  the  very  mea- 
snre  in  question ;  for  the  commerce,  not  the 
sovereignty,  of  the  colonies,  is  that  object  of 
hostile  interest,  which  is  wrongfully  protected 
against  us.     The  apologist,  therefore,  should  go 


155 

on  to  allege,  if  he  can,  that  the  colonial  naviga- 
tion and  commerce,  as  well  as  the  territory,  were 
perfectly  safe  from  our  arms. 

If  France  should  cede  to  the  United  States,  the 
island  of  Martinique,  or  Spain  the  province  of 
Mexico,  it  might  perhaps  be  a  material  defence 
for  their  accepting  the  grant,  though  adverse  to 
our  interest  in  the  war,  that  the  enemy  remained 
in  possession  when  he  made  it;  and  that  the 
colony  was  not  besieged  or  invaded ;  but  since 
the  cession  now  complained  of,  is  not  of  the  ter- 
ritory, but  of  its  maritime  trade,  the  foundation 
of  the  argument  fails ;  for  the  enemy  is  not  in 
possession,  much  less  in  an  uncontested  posses- 
sion, of  the  commerce,  which  he  affects  to  surren- 
der. He  still  holds,  indeed,  the  key  of  his  co- 
lonial ports ;  but  the  way  to  them,  is  occupied  by 
an  enemy,  whom  he  can  neither  resist  nor  escape. 
It  is  not  the  mere  right  of  landing  and  taking  on 
board  of  goods,  in  the  harbour  of  St.  Pierre,  or 
Vera  Cruz,  but  the  right  of  carriage  from  the  co- 
lony to  the  transmarine  market,  that  is  the  subject 
of  the  grant  to  the  neutral ;  and  of  this  important 
franchise,  the  enemy  found  himself  incapable  to 
defend  the  possession,  before  he  relinquished  the 
right. 

The  geographical  way  itself,  indeed,  is  com- 
mon to  all  nations  :  and  we  are  perpetually  told, 
4Jiat  the  sea  is  open  and  fifee.     Put  a  ri^ht  of  cax 


156 

i-iage  may  be  restrained,  in  respect  of  the  articles 
that  are  carried,  and  the  places  to  or  from  which 
they  pass,  as  well  as  in  respect  to  the  path-way 
itself. 

The  road  from  London  to  York,  is  open  and 
common  to  all  his  Majesty's  subjects;  but  not 
for  the  carriage  of  a  mail-bag,  to  or  from  any  part 
of  the  realm,  for  the  profit  of  private  persons.  The 
right  of  such  carriage,  notwithstanding  the  gene- 
ral freedom  of  the  York  road,  belongs  exclusive- 
ly to  the  Post-office;  and  so  did  the  carriage  of 
colonial  produce  or  supplies,  to  the  parent  state, 
notwithstanding  the  general  freedom  of  the  sea. 
In  this  respect,  the  passage  w  as  not  open  in  time 
of  peace ;  to  allege  the  common  right  of  navigat- 
ing the  ocean,  therefore,  in  defence  of  the  insidi- 
ous assignment  of  the  right  of  carriage,  is  not  less 
preposterous,  than  if  the  freedom  of  the  post- 
roads,  should  be  offered  as  an  excuse  for  the  un- 
lawful acquisition  or  transfer  of  a  post-office  con- 
tract. 

To  give  the  argument  we  are  considering, 
all  possible  scope,  let  it  be  supposed  that  the 
enemy  was  in  full  immediate  possession,  not 
only  of  his  colonies,  but  of  his  ordinary  com- 
merce with  them,  at  the  time  of  relaxing  his 
monopoly.  This  is  certainly  to  concede  much 
Tnore.than  is  due;  since  he  durst  not,  at  the 
time,    send   a  ship,  under   his   own   colours,  to 


157 

or  from  the  colonial  ports;  and  therefore,  the 
possession  of  the  commercial  franchise,  by  its 
actual  exercise,  the  only  mode  of  possession  of 
which  it  is  susceptible^,  was  suspended.  But 
supposing  the  reverse  -,  still  this  great  branch  of 
commerce  became  a  known  subject  of  belli- 
gerent contest,  on  the  commencement  of  a  mari- 
time war ;  for  it  would  be  trifling  to  go  about  to 
prove,  that  Great-Britain  must  always  look  to 
the  colonial  trade  of  France  and  S[*ain,  as  the 
first  object  of  her  hostilities.  When  we  drew 
the' sword,  it  was  notice  to  every  neutral  power, 
that  this  commerce  was  no  longer  an  uncontested 
possession  of  our  enemies ;  but  rather  a  prize 
set  up  within  the  lists  of  war,  the  seizure  or  de- 
fence of  which  would  be  a  principal  aim  of  the 
combatants.  If  so,  how  can  the  assisting  our 
enemies  to  withdraw  the  rich  stake  from  the 
fieldj  be  reconciled  with  the  duties  of  neutrali- 
ty ? 

Let  it  be  supposed,  that  a  large  fleet  of  French 
and  Spanish  merchantmen,  with  their  owners  on 
board,  were  passing  the  sea  under  convoy ;  and 
that  receiving  information  on  their  way,  of  the 
position  of  a  British  squadron  sent  out  to  take 
them,  by  which  they  must  infallibly  be  inter- 
cepted in  a  few  hours,  they  should  avail  them- 
selves of  an  opportunity  to  sell  the  ships  and 
•cargoes  to  some  neutral  merchants,  whom  they 


158 

met  with  at  the  moment  at  sea ;  it  will  hardly 
be  thought  that  such  a  transfer  would  be  valid 
against  tlie  British  captors,  if  the  squadron 
should  afterwards  fall  in  with  and  capture  the 
fleet. 

Yet  what  principle  of  natural  justice  makes  it 
otherwise,  that  does  not  equally  apply  to  the  case 
of  the  colonial  trade  ?  The  purchase  of  ships  and 
cargoes  at  sea,  is  not  a  wider  departure  from  the 
ordinary  course  of  commerce,  thaji  trading  in  su- 
gar and  coffee  under  foreign  flags,  in  the  West- 
Indies  y  the  right  of  the  owner  to  sell,  in  the  one 
instance,  may  be  alleged  as  plausibly  as  the  right 
of  the  hostile  state  to  open  its  ports,  in  the  other; 
and  the  motive  is  in  both  cases  the  same. 

But  when  we  advert  to  the  principles,  on  which 
the  trade  in  question  is  defended,  this  illustration 
is  far  too  weak,  to  show  their  injustice.  There  is 
not  one  of  them  that  would  not  serve  to  justify  the 
sale  of  the  merchantmen  in  the  supposed  case  to 
the  neutral,  if  made  after  the  British  squadron  had 
come  up,  and  when  it  was  on  the  point  of  taking 
the  convoy. 

The  justice  of  municipal  law,  may  furnish  us 
here  with  some  fair  analogies. 

Is  property  of  any  kind,  when  the  specific 
subject  of  litigation,  aliened  by  the  party  in  pos- 
session pending  a  suit  for  its  recovery,  and  to  a 
person  who  has  notice  of  that  suit ;  the  accept- 


159 

ance  of  it,  is  a  wrong  to  the  adverse  party ;  and 
he  may  assert  against  the  grantee,  though  a 
purchaser  at  an  adequate  price,  the  same  specific 
rights  which  he  had  against  his  first  opponent. 
With  equal  reason,  Great-Britain  may  exercise 
against  this  commerce,  though  assigned  to  neu- 
trals, the  right  of  maritime  capture. 

Should  it  be  objected,  tliat  there  is  no  specific 
title  vested  in  the  adverse  belligerent  but  only  a 
general  right  of  seizure,  I  answer,  that  this  dis- 
tinction, though  often  allowed  in  favour  of  com- 
mercial convenience,  is  not  held  by  municipal 
law  to  affect  the  equity  of  the  rule  when  the 
intent  of  the  transaction  is,  to  defeat  such  ge- 
neral rights;  as  might  be  shown  by  reference 
to  the  bankrupt  laws,  and  other  parts  of  our 
code. 

In  the  case,  for  instance,  of  goods  removed  by 
a  tenant  from  his  leasehold  premises,  to  avoid  a 
distress  for  rent,  and  sold  for  that  purpose  to  a 
third  person  privy  to  the  fraud,  the  landlord  may 
follow,  and  seize  them  within  a  limited  time,  even 
in  the  hands  of  the  purchaser.  The  latter  also, 
if  an  accomplice  in  the  contrivance,  is  regarded 
as  a  criminal,  and  punished  by  a  forfeiture  of 
double  the  value  of  the  goods. 

In  this,  I  apprehend,  as  in  the  former  case, 
the  rule  of  American  law  is  conformable  to  that 
of  England ;    but  should  the  general  equity  of  it 


160 

appear  at  all  doubtful,  let  the  following  further 
circumstances  be  added  to  the  illegal  transac- 
tion. Let  it  be  supposed,  that  the  tenant,  in 
consequence  of  previous  distresses,  or  from 
other  causes,  has  no  means  of  sending  his  own 
corn  or  hay  to  market,  by  his  own  waggons,  as 
formerly,  so  as  to  avoid  a  seizure  by  the  land- 
lord ;  and  therefore,  contrary  to  all  ordinary 
usage,  and  to  the  necessary  economy  of  his 
business,  offers  to  sell  them  in  the  stack  to  his 
neighbours,  at  a  low  price,  to  be  conveyed  by 
them,  on  their  own  account,  in  their  own  ve- 
hicles, from  the  premises.  Should  they,  know- 
ing his  necessities,  and  his  dishonest  views,  take 
the  proffered  advantage,  and  send  their  own  carts 
and  waggons  into  his  farm-yard  for  the  purpose; 
surely  the  justice  of  the  rule  of  law  would,  in 
such  a  case,  be  readily  admitted.  The  applica- 
tion is  sufficiently  obvious. 

It  has  been  further  objected  to  the  rule  of  the 
war  1756,  "  that  neutrals  are  allowed,  without 
"  opposition,  in  other  cases,  to  avail  themselves 
*^  of  various  alterations  in  the  laws  of  the  bel- 
"  ligerent  states,  to  which  the  policy  of  war  has 
"  given  birth,  and  by  virtue  of  which  they  are 
"  admitted  into  several  branches  of  trade  with 
"  the  metropolitan  country  itself,  which  were 
"  not  open  before,  as  well  as  encouraged  to 
*'  engage  more  extensively  in  others,  by  greater 


161 

*^  privilege  and  favour  than  the  pacific  system 
"  allowed.  In  some  cases,  therefore,  it  is  argued, 
"  we  ourselves  admit,  that  it  is  lawful  to  trade 
'^  with  an  enemy  in  time  of  war,  in  a  way  not 
"  permitted  in  time  of  peace :  and  should  we 
"  now  assert  a  contrary  principle,  many  well- 
*'  established  branches  of  neutral  commerce  in 
"  the  European  seas,  and  even  with  Great-Bri- 
''  tain  herself,  might  be  on  the  same  ground 
''  abolished." 

This  is  an  argument  of  the  same  family  with 
those  modern  political  sophisms,  by  which  na- 
tions have  been  convulsed,  and  kingdoms  over- 
thrown. 

To  confound  practical  moderation,  with  theo- 
retical inconsistency,  to  reject  all  principles  that 
cannot  be  followed  into  their  extreme  conse- 
quences, and  to  justify  one  excess  by  the  in- 
conveniences of  another,  are  effectual  weapons 
for  the  assault  of  every  legal  or  political  system, 
and  for  the  defence  of  every  innovation. 

I  admit  that  partial  changes  in  the  commercial 
laws  of  a  belligerent  state,  are  occasionally  made 
in  favour  of  neutral  commerce ;  and  that  when 
such  changes  are  calculated  to  produce  an  eifect 
on  the  war,  advantageous  to  the  party  w  ho  makes 
them,  and  detrimental  to  his  opponent,  they  fall 
in  strictness  within  the  principle  of  the  rule  of 
the  war    1756,    though   the    commerce   of  the 

y 


162 

mother  country  only,  not  of  the  colonies,  should 
be  their  subject. 

But  of  what  nature  have  been  tliese  altera- 
tions ?  Not  an  unqualified  admission,  as  in  the 
colonial  case,  of  neutral  ships,  into  ports  Avhere 
no  foreign  prow  could  enter  for  any  commercial 
end  before  ;  not  an  entire  surrender  of  a  national 
privilege,  or  monopoly,  which,  in  time  of  peace, 
was  always  jealously  maintained  ;  much  less,  an 
invocation  of  neutrals,  to  conduct  an  intercourse 
essential  to  the  existence  of  one  part  of  the  em- 
pire, and  which  must,  otherwise,  be  totally  lost ; 
but  for  the  most  part,  only  a  reduction  or  remis- 
sion of  duties,  and  at  the  utmost,  a  j^ermissioa 
to  import  or  export  specific  articles,  to  or  from 
some  foreign  country,  in  a  manner  not  allowed 
before. 

I  except^  of  course,  that  indiscriminate  admis- 
sion into  every  branch  of  the  commerce  of  our 
enemies,  including  even  their  coasting  trade, 
which  has  now  taken  place.  The  comprehensive 
enormity  of  the  existing  wrong  itself,  will  hardly 
be  objected,  in  defence  of  its  most  exceptionable 
branch ;  besides,  as  to  the  coasting  trade,  the 
employment  of  neutral  vessels  in  it,  is  treated 
by  our  prize  tribunals  as  illegal,  though  the  ex- 
treme penalty  of  confiscation,  has  not  yet  been 
applied*.     Perhaps   his   Majesty *s   government, 

*i^  Case  of  tke  Emauuel,  Soderstromj  4  Robinson,  296. 


163 

finding  the  mote  lenient  sanctions  of  a  forfeiture 
of  freight,  and  expenses,  and  such  further  dis- 
couragements as  have  been  hitherto  applied,  to 
be  wholly  ineffectual,  ought  to  consider  this  as 
a  branch  of  illicit  trade,  to  which  the  forfeiture 
of  ship  and  cargo  should  in  future  be  annexed^ 
and  to  issue  an  instruction  for  that  purpose  *. 

In  all  other,  and  ordinary  innovations  of  this 
kind,  the  change  has  rather  been  in  the  enlarge- 
ment of  an  existing  intercourse,  than  the  open- 
ing of  one  which  had  been  quite  interdicted 
before.  But  the  change  in  the  colonial  com- 
merce, has  amounted,  in  respect  of  the  flag  and 
the  voyage,  to  an  entire  revolution  ^  except  in 
certain  free  ports,  and  in  some  special  cases,  the 
entry  of  a  foreign  vessel  into  a  colonial  port,  for 
any  mercantile  purpose,  is  a  kind  of  commercial 
adultery,  to  which,  till  the  divorce  occasioned 
by  war,  no  colonizing  power  submitted. 

This  distinction  is  important,  not  only  to  the 


*  The  fact  of  hostile  property  in  this  trade,  as  in  the  rest,  is  co- 
Tcred  by  such  abundant  and  accurate  perjur^'^,  that  unless  a  judge 
were  at  liberty  to  act  on  the  firm  persuasion  of  his  mind,  arising  from 
general  presumptions,  against  the  fullest  positive  testimony,  the  cargoes 
can  rarely  be  condemned  ;  and  consequently  forfeiture  of  freight,  is  a 
penalty  that  can  rarely  be  applied.  The  further  discouragement  here 
alluded  to,  is  the  privation  of  such  indulgences,  in  admission  of  future 
evidence,  as  claimants  of  property  taken  in  a  fair  and  lawful  trade  are 
entitled  to. 


164 


nature  and  extent  of  the  wrong,  but  to  the  con- 
venience of  the  remedy. 

The  redress  which  the  injured  belligerent  ob- 
tains, by  the  seizure  of  the  offending  vessels,  is 
naturally  offensive  in  its  mode,  and  liable  to 
abuse  in  its  application.  The  right  of  capture, 
therefore,  ought  not  to  be  exercised  against  neu- 
trals, but  in  cases  which  admit  of  being  broadly 
and  clearly  defmed  ;  for  it  is  better  to  submit  to 
many  palpable  encroachments  on  the  confines 
of  our  belligerent  rights,  than  to  guard  them 
with  a  strictness  which  may  be  inconvenient  to 
our  peaceable  neighbours.  If  it  were  resolved 
to  apply  the  rule  of  the  war  17^6,  to  all  the 
branches  and  modes  of  European  commerce 
with  our  enemies,  to  which  neutrals  have  been 
admitted  during  the  war,  and  in  consequence  of 
the  war,  it  would  be  a  line  of  conduct  difficult 
to  draw  with  precision,  even  in  the  cabinet  -, 
nor  however  carefully  delineated  by  specific  in- 
structions to  our  cruizers,  would  its  practical 
application  be  easy.  It  would  also  give  birth  to 
endless  distinctions  in  judgment,  and  to  an  in- 
finity of  petty  and  intricate  disputes  with  the 
neutral  nations ;  for  let  it  be  remembered,  that 
not  the  novelty  of  the  trade  only,  but  the  motive 
of  its  permission  by  the  enemy,  is  essential  to  the 
Tule  in  tjuestion. 


165 

And  here  let  me  point  out  by  the  way,  a  new 
reason  for  not  allowing  the  particular  manner 
and  motive  of  an  importation  into  a  neutral 
country,  to  determine  the  right  of  re-exporting 
the  same  goods  to  a  foreign  market,  or  its  lia- 
bihty  to  seizure  on  the  way.  If  the  direct  trade 
between  the  hostile  countries  and  their  colonies 
is  to  be  legalized  by  nice  distinctions,  the  fact 
of  which  a  visiting  officer  can  never  with  cer- 
tainty discover,  it  would  be  better  at  once  to 
give  up  the  whole  of  that  important  rule  for 
which  I  contend,  and  allow  the  intercourse  to 
be  conducted  by  neutrals  in  a  direct  and  single 
voyage. 

The  colonial  trade,  however,  is  further  distin- 
guishable from  those  other  branches  of  com- 
merce, which  have  been  the  subjects  of  a  like 
belligerent  policy,  in  some  very  essential  fea- 
tures. 

It  differs  from  them,  not  only  in  the  j)t?culiar 
strictness,  and  broad  generical  character  of  the 
monopoly  by  the  parent  state  during  peace, 
which  is  fraudulently  suspended  in  war ;  but  in 
the  nature  of  those  interests  which  it  involves, 
and  in  the  principles  on  which  it  is,  in  its  natural 
course,  conducted. 

Strictly  speaking,  it  is  not  commerce  ;  though, 
in  conformity  to  common  usage,  and  for  want  of 
an    appropriate   term,   I  bave   liitherto  given  it 


166 

that  appellation;  and  I  cannot  help  thinking, 
that  the  difficulty,  (if  to  any  impartial  mind  tlicre 
really  appears  any  difficulty  at  all,  attendant  on 
this  plain  question)  would  never  have  been  itna- 
gined,  if  the  anomalous  intercourse  between  rt 
mother  country  and  its  colony,  had  not  been 
confounded  in  idea,  through  the  use  of  a  vague 
general  name,  with  ordinary  commerce  or 
trade. 

Commerce,  in  its  proper  signification,  implies 
both  buying  and  selling ;  and  in  a  commercial 
voyage,  goods  are  usually  either  transmitted 
from  the  seller  in  one  country,  to  the  buyer  in 
another ;  or  sent  on  the  buyer's  account,  for  sale 
in  a  different  market. 

But  what  is  the  general  object  of  shipments 
in  time  of  peace,  from  Europe  to  a  West-India 
island  ?  To  send  for  sale,  merchandize  which 
has  been  purchased  or  ordered,  on  account  either 
of  the  shipper  or  consignee  ?  No  such  thing : 
If  we  except  small  quantities  of  provisions,  cloath- 
ing,  and  other  necessaries,  destined  for  the  sup- 
ply of  the  few  white  inhabitants,  which  are 
bought  in  Europe  by  the  agents  of  the  West-In- 
dia store-keepers,  and  sent  to  them  on  their  ac- 
count, to  be  retailed  in  their  stores  or  shops;  the 
outward  cargoes  are  all  shipped  by  planters,  or  the 
agents  of  planters,  and  consigned  to  them,  their  at- 
tornics,  or  mauagei^s,  for  the  use  of  their  estates. 


167 

Again,  on  the  return  voyages,  are  the  cargoes 
composed  of  goods,  the  subjects  of  mercantile  en- 
terprise, which  have  been  shipped  by  merchants 
in  the  colony  on  their  own  account,  or  on  ac- 
count of  merchants  in  Europe,  by  whom  they  have 
been  ordered  ?  By  no  means :  they  consist  al- 
most universally,  of  the  produce  of  the  planta- 
tionsj  sent  by  the  planters  to  their  own  agents  in 
the  mother  country;  or  which  is  much  more  com- 
mon, to  the  planter  himself  in  that  country,  by  his 
own  manager  in  the  colony. 

Am  I  asked  how  such  transactions  differ  from 
commerce  ?  I  answer — in  the  same  degree,  that 
a  man  sending  his  own  wine,  from  his  cellar  in 
London  to  his  house  in  the  country,  differs  from 
commerce  ;  and  in  the  same  degree  that  a  gentle- 
man farmer,  who  sends  his  own  corn  to  his  factor 
in  the  market  town,  differs  from  a  merchant. 

In  these  cases,  indeed,  inland  carriage  is  used, 
and  in  the  former,  a  passage  by  sea,  which,  from 
habitual  association  of  ideas,  seems  to  us  to  give 
a  mercantile  character  to  the  transaction  ;  but 
let  us  divest  ourselves  for  a  moment  of  this  pre- 
judice, and  that  transniission  of  goods  across  the 
Atlantic  by  the  owners,  which  we  call  the  co- 
lonial trade,  will  be  seen  to  be,  it  its  general  na- 
ture, no  more  commercial,  than  the  carriage  of 
the  wine  or  the  corn,  in  the  cases  I  have  men- 
tioned. 


168 

The  plantation  stores,  indeed,  are  purchased  by 
the  planter,  previous  to  their  shipment ;  and  the 
produce  will  be  sent  to  market  by  the  consignee, 
and  sold,  after  its  arrival:  but  the  commercial 
transaction  in  the  one  case,  was  finished  before 
the  commencement  of  the  voyage;  in  the  other, 
it  does  not  commence,  till  after  the  voyage  has 
ended.  Till  the  planter,  or  his  agent,  sends  the 
produce  from  the  warehouse  to  the  market,  it  is 
not  in  any  sense  the  subject  of  trade ;  and  even 
the  ultimate  sale,  on  account  of  the  grower  of  the 
commodity,  cannot  strictly  be  regarded  as  a  mer- 
cantile transaction.  If  it  be  such,  every  farmer 
is  a  mercliant. 

These  are  far  from  mere  verbal  distinctions. 
They  go  to  the  root  of  the  pretences,  such  as 
they  are,  by  which  the  neutral  intercourse  be- 
tween the  enemy  and  his  colonies  is  defended; 
for  if  the  subject  of  acquisition  by  the  neutral, 
is  not  of  a  commercial  nature,  or  was  not  such 
till  made  so  for  the  purpose  of  enabling  him  to 
acquire  it,  there  is  an  end  of  all  the  arguments 
or  declamations  that  turn  on  the  variable  and 
assignable  nature  of  commerce  in  time  of  peace, 
and  to  III!  tli(/  supposed  analogies  between  this 
commerce,  and  other  new-born  branches  of  neu- 
tral navigation.  This  is  not,  like  the  other  cases, 
merely  the  carrying  on  of  a  trade  in  foreign  bot- 
loins,  ijiid  on  foreign  account,  which  before  was 


169 

carried  on  in  native  bottoms,  and  on  native  ac- 
count; but  it  is  the  converting  into  a  trade,  of 
that  which  before  was  a  mere  removal  of  goods, 
without  any  transfer  of  property. 

A  new  character,  as  well  as  a  new  conveyance, 
is  given  to  the  exports  and  imports  of  the  colo- 
nies. The  alleged  right  to  protect  them,  is  found- 
ed on  their  being  commercial ;  but  they  were 
first  made  commercial,  in  order  to  be  protected  ; 
and  if  the  neutral  merchant  really  carries  them 
on  his  own  account,  he  do^s  more  than  was 
done  by  the  enemy  merchants,  before  the  war. 
Not  only  the  ancient  system  of  navigation,  there- 
fore, but  the  ancient  course  of  colonial  econo- 
my, is  inverted,  for  the  sake  of  eluding  our  hostili- 
ties. 

But  there  is  another,  and  perhaps  a  still  stronger 
ground  of  distinction,  between  this  and  all  the 
other  branches  of  commerce,  which  neutrals  have 
been  allowed  to  conduct  in  time  of  war. 

The  capital  employed  in  colonial  agriculture 
belongs,  for  the  most  part,  to  the  mother  coun- 
try, where  the  owners  or  mortgagees  reside ; 
and  the  produce  sent  to  Europe  is  chiefly  the 
returns  on  that  capital :  consequently  the  mother 
country  has  a  beneficial  interest  in  the  remit- 
tance, quite  distinct  from  its  commercial  use, 
and  which  equals  or  bears  a  large  proportion  to 
its  entire  value.     It  is  not  merely  a  medium  or  ver 

Z 


17Q 

hide  of  commercial  gain,  or  a  subject  of  manu- 
facturing profit;  but  is,  abstractedly  from  its 
specific  form  and  use,  substantial  wealth  and  re- 
venue. It  differs  from  ordinary  commercial  im- 
ports, as  corn-rent  paid  to  a  land-holder,  differs 
from  the  purchased  corn  of  the  miller  or  specula- 
tor in  grain. 

Let  the  effects  of  this  difference,  as  to  the  perils 
of  carriage  in  war,  be  fairly  considered.  . 

In  other  branches  of  trade,  to  destroy  the  com- 
mercial profit  of  an  enemy,  or  highly  aggravate 
the  price  of  a  particular  commodity  consumed  by 
him,  is  to  make  him  feel  effectually  the  pressure 
of  the  war ;  and  these  ends  may  possibly  be  ac- 
complished, notwithstanding  his  resort  to  the  pro- 
tection of  neutral  flags. 

In  respect  of  goods  which  he  buys  to  sell  again 
to  foreigners,  either  in  the  same  or  a  meliorated 
state,  and  even  in  respect  of  manufactures  for  fo- 
reign markets,  of  which  a  native  commodity  is  the 
basis,  the  enhanced  price  of  maritime  carriage 
may  be  fatal  to  his  hopes  of  profit.  You  ruin  the 
trade,  when  you  cut  off  the  gains  of  the  merchant. 
But  his  colonial  produce  is,  for  the  most  part,  the 
returns  of  a  transmarine  capital  already  laid  out 
and  invested.  The  importation  of  it,  therefore, 
cannot  cease  to  be  beneficial  to  him,  unless  you 
could  raise  by  your  hostilities  the  price  of  car- 
riage, till  it  became  equal  to  the  entire  gross 
value  of  the  commodity.     Nothing  else,  except 


171 

the  actual  interception  of  the  produce  by  cap- 
ture, can  make  him  feel  the  full  effect  of  the  war. 

In  other  cases  also,  to  force  him  out  of  his 
ordinary  methods,  or  established  channels  of 
trade,  might  be  to  destroy  the  trade  itself.  If  he 
could  no  more  import  raw  silk  or  cotton,  by  his 
own  navigation  into  France,  or  could  no  longer 
buy  goods  in  the  Levant  or  the  East-Indies,  to 
sell  them  again  in  the  north  of  Europe,  his  fac- 
tories at  Smyrna  and  Canton  might  be  abandoned. 
But  the  case  is  very  different  in  respect  of  the 
returns  of  his  colonial  capital.  As  long  as  French 
or  Spanish  sugar  and  coffee,  can  pass  from  the 
West-Indies,  under  neutral  colours,  or  even  on 
neutral  account,  to  any  market  on  earth,  so  long 
the  colonial  interests  of  the  planter,  and  of  the 
state,  will  be  partially,  if  not  wholly,  protected 
from  the  ruinous  effects  of  war :  the  value  of 
the  produce  will  find  its  way  to  France  and  Spain, 
though  the  produce  itself  should  be  excluded. 

I  infer,  then,  from  these  essential  distinctions, 
that  if  we  were  bound  to  submit  to  all  the  other 
encroachments  of  the  neutral  flag,  their  admis- 
sion into  the  ports  of  the  hostile  colonies,  might 
still  be  fairly  and  consistently  resisted. 

Perhaps  these  flimsy  defences  may  not  be 
thought  worthy  of  the  time  that  has  been  spent 
in  their  refutation ,  and  yet  I  know  of  none  more 
specious  that  the  apologists  of  neutral  encroach- 


17« 

ments  have  offered.  In  general,  a  vague  and 
senseless  clamour,  is  their  substitute  for  argu- 
ment. "  Piratical  depredations,"  and  "  mari- 
time despotism,'*  are  phrases  which  they  inces- 
santly repeat ;  and  like  the  vociferations  of  "  stop 
thief,"  by  a  pickpocket,  it  is  a  species  of  logic, 
which,  if  it  proves  not  their  innocence,  at  least 
favours  their  escape. 

After  all  that  has  been,  or  can  be  said,  on  this 
important  subject,  one  plain  question  will  proba- 
bly be  felt  to  be  decisive,  by  every  equitable  mind. 

^c2uo  animo  ? — ^With  what  intention,  did  the 
enemy  open  the  ports  of  his  colonies  to  foreign 
flags? 

If  it  was  with  commercial  views,  or  for  the 
mere  sake  of  imparting  a  benefit  to  friendly 
powers,  their  acceptance  of  the  boon  may,  per- 
haps, be  justifiable :  but  if  the  single,  manifest, 
undissembled,  object  was  to  obtain  protection 
and  advantage  in  the  war,  to  preserve  his  colonial 
interests  without  the  risk  of  defending  them, 
and  to  shield  himself  in  this  most  vulnerable 
part,  against  t'he  naval  hostilities  of  England ;  I 
say,  if  such  was  the  manifest,  and  known  pur- 
pose of  the  measure,  I  see  not  how  any  dispas- 
Tsionate  mind  can  doubt  for  a  moment,  that  a  co- 
operation in  such  an  expedient,  by  powers  in 
amity  with  England,  was  xi  violation  of  the  duties 
of  neutrality. 


173 

The  motive,  indeed,  on  their  part,  may  not  have 
been  hostile ;  it  was  the  covetous  desire,  perhaps, 
only  of  commercial  gain ;  but  if  they  give  effect 
to  a  belligerent  stratagem  of  our  enemy,  whether 
of  an  offensive,  or  defensive  kind,  knowing  it  to 
be  such,  they  become  instruments  of  his  insidious 
purpose,  and  accomplices  in  his  hostile  act.  If 
the  commercial  motive  can  defend  them  from 
the  charge  of  inimical  conduct,  then  let  the  hired 
assassin,  who  acts  without  malice  to  the  victim,  be 
absolved  from  the  guilt  of  the  murder. 

Is  it  then  a  doubt,  I  will  not  say  with  any 
statesman,  but  with  any  individual  merchant,  in 
America,*  Prussia,  or  Denmark,  that  security  and 
advantage  in  the  war,  were  the  sole  objects  of  this^ 
measure  with  the  belligerent  governments  that 
adopted  it  ?  They  themselves  have  never  lent 
their  neutral  accomplices  so  much  countenance, 
as  to  pretend  the  contrary.  Some  of  them  did 
not  scruple  even  to  recite  the  obvious  truth,  in 
the  public  instruments,  by  which  their  ports  were 
opened. 

But  the  avowal  was  unnecessary:  and  could 
a  doubt  on  this  subject  have  existed  during  the 
last  war,  it  would  have  been  precluded  in  the 
present,  by  the  intermediate  conduct  of  those 
powers,  after  the  peace  of  Amiens.  So  far  was 
the  change  of  system  from  being  permanent,  as 
was  argued,  on  behalf  of  the  neutral  claimants 


174 

in  the  last  war,  that  orders  were  sent  to  reverse 
it,  the  moment  the  sword  was  sheathed.  Even 
those  foreigners,  who  had  a  right  to  remove  their 
property  from  the  hostile  colonies,  within  a  limit- 
ed time,  by  virtue  of  the  treaty  of  Amiens,  could 
not  obtain  liberty  to  use  their  own  ships  for  the 
purpose ;  nay,  Bonaparte,  with  all  his  predilec- 
tion for  the  slave  trade,  refused  permission  to 
the  planters  of  Tol)ago,  to  import  negroes  6n 
their  own  account  in  foreign  bottoms. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  first  advices  of  a  new 
war  with  Great-Britain,  were  accompanied,  in  all 
the  colonies,  with  orders  to  open  their  ports  again 
to  all  the  former  extent. 

The  hardiest  champion  of  this  commerce  then,' 
will  now  scarcely  venture  to  deny,  that  it  not  only 
grew  out  of,  but  is  to  end  with  the  war.  Should 
we,  however,  hear  again  of  any  doubt  on  that 
point,  or  of  the  title  to  commercial  advantages 
under  a  grant  from  our  enemies,  let  the  grant  it- 
self be  produced ;  let  a  treaty  between  our 
enemies  and  any  neutral  power  be  shown,  by 
which  the  possession  of  these  advantages  Is  secur- 
ed for  a  single  moment. 

Some  engagement  of  that  kind,  might  seem 
necessary,  even  to  the  security  of  the  neutral 
merchants,  if  they  really  carry  on  the  colonial 
trade,  as  they  pretend,  with  their  own  capitals, 
■and  on  their  own  account:  for  how  are  they  to 


175 

collect  and  bring  away  the  immense  funds,  which 
they  are  continually  representing,  in  our  prize 
courts,  to  have  been  intrusted  by  them  to  their 
correspondents  in  the  colonies,  and  to  purchasers 
of  their  outward  cargoes,  resident  there,  if  the 
ports,  on  the  cessation  of  war,  are  suddenly  sub- 
jected again  to  the  ancient  monopoly  ?  We  have, 
however,  I  admit,  heard  of  no  inconvenience 
having  arisen  from  this  source,  subsequent  to  the 
treaty  of  Amiens.  The  doors  were  suddenly 
shut,  but  there  have  been  no  complaints  that  any 
neutral  wealth  was  shut  in.  It  had  vanished,  no 
doubt,  like  the  gold  and  jewels  of  an  Arabian 
tale,  on  the  reversal  of  the  talisman  that  pro- 
duced it. 

If  then  this  trade  has  not  the  promise,  or  hope 
of  existing  beyond  the  war  that  gave  it  birth, 
the  advantage  arising  from  it  in  the  war,  is  the 
palpable  and  only  object  of  the  enemy  in  open- 
ing it,  and  the  neutral  cannot  in  this,  as  in  for- 
mer cases,  pretend  that  there  was  a  different,  or 
even  a  concurrent  motive,  such  as  may  excuse 
his  acceptance  of  the  benefit.  The  service  to 
the  enemy,  in  a  belligerent  view,  is  the  rent 
paid  for  the  possession  of  a  commerce,  which  is 
strangely  pretended  to  be  neutral :  and  the  term 
is  by  tacit  compact  to  cease,  when  that  rent  can 
be  rendered  no  longer. 

But,  it  is  not  only  in  its  motive  and  purpose 


176 

that  the  transaction  is  of  a  hostile  character.  I 
have  shown,  also,  that  the  effects  actually  produc- 
ed, are  of  a  kind  most  directly  hostile  and  injuri- 
ous ;  that  the  commerce  in  question,  not  only  pro- 
tects, but  strengthens  our  enemies,  and  puts  ma- 
ritime arms  again  into  their  hands,  for  our  future 
annoyance  and  ruin. 

This  neutrality,  is  like  that  of  the  poetic  dei- 
ties, who,  when  it  is  unlawful  to  them  to  engage 
in  the  battle,  not  only  cover  their  favourite  hero 
with  a  cloud,  and  withdraw  him  from  the  pur- 
suit of  his  opponent,  but  restore  to  him  the 
sword,  which  he  had  previously  lost  in  the  com- 
bat. 

Let  me,  however,  refer  our  Christian,  though 
very  unreasonable  friends,  to  a  better  standard, 
than  that  of  poetic  divinity.  St.  Paul  holds  him- 
self an  accomplice  in  the  murder  of  Stephen, 
though  he  took  no  active  part  in  it  beyond  keep- 
ing the  clothes  of  the  assassins  :  but  on  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  pretensions  I  am  combating,  this 
was  neiitralitij.  Nay,  St.  Paul  might  have  in- 
nocently gone  much  further,  tlian  thus  to  faci- 
litate the  act,  by  the  accommodation  of  those  who 
were  engaged  in  it.  He  might  not  only  have 
taken  care  of  their  clothes,  but  furnished  them 
stones  for  their  purpose. 


177 

Without  attempting  further  to  illustrate  thig 
very  plain,  though  controverted  subject,  I  con- 
clude, that  the  illegality  of  this  commerce,  is  as 
certain  as  its  mischievous  tendency ;  that  to  en- 
gage in  it,  is  to  interpose  in  the  war,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  rescuing  our  enemy  from  our  superior  na- 
val force  ;  or,  in  the  terms  of  an  expressive  meta- 
phor sometimes  applied  to  it,  '^  hosti  imminenti 
eripere  hostem  j"  and  that  the  merchants  who  thus 
grossly  violate  the  duties,  have  no  claim  to  the 
rights  of  neutrality. 


Such  is  the  obvious  remedy  for  this  grand  evil 
in  the  war,  and  such  our  right  of  applying  it. 

The  other  abuses  of  the  neutral  flag,  a  parti- 
cular examination  of  which  does  not  belong  to 
my  present  plan,  admit  not  of  so  simple  a  cure ; 
for  they  chiefly  consist  in  the  fraudulent  carriage 
of  hostile  property,  under  the  cloak  of  a  fictitious 
neutrality,  in  voyages  which  fall  within  the  law- 
ful range  of  neutral  navigation.  To  these,  there- 
fore, no  general  remedy  can  be  applied,  unless 
a  method  could  be  found  of  either  increasing,  in 
the  minds  of  neutral  merchants,  respect  for  tlie 
obligation  of  veracity,  or  obviating  in  our  courts 
of  prize,  the  deceptions  influence  of  false- 
hood- 

^  A 


178 

In  truth,  the  unprecedented  extent  and  sucqess 
of  fraudulent  claims,  is  a  natural  and  almost  un- 
avoidable effect  of  the  long  duration  of  maritime 
war,  especially  in  a  war,  the  circumstances  of 
which  have  excited,  beyond  all  former  example, 
the  efforts  of  deceit  in  our  enemies  and  their 
neutralizing  agents. 

To  make  this  truth  perfectly  intelligible  and 
clear,  it  would  be  necessary  to  spend  more  time 
than  I  or  my  readers  can  spare>  in  an  exposition 
of  the  practice  of  the  prize  courts.  I  must  be 
contented  with  observing,  that  the  original  evi- 
dence which  is  to  justify  a  capture,  and  lead  to 
condemnation,  must  be  obtained  from  the  cap- 
tured vessel,  either  in  the  papers  wliich  are  put 
on  board  by  the  alleged  owners  and  shippers 
themselves,  or  in  the  testimony  of  the  master 
and  the  other  persons  on  board,  when  examined 
on  standing  interrogatories.  Since  then  the  evi-r 
dence  all  proceeds  from  the  ostensible  proprietors 
themselves,  or  from  their  agents,  or  witnesses  in 
their  service  and  pay,  it  cannot  be  supposed  that 
facts  will  often  be  brought  to  light  intentional- 
ly, which  the  true  owners  may  desire  to  conceal. 
It  may  even  create  surprise,  that  a  captor  is 
ever  able  to  establish  a  case  in  point  of  evidence, 
which  will  entitle  him  to  a  favourable  sentence: 
nor  would  this  often  happen,  if  the  standing  in- 
terrogatories were  not  very  numerous  and  close. 


179 

and  so  wisely  framed  by  the  light  of  progressive 
experience,  that  it  is  difficult  for  a  witness,  not 
previously  apprized  of  their  terms,  so  to  answer 
them  all,  as  to  support  consistently,  in  all  its  parts, 
the  necessary  tale  of  falsehood. 

But,  unhappily,  after  a  war  has  lasted  long,  the 
neutralizing  agents,  and  the  masters  and  officers 
they  employ,  become  perfectly  well  acquainted 
with  the  nature  of  this  ordeal  of  the  prize  court; 
so  that  the  witnesses  have  a  preconcerted  answer 
ready  to  every  interrogatory  that  is  proposed  to 
them.  It  is  a  well  known  fact,  that  in  certain 
eminent  neutralizing  ports  on  the  continent,  the 
master  and  other  officers,  usually  interrogated  in 
the  Admiralty,  are  rigidly  and  repeatedly  examin- 
ed hy  their  employers,  before  the  vessel  sails,  on 
our  standing  interrogatories,  till  they  have  learnt 
to  answer  in  all  points,  promptly  and  accurately, 
and  consistently  with  the  colourable  case  which  is 
in  the  event  of  capture  to  be  supported. 

With  equal  skill  and  care,  are  those  affidavits 
and  documents  now  prepared  in  neutral  coun- 
tries, which  the  British  prize  court  usually  re- 
quires on  a  decree  for  further  proofs. — In  short, 
every  neutralizer  of  eminence,  is  become  al- 
most as  expert  in  the  rules  of  our  Admiralty, 
in  regard  to  evidence,  as  a  proctor  at  Doctors' 
Commons. 


#  180 

It  is  evidently  not  easy  to  remedy  evils  like  these  ; 
and  the  more  difficult  it  is,  the  more  indispensa- 
bly necessary  is  it  not  to  widen  their  range,  by 
suffering  that  of  the  neutral  flag  to  be  unlawfully 
extended. 

The  growing  cunning  and  dexterity  of  those 
who  are  the  ordinary  and  fraudulent  suitors  in 
the  prize  court,  can  only  be  in  any  degree  coun- 
teracted, by  an  increasing  vigilance  and  patience 
of  investigation,  as  well  as  increasing  ex^jerience, 
in  the  judges  -,  and  for  this,  as  well  as  other  rea- 
sons, it  was  wise  to  appoint  men  of  professional 
talents,  with  salaries  adequate  to  the  full  value 
of  their  time,  to  preside  in  the  vice-admiralty 
courts. 

Is  there  after  all,  it  may  reasonably  be  demand- 
ed, no  other  redress  for  violations  of  neutral  du- 
ties, than  capture  and  condemnation  in  the  prize 
court?  I  answer,  that  though  the  offending 
party  certainly  ought  to  be  punished  by  his  own 
government,  on  the  complaint  of  the  injured  bel- 
ligerent, yet  mutual  convenience  has  given  rise 
to  the  usage  of  leaving  the  latter,  in  ordinary  cases, 
to  avenge  himself,  by  treating  as  hostile  the  pro- 
perty which  is  engaged  in  the  offence  -,  for  other- 
wise, the  trespasses  of  individuals,  might  furnish 
endless  occasions  of  diplomatic  controversy  bo- 
tween  friendly  nations. 


181 

New  or  extreme  cases,  however,  generally 
demand  a  departure  from  ordinary  rules ;  and 
the  unprecedented  grossness  of  the  abuses  which 
now  exist,  seems  to  me  to  demand,  in  this  in- 
stance, an  appeal  to  the  justice  of  the  neutral 
states,  against  their  offending  subjects.  Such  a 
resort  seems  to  be  the  more  proper  and  neces- 
sary, on  account  of  the  querulous  and  conten- 
tious disposition  which  is  said  to  have  been  lately 
exhibited  by  some  of  those  powers,  notwithstand- 
ing the  extreme  licence  in  which  they  have  been 
hitherto  indulged. 

It  is  highly  disadvantageous  for  an  accused, 
but  much  injured  party,  to  stand  wholly  on  the 
defensive ;  and  in  a  case  like  this,  it  tends  perhaps 
to  give  colour  to  the  accusation  in  the  eyes  of 
indifferent  judges  ;  nay,  the  people  of  the  neutral 
country  itself  may  be  misled,  by  the  reiterated 
and  noisy  complaints  of  their  own  merchants, 
and  of  the  disguised  agents  of  our  enemies  re- 
sident among  them,  when  unopposed  by  any  ex- 
postulation on  our  part,  or  any  exposure  of  our 
wrongs*. 

Their    ambassadors  and  consuls  in   England 

*  There  is  great  reason  to  believe  that  the  ministers  or  eaiissarics 
of  the  French  government,  procure  the  ijisertion  in  the  American  papers 
ef  many  of  those  false  and  incendiary  paragraphs,  by  which  this 
country,  in  spite  of  her  extreme  indulgence,  is  insulted  and  defamed  in 
£hat  country. 


18S 

also,  are  perpetually  solicited  and  stimulated  by 
the  captured  neutralizers,  to  whose  frauds  they 
are  no  doubt  strangers,  to  represent  their  imagi-* 
nary  wrongs.      These  parties  are   always  more 
troublesome  than  the  genuine  neutral  merchant ; 
and  are  the  most  clamorous  asserters  of  the  re- 
spect due  to  their  flag,  for  the  same  reason  that 
a  fashionable  sharper  is,   in  his    quarrels,  often 
more  punctilious  than  a  real  gentleman,  in  main- 
taining the  point  of  honour.     It  is  not  his  senti- 
ment, but  his  trade.     The  neutral  ministers,  in 
consequence,    present    memorials    and     remon- 
strances ;  and  their  governments,  perhaps,  are  in- 
duced to  take  up  the  dispute.      But  if  abuses  of 
the  neutral  flag,  were  made  grounds  not  merely 
of  defence,  but  of  voluntary  and  original  accusa- 
tion, and  if  the  punishment  of  the  offenders  were 
fn-mly  demanded,  the  latter  would  often  deem  it 
prudent  to  be  silent ;   while  the  neutral   govern- 
ments and  their  ministers,  if  they   had   serious 
and  frequent  complaints  to  answer,  would  have 
less  leisure,   and   less   inclination    to  complain ; 
they   ought    therefore,    I    think,   under   present 
circumstances,  to  be  put  in  their  turn  on  the  de- 
fensive. 

Our  only  effectual  remedy,  however,  must  be 
found  in  that  ancient  and  just  resort,  the  seizure 
and  confiscation  of  the  property  which  is  the 
subject  of  illicit  transactions. 


183 


^d.    Of  the  prudence  of  applying  the  proposed  Re- 
medy^ 171  regard  to  the  Colonial  Trade. 

It  remains  only  to  consider,  as  I  proposed  to  do 
in  the  last  place,  whether  it  is  prudent  to  resort  to 
that  remedy  for  the  evils  which  have  been  delineat- 
ed, our  right  of  applying  which  has,  I  trust,  been 
sufficiently  shown. 

In  this  as  in  most  other  questions  of  practical 
policy,  especially  in  the  present  very  difficult 
times,  it  is  vain  to  expect  that  the  alternative  to 
existing  evil,  should  be  complete  and  unqualified 
good.  AVe  are  sailing  in  a  tempestuous  sea,  sur- 
rounded with  rocks  and  slioals  ;  and  the  ques- 
tion is  not,  whether,  by  changing  our  course, 
we  shall  certainly  have  a  prosperous  voyage ; 
but  whether  the  ship  will  labour  less,  and  the 
breakers  in  sight  be  avoided. 

It  has  been  shown,  that  the  extreme  licence 
of  the  neutral  flags,  teems  with  mischiefs  of  a 
ruinous  and  fatal  tendency  to  our  commerce,  to 
our  colonies,  to  our  wooden  walls  themselves, 
and  to  our  best  hopes  in  the  war ;  and  it  remains 
to  see,  what  new  evils  or  dangers  must  be  en- 
countered, should  this  pernicious  licence  be  re- 
strained. 

The  sum  of  all  these  opposing  considerations 
seems   to  be   this,  '^  we   may  provoke  a  quarrel 


184 

<*  with  the  neutral  powers."  I  propose,  there- 
fore, briefly  to  consider,  first,  the  degree  of  this 
danger  ;  and  next,  whether  the  evils  of  such  a 
quarrel,  if  certain,  would  be  greater  than  those 
to  which  we  at  present  submit. 

It  is  certain,  that  should  his  Majesty's  govern- 
ment think  fit  to  recal  the  indulgent  instruction 
that  has  been  so  much  abused,  and  revert  to  the 
rule  of  the  war  1756,  with  such  modifications 
only  as  can  be  safely  allowed,  great  clamours 
would  immediately  arise  in  the  neutral  coun- 
tries. The  neutralizing  agents,  deprived  of  a 
large  portion  of  their  fraudulent  gains,  would 
exclaim  aloud  against  the  measure;  and  even 
such  merchants  as  have  carried  on  the  colonial 
trade  on  their  own  account,  would  not  be  well 
satisfied  to  find  their  field  of  commerce  ma- 
terially narrowed  by  the  assertion  of  our  bellige- 
rent rights. 

The  neutral  governments  therefore  would  no 
doubt  complain  and  remonstrate;  "  but  would 
"  they,  if  firmly,  though  temperately,  resisted, 
"  push  the  controversy  into  a  quarrel  .^"  would 
they  maintain  their  pretensions  to  the  trade  iii 
question,  at  the  expense  of  a  war  with  Great- 
Britain  ?  [  hrmly  believe  they  would  not ;  be- 
cause I  am  sure  they  ought  not,  whether  they 
regard  their  honour,  their  dwty,  or  their  interest* 


185 

Much  though  the  principles  of  justice  are  un- 
happily made  to  bend  to  political  convenience  in 
the  conduct  of  nations,  they  have  not  yet  wholly 
lost  their  force.  Like  the  merits  of  an  honorary 
quarrel  among  gentlemen,  they  may  at  least  serve 
for  a  basis  of  conciliation  between  parties  who 
have  no  very  urgent  motive,  or  determined 
inclination,  to  fight.  They  will  save  the  point  of 
honour;  for  a  nation  cannot  be  disgraced  by  re- 
ceding from  pretensions  which  are  demonstrably 
groundless  and  unjust. 

I  cannot  help  hoping,  however,  that  with  our 
late  fellow-subjects  of  America  at  least,  the  equity 
of  our  cause  will  have  a  more  direct  and  powerful 
influence ;  for  I  have  marked  as  an  auspicious 
omen,  in  this  vernal  season  of  their  power,  a  re- 
verence for  moral  principle  prevailing  in  their  su- 
preme representative  assembly,  and  triumphing, 
in  matters  of  interior  legislation  at  least,  over  the 
suggestions  of  an  ungenerous  policy. 

It  cannot  be  supposed,  that  the  great  body  of 
the  American  people  are  at  this  period  partial  to 
France,  or  inimically  disposed  to^^  Great-Britain. 
If  they  are  insensible  to  the  tifes  of  a  common, 
extraction,  and  if  the  various  sympathies  of  re- 
ligion, language,  and  manners,  that  ought  to  in- 
cline them  favourably  towards  us,  have  lost  their 
natural  influence,  they  still  canilot  be  regardless 
of  the  interesting  fact,  that  we  alone,  of  all  the  na- 


186 

tions  in  the  old  world,  now  sustain  the  sinking 
cause  of  civil  liberty,  to  which  they  are  so  fondly 
attached.  They  see  that  the  iron  yoke  of  a  mHu 
tary  despotism  is  now  rivetted  on  the  neck  of  that 
powerful  people,  which  aspires  to  universal  do- 
mination ;  and  which  has  already  deprived  its  de- 
fenceless neighbours  of  the  freedom  they  formerly 
enjoyed ;  nor  can  they  doubt  that  the  subjugation 
of  England,  would  be  fatal  to  the  last  hope  of  li- 
berty in  Europe. 

Is  the  Atlantic  thought  a  sufficient  rampart  for 
themselves,  against  the  same  despotic  system  ? 
The  people  of  America  are  neither  so  ungene- 
rous, nor  so  unwise,  as  to  act  on  that  mistaken 
confidence.  They  will  advert  to  the  state  of 
things,  which  a  disastrous  issue  of  the  present 
war  might  produce.  They  will  contemplate  the 
possible  approach  of  a  political  prodigy,  more 
terrific  than  any  that  earth  has  yet  beheld — 
France  lord  of  the  navies,  as  well  as  the  armies, 
of  Europe.  They  will  look  to  the  South,  and 
see  the  resources  of  the  Spanish  American  em- 
pire in  the  hand  of  this  Colossus ;  they  will 
look  btfhiud  them,  and  regard  a  large  country, 
in  which,  were  the  British  government  sub- 
rerted,  religion,  extraction,  and  language,  would 
favour  the  ambition  of  France.  Nor  will  they 
forget,  tliat  this  unprincipled  power  is  crafty, 
as  well  as  audacious ;  that  she  well  knows  how  to 
divide  those  whom  she  means  to  subdue  i   and. 


187 

has  already  broken  confederations  as  sacred,  as 
tOiat  of  the  American  states. 

It  will  not  be  thought,  that  the  new  world 
has  no  adequate  temptations  to  attract  the  am- 
bition of  the  French  government,  or  to  excite  it 
to  arduous  efforts.  The  armies  of  St.  Domingo 
will  be  remembered.  Nor  will  the  constrained 
and  prudent  cession  of  Louisiana,  efface  the 
recollection  of  that  alarming  line  of  policy,  by 
which  it  was  acquired. 

But  should  America  be  safe,  in  her  distance, 
in  her  unanimity,  and  in  her  interior  defensive 
resources,  still  what  would  become  of  her  com- 
merce, if  France  were  enabled  to  give  law  to  the 
maritime  world  ? 

Is  it  supposed  that  Bonapafte,  or  his  imperial 
successors,  will  tolerate  in  their  ports,  a  moment 
longer  than  is  necessary,  a  republican  fla^  ?  Vain 
imagination  !  Had  he  even  no  antipathy  to  fc^e- 
dom,  the  plague,  or  the  yellow  fever,  would  have 
iess  terrors,  than  such  a  mischievous  memento  to 
*^  his  best  and  greatest  of  peoples.**  At  this  mo- 
ment he  relies  on  the  evident  necessity  of  re- 
moving such  dangerous  examples,  as  a  sufficient 
apology  to  Europe  for  putting  crowns  on  the 
beads  of  the  nominal  republics  around  him*. 

The  citizens  of  the  United  States  are  a  sa- 
gacious people,  and  will  reflect  on  these  things. 

*  See  oixe  of  his  gnswew  to  the  Austrian  manifesto. 


188 

They  will  see  that  they  have  a  commercial  in- 
terest, at  least,  if  not  interests  of  far  greater  im- 
portance, which  forbid  their  aiding  France  at  this 
alarming  conjuncture,  to  overthrow  the  indepen- 
dence of  Europe. 

Widely  different  was  the  face  of  affairs  in  1794 
and  1795,  when  their  commerce  with  the  French 
colonies  was  a   subject   of  dispute   with   Great- 
Britain.     It  was  natural  at  that  period,  that  the 
people  of  America  should  have  good  wishes  for 
the  liberty  of  France,  and  some  jealousy  of  the 
confederated  powers.     Yet  even  then,  they  were 
too  wise,  and  too  just,  to  rush  into  a  quarrel  with 
this  country,  in  support  of  their  present  extreme 
and  unfounded  pretensions ;  though  the  instruc- 
tion of  November    1793  had,  as  I  have  already 
admitted,   given  them  some  specious  grounds  of 
complaint.      The   legal  merits   of  the   question 
were   then,  as   I   fear  they    still  are,  very  little 
understood  in  America;  but  the  moderation  of 
Mr.  Jay   found   a  middle   point   of  agreement; 
and  though,   unfortunately,  the  same  spirit  did 
not   prevail  among  his  constituents,  so  far  as  to 
induce  them  to  ratify  the  treaty  throughout,  we 
may  reasonably  regard  the  conduct  of  the  Ameri- 
can government  at  that  time,  as  a  proof  of  the 
pacific  temper  of  the  people ;  and  as  a  pledge, 
that  the  strong  equity  of  our  present  case  will 
not,  under  tlie  more  favourable  circumstances  of 
the  times,  be  obstinately  disregarded. 


189 

Happily^  we  have  not  here  to  do  with  a  people, 
to  whose  understandings  and  feelings  no  open  ap- 
peal can  be  made. 

I  regard  it  as  not  the  least  perilous  circum- 
stance,  in  the  present  situation  of  Europe,  that 
hy  the  unprecedented  despotism  exercised  over 
the  press  in  France,  in  a  positive,  as  well  as 
negative  mode,  an  ardent  and  intelligent  people 
cannot  only  be  kept  in  profound  ignorance  of 
the  true  nature  of  public  events,  and  the  real 
conduct  of  their  government  towards  foreign 
nations,  but  impressed  with  a  belief  of  facts 
diametrically  opposite  to  tne  truth  -,  for  by  these 
means  they  can  be  made  to  engage  cordially  in 
any  measures,  however  contrary  to  then-  own 
honour  and  interest,  as  well  as  to  the  safety  of 
their  neighbours.  The  case  seems  absolutely 
new  5  not  only  in  degree,  but  in  species ;  for  the 
ministers  of  France,  professing  only  to  direct  an 
official  corner  in  one  of  their  many  newspapers, 
are  in  truth  the  political  editors  of  all  3  and  they 
even  oblige  such  foreign  prints,  as  they  allow  to 
be  brought  into  the  country,  to  usher  in  or  con- 
firm their  own  mendacious  statements ,  so  that  a 
curious  public  is  actually  starved  into  the  diges- 
tion of  their  poisonous  intelligence,  from  the  want 
of  any  other  food. 

Under  other  despotic  governments,  if  the  peo- 
ple have  had  no  means,  they  have  had  as  little' 
inclination,  to  canvass  affairs  of  state.    Ignorant 


190 

and  indifferent,  their  bodies  have  been  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  sovereign ;  but  popular  opinion,  and' 
feeling,  are  powerful  engines  in  the  hands  of  a  g6- 
vernment,  which  their  characters  could  not  sup- 
ply ;  and  hence  the  strength  of  an  absolute,  has 
been  counterpoised  by  the  spirit  and  energy  of  a 
free  constitution ;  but  by  inviting  a  highly  civiliz- 
ed people  to  reason,  and  cheating  them  with  fal- 
lacious premises,  both  these  advantages  are  for- 
midably united.  The  public,  in  this  unnatural 
state,  becomes  a  centaur,  in  which  brutal  force  ii^ 
monstrously  associated  with  the  powers  of  a  ra- 
tional agent. 

But  in  America,  the  government,  if  it  could  be 
supposed  to  feel  the  wish,  has  not  the  powerj 
so  to  influence  popular  opinion.  The  grounds 
of  every  public  measure,  more  especially  a  mea- 
sure so  awfully  serious  as  war,  must  be  fairly 
known,  and  freely  canvassed  by  the  people) 
They  will  hear,  and  examine,  the  reasons  whicli 
demonstrate  the  commerce  in  question  to  be  an 
invasion  of  the  rights,  and  dangerous  to  tbe  se- 
curity of  England ;  and  if,  unlike  the  Carthage- 
nians,  they  feel  no  wish  to  succour  their  parent 
country,  when  fighting  for  her  liberty  and  her  ex- 
istence, they  will  at  least  desist  from  wrongs  which 
augment  her  dangers,  and  frustrate  her  defensive 
efforts. 

On  the  probable  feelings  and  conduct  of  the 
neutral  courts  in  Europe,   I  forbear  to  hazard 


191 

so  confident  an  opinion.  While  I  write,  every 
wind  wafts  over  from  the  continent  rumours  of 
new  wars,  new  alliances,  new  declaratiojis  of  neu- 
trality, and  new  breaches  of  those  declarations ; 
so  that  it  is  impossible  for  any  private  j  udgment  to 
foresee,  whether  any,  and  what  European  powers 
will  sustain  the  neutral  character,  when  these 
sheets  issue  from  the  press. 

Beyond  doubt,  the  accession  of  new  parties  to 
the  war,  will  materially  affect  the  tone  of  neu- 
tral pretensions  on  this  side  of  the  Atlantic  j  and, 
I  trust,  not  unfavourably  to  the  true  principles 
of  the  maritime  code.  The  generous  and  mag- 
nanimous policy  of  our  allies,  will  induce  them 
to  respect  the  rights  of  neutral  nations ;  but  they 
can  have  no  wish  to  favour  abuses  which  tend 
to  feed  the  revenues  of  France,  and  to  defeat  the 
best  efforts  in  offensive  war,  that  can  be  contri- 
buted on  the  part  of  Great-Britain.  It  is  their 
part,  chiefly  to  oppose  the  armies  of  the  com- 
mon enemy  in  the  field ;  it  is  ours,  to  diminish 
greatly  the  resources  by  which  those  armies  are 
maintained,  and  to  make  the  French  people  feel 
in  their  commerce,  the  evils  of  war,  in  spite  of 
their  lying  gazettes ;  but  to  countenance  the 
present  encroachments  of  the  neutral  powers, 
would  be  to  forbid  that  essential  assistance ;  and 
to  render  our  active  co-operation  feeble,  if  not  ab- 
solutely useless. 


m 

Both  in  Europe,  however,  and  in  America,  we 
have  still  stronger  grounds  of  hope,  that  our  just 
rights,  if  firmly  asserted,  will  not  be  resisted  at 
the  cost  of  a  war;  for  the  plain  interest  of  the  neu- 
tral powers  themselves,  will  incline  them  to  an  op- 
posite coui^se. 

What,  after  all,  is  to  them  the  value  of  this 
new  commerce,  by  which  our  enemies  profit 
so  largely?  A  few  merchants,  or  pretended 
merchants,  are  enriched  by  it,  chiefly  through 
fraudulent  means;  but  their  ill-gotten  wealth, 
will,  with  the  common  fate  of  opulence  sudden- 
ly and  unjustly  acquired,  speedily  vanish  away ; 
without  leaving  any  lasting  effect  on  the  com- 
merce of  their  country,  except  the  taint  of  theif 
immoral  practices,  and  their  exotic  luxury  of  man- 
ners. 

In  North  America  especially,  such  will  be  the 
certain  result.  A  great  many  of  her  most  emi- 
nent neutralizers,  and  West-India  merchants,  are 
natives,  either  of  the  belligerent  countries  which 
they  trade  with,  or  of  other  parts  of  Europe; 
and  when  the  business  of  the  war  is  finished, 
they  will  not  stay  to  contend,  in  the  permanent 
commerce  of  America,  with  her  frugal  and  in- 
dustrious citizens ;  but  return  to  more  congenial 
regions,  with  the  fortunes  they  have  rapidly  ac- 
quired. Even  with  the  native  Americans  them- 
selves, the  effect  of  wealth  forced  in  this  com- 
mercial hot-bed,  will  be  a  strong  disposition  to 


193 

migrate,  when  peace  puts  an  end  to  their  trade ; 
for  it  is  not  to  be  dissembled,  that  this  new  coun- 
try has  not  such  attractions  as  Europe,  for  mer- 
chants who  have  grown  suddenly  rich  in  it,  by 
means  of  exterior  connexions. 

Far  superior  in  every  country,  but  especially 
in  one  that  is  newly  and  imperfectly  settled, 
is  the  value  of  that  commerce  which  is  the 
natural  growth  of  the  place,  which  feeds  on, 
or  sustains,  its  manufactures,  its  agriculture,  and 
the  industry  of  its  people,  and  is  therefore  per- 
manently affixed,  as  it  were,  to  the  soil ;  to  that 
of  a  commerce  temporary  and  extraneous,  which 
is  prosecuted  to  and  from  a  foreign  land,  and  has 
no  connexion  with  the  country  of  the  merchant, 
but  that  of  mere  passage  and  sale.  Yet,  in  the 
neutral  countries,  the  former  and  more  estimable 
species  of  commerce,  is  impeded  in  its  growth, 
end  even  reduced  in  its  extent,  by  the  artificial 
increase  of-  the  latter.  That  which  may  be  called 
the  native  commerce  of  the  country,  is  kept 
down  and  discouraged,  by  the  diversion  of  ca- 
pitals, the  increase  of  freight  and  wages,  the 
advanced  price  of  warehouse-room,  and  inland 
carriage,  and  of  the  other  various  expenses  at- 
tendant on  the  importation  or  exportation  of 
goods ;  all  which  are  necessary  effects  of  a  great 
and  sudden  increase  of  mercantile  operations,  at 
a  neutral  port,  through  its  trade  with  belligerent 
countries. 

2  e 


194 

Besides,  it  unavoidably  happens,  that  the  frauds 
which  are  committed  in  the  new  branches  of 
commerce  opened  with  belligerents,  fall  sometimes 
heavily,  in  their  effects,  on  the  honest  part  of 
the  mercantile  body  in  the  neutral  country,  even 
when  conducting  their  ancient  and  natural  com- 
merce. Their  ships  and  cargoes  are  involved  in 
the  general  suspicion  deservedly  attached  to  their 
flags,  and  to  their  commercial  documents,  and  the 
public  testimonials  they  carry. 

They  are  consequently  seized,  brought  into 
port,  and  perhaps,  on  examination,  discharged. 
But  they  have  sustained  considerable  loss  by  de- 
tention ;  and  what  is  to  be  done  ?  Is  a  captor 
to  be  punished  for  suspecting  the  truth  of  docu- 
ments, which,  in  a  great  majority  of  similar 
cases,  are  notoriously  false  ?  It  would  be  like 
punishing  an  ofiicer  for  taking  up  on  suspicion 
an  honest  man,  but  a  stranger  to  him,  whom  he 
found  in  company  with  felons.  Were  captors 
to  pay  costs  and  damages  in  such  cases,  it  would 
be  charity  to  our  naval  officers  to  renounce  alto- 
gether the  right  of  maritime  capture ;  yet,  if  the 
capture  is  held  justifiable,  a  fair  trader  smarts 
for  the  sins  of  his  countrymen — the  rate  of  in- 
surance as  well  as  all  other  charges,  is  conse- 
quently raised  on  neutral  shipments  in  general. 

The  old  and  genuine  Prussian  merchants,  as 
I  am  well   informed,  complain   greatly  of  these 


195 

evils ;  and  murmur  at  the  improper  use  that  is 
made  of  their  flag,  as  freely  as  they  dare. 

But  in  the  case  of  America,  able  as  she  is  to 
enlarge  her  permanent  commercial  establish- 
ments in  various  directions,  to  the  utmost  ex- 
tent that  her  capital  or  credit  can  afford,  and 
unable,  from  the  want  of  hands,  to  promote 
suiTicienlly  that  vital  interest,  the  extension  of  her 
agriculture,  the  encouragement  of  a  temporary 
carrying  trade,  at  the  expense  of  her  native  com- 
merce, must  be  peculiarly  impolitic.  It  is,  as  if 
a  landholder  should  take  a  scanty  provision  of 
manure  from  his  freehold  lands,  which  are  in  ur- 
gent want  of  it,  to  dress  a  field  of  which  he  is 
tenant  at  will. 

I  cannot  believe,  therefore,  that  the  intelli- 
gent citizens  of  the  United  States,  unengaged 
in  the  new-found  colonial  commerce,  would  be 
very  sorry  to  see  it  restrained  ;  much  less  that 
they  would  tenaciously  defend  it,  at  the  cost 
of  an  evil  so  destructive  to  their  growing  pros- 
perity  as  a  war  with  Great-Britain. 

Let  it  be  considered,  that  the  trade  in  ques- 
tion is  but  a  part  of  that  new  and  lucrative 
commerce,  which  the  war  has  conferred  on  the 
neutral  nations  in  general.  Were  their  trade  with 
the  colonies  of  our  enemies  wholly  cut  off,  many 
other  very  valuable  branches  of  commerce  would 
remain,  which  they  hold  by  no  other  tenure  than 
the  neutrality  of  their  flag. 


196 

But  it  is  not  my  purpose  to  recommend  a  totSl 
and  unqualified  prohibition,  of  even  the  colonial 
trade ;  I  have  maintained,  indeed,  our  right  to 
interdict  it  M^ithout  reserve,  on  the  assumption 
that  it  w^as  wholly  prohibited  by  the  enemy  in 
time  of  peace ;  a  proposition  generally  true,  but 
which  is  liable  to  an  exception,  that  I  have  hither- 
to forborne  to  notice. 

To  one  particular  nation,  and  at  certain  free 
ports  in  the  French  islands,  the  importation  and 
exportation  of  certain  specified  articles  under  a 
foreign  flag,  were  allowed,  before  the  commence- 
ment or  contemplation,  of  the  last  war.  Ameri- 
cans, could  import  their  native  provisions  and  lum- 
ber in  their  own  vessels ;  and  could  receive  in  re- 
turn those  inferior  articles  of  colonial  produce, 
rum,  taffia,  and  molasses.  Thus  far,  therefore,  an 
exception  to  the  rule  of  the  war  1756  is,  perhaps, 
demanded  by  the  principle  of  that  rule ;  and  it 
seems  due  also  on  another  score  ;  for  we  have  re- 
laxed our  own  colonial  monopoly,  in  an  irregular 
manner,  to  the  same  extent ;  and  it  is  right  to 
admit  the  principle  of  equality  in  such  cases. — 
"  Injure  belli ^  quod  quis  siln  stunit^  hostibus  tribu- 
endum  est.'' 

But  we  might  even,  as  a  voluntary  sacrifice  to 
amity  with  the  neutral  powers,  go  considerably 
further:  ^ve  might,  perhaps,  without  any  very 
serious  mischief,  extend  to  all  the  ports  of  the 
French  colonies,  and   to  ey^ry  neutral   nation. 


197 

the  privileges  enjoyed  hy  Americans  at  some  of 
those  ports  in  time  of  peace.  Nay,  we  might, 
perhaps,  allov/  an  intercourse  of  the  same  spe- 
cies, and  subject  to  similar  restrictions,  with  the 
colonies  of  Spain  and  Holland. 

By  such  concessions,  it  is  true,  our  belligerent 
rights  would  be  narrowed,  and  the  hostile  colo- 
nies, in  some  measure,  relieved  from  the  pressure 
of  the  war  ;  but  if  the  more  valuable  articles  of 
their  produce,  their  sugar,  coffee,  cotton,  cocoa, 
indigo,  and  bullion,  were  prevented  from  eluding 
our  hostilities  under  the  neutral  flags,  the  greater 
part  of  the  evils  which  I  have  noticed  would  be 
remedied ;  and  the  farmers  of  America,  having 
the  same  markets  for  their  produce,  as  under  the 
present  licentious  system,  would  all  find  their  in- 
terests on  the  side  of  conciliation  and  peace. 

If  permitted  to  retain  such  a  portion  of  the 
trade  in  question,  together  with  all  the  rest  of 
such  existing  commerce,  as  is  the  fair  fruit  of 
their  neutrality  in  every  quarter  of  the  globe, 
what  motive  could  these  nations  find  for  asserting 
their  further,  and  unjust  pretensions  by  arms  r 
To  suppose  that  commercial  interest  would  excite 
them  to  do  so,  is  to  suppose,  that  for  the  sake  or* 
a  part,  they  would  wilfully  sacrifice  the  whole. 

The  neutralizing  agents  themselves,  would  be 
the  first  to  shrink  from  a  definitive  quarrel. — 
Thev  would  clamour,   Vv  hile  thev  hoped  to  pre- 


198 

vail  in  extorting  from  our  fears  or  our  prudence, 
acquiescence  in  all  their  lucrative  encroachments; 
but  when  convinced  by  our  firmness  that  this  end 
is  not  attainable,  they  would  become,  instead  of 
sticklers  for  war,  the  staunchest  advocates  for 
peace.  They  will  not  be  so  simple  as  to  ruin 
their  own  business,  by  exchanging  the  neuiraU 
for  the  belligerent  character. 

I  rely  not,  however,  on  these  men,  but  on  the 
equity  and  good  sense  of  their  countrymen  at 
large,  who  know  how  to  distinguish  between  the 
selfish  clamours  of  individuals,  and  the  dictates 
of  national  prudence.  Our  brethren  of  Ame- 
rica, especially,  know  how  to  value  the  bless-, 
ings  of  peace  ;  and  the  wise  government  of  ihat 
country  has  shown  itself,  in  this  and  all  other 
points,  in  unison  w  ith  the  sense  of  the  people. 
They  will  not,  therefore,  suffer  their  passions  to 
be  inflamed  by  groundless  suggestions,  and 
plunge  into  a  war,  against  the  clearest  ciictates 
both  of  policy  and  justice. 


Since,  however,  it  is  right  in  so  important  a  case 
to  calculate  on  every  chance,  and  to  be  prepared 
for  every  possible  consequence,  of  a  change  of 
system,  I  will,  in  the  last  place,  suppose,  that  the 
only  alternative  to  the  sacrifice  of  our  maritime 
rights,  is  a  quarrel  with  the  neutral  powers. 


199 

If  so,  the  question  is,  which  of  these  two  great 
evils  is  the  worst  ?  and  I  hesitate  not  to  answer, 
beyond  all  comparison,  the  former. 

The  arms  of  the  powers  now  neutral,  added  to 
those  of  the  present  confederates,  if  so  mon- 
strous a  coalition  could  be  imagined,  would  add 
something,  no  doubt,  to  our  immediate  dan- 
gers ;  but  acquiescence  in  the  present  abuses, 
must,  unless  the  power  of  France  be  broken 
on  the  continent,  ultimately  insure  our  ruin. 
Looking  forward,  as  we  are  bound  in  prudence 
to  do,  to  a  long-protracted  war,  it  is  demonstra- 
ble, from  the  premises  I  have  shown,  that  we 
must,  before  the  close  of  it,  lose  our  naval  su- 
periority, if  the  enemy  is  allowed  to  retain,  and 
still  continue  to  improve,  his  present  oppressive 
advantages. 

While  he  is  preparing  the  means  of  active  ma- 
ritime enterprises,  we  are  reduced  at  sea,  as  well 
as  on  shore,  to  a  mere  defensive  war.  While  our 
colonies,  and  our  colonial  commerce,  are  labour- 
ing under  great  and  increasing  burthens,  those 
of  the  enemy,  comparatively  unincumbered,  are 
thriving  at  their  expense.  While  freight,  war 
duties,  and  insurance,,  are  advancing  in  England, 
the  expense  of  neutralization  is  daily  diminishing 
in  France,  Holland,  and  Spain.  Competition, 
and  the  safety  of  neutral  carriage,  are  reducing 
it  every  day.  Meantime,  the  hostile  navies  are 
nursed,  augmented,  and  reserved  in  safety  for  a 


200       , 

day  of  advantageous  trial ;  while  our  own  is  sus- 
taining all  the  most  laborious  duties  of  war,  with 
scarcely  any  of  its  ancient  encouragements ;  our 
seamen,  also,  are  debauched  into  foreign  employ, 
to  carry  on  the  trade  of  our  enemies.  In  what 
must  this  progress  end  ? 

"  But  our  trade  ,would  be  materially  injured 
"  by  a  war  with  the  neutral  powers/*  It  would, 
probably,  be  so  in  some  degree ;  at  least  in  the 
beginning;  nor  am  I  insensible  of  the  great  im- 
portance of  such  an  inconvenience,  in  a  view  to 
immediate  revenue. 

But  these  considerations,  important  though 
they  are,  may  be  justly  superseded  by  others.  Ta 
sacrifice  our  maritime  rights,  for  the  sake  of  our 
custom-house  entries,  would  be  like  keeping  up 
the  pulse  of  a  hectic  patient,  at  the  expense  of  hiss 
vital  organs,  instead  of  that  more  rational  treat- 
ment which,  though  weakening  at  the  moment, 
can  alone  lead  to  a  cure. 

Our  two  great  rival  statesmen,  though  their 
views  unhappily  do  not  often  coincide,  have 
agreed  in  declaring  our  unexhausted  means  o£ 
finance  to  be  still  copious ;  and  the  opinion  is 
highly  consoling.  But,  if  we  dare  not  assert  our 
essential  maritime  rights,  for  fear  of  reducing 
our  exports,  they  are  both  greatly  mistaken. 
We  are  already  at  the  end  of  our  resources.  It 
is  idle  to  say  that  we  are  still  able  to  carry  on  the 
war,  if  we  cannot  carry  it  on  without  renounc- 


201 

ing,  for  the  sake  of  revenue,  the  means  of  making 
war  with  effect.  It  is  like  a  soldier  selling  his 
arms,  to  enable  him  to  continue  his  march. 

The  notion,  however,  that  any  great  diminu- 
tion of  our  trade,  would  result  from  the  supposed 
quarrel,  is  not  better  founded  than  the  fear  of  the 
quarrel  itself 

Is  it  asked,  "  who  would  afterwards  carry  our 
"  manufactures  to  market  ?"  I  answer,  our  allies, 
our  fellow-subjects,  our  old  and  new  enemies 
themselves.  In  the  last  war,  nothing  prevented 
the  supplying  of  Spanish  America  with  British 
manufactures,  in  British  bottoms,  even  when  they 
were  liable  to  confiscation  by  both  the  belligerent 
parties  for  the  act,  but  that  the  field  of  commerce 
was  pre-occupied,  and  the  markets  glutted  by  the 
importations  under  neutral  flags  *. 

"  But  would  I  advise  a  toleration  of  these  new 
^^  modes  of  relieving  the  hostile  colonies  ?"  Its  to- 
leration would  not  be  necessary.  Even  yom-  own 
hostilities  would  not  be  able  to  overcome  the  ex- 
pansive force  of  your  own  commerce,  when  deli- 
vered from  the  unnatural  and  ruinous  competition 
of  its  present  privileged  enemies.  You  might  of- 
ten capture  the  carriers  of  it,  and  condemn  their 
cargoes ;  but  the  effect  would  chiefly  be  to  raise 
the  price  upon  the  enemy,  and   the   difference 

*  Case  of  the  Chesterfield,  at  the  Cockpit,  1804. 
25   D 


2021 

would  go  into  the  purses  of  your  seamen.  The 
prize  goods  themselves,  would  fmd  their  way  from 
your  colonies  into  the  hostile  territories. 

But  I  do  not  affirm,  that  it  would  be  necessary 
or  proper  in  the  case  supposed,  absolutely,  and 
universally  to  refuse  protection  to  British  mer-* 
chandize,  when  passing  to  the  enemy,  or  colonial 
produce  received  in  exchange  for  it,  in  British, 
or  even  in  hostile  bottoms. 

At  present,  the  royal  prerogative  of  suspending 
the  rights  of  war,  in  favour  of  particular  branches 
of  commerce  or  particular  merchants,  is  very  \u 
berally  exercised.  Papal  dispensations,  were  not 
more  easily  obtained  in  the  days  of  Luther,  than 
dispensations  from  the  law  of  war,  now  are  from 
his  majesty's  government :  but  let  it  be  remem-» 
bered,  that  when  the  Pope  thus  relaxed  the  ancient 
war  of  the  church  against  sin,  he  shook  his  own  su- 
premacy ;  and  these  salt-water  indulgences,  tend 
p^'haps  to  produce  a  similar  effect,  on  the  mari- 
time greatness  of  England.  I  am  far  from  blaming 
the  exercise  of  this  wholesome  prerogative,  in  a 
moderate  degree,  and  upon  well  investigated 
grounds;  as  for  instance,  when  it  enabled  our 
merchants  to  import  corn,  during  a  scarcity,  from 
Holland ;  but  when  it  is  used  for  the  mere  con- 
venience and  profit  of  every  merchant  who  chooses 
to  apply  for  it,  and  who  can  olfer  some  flimsy  ex 


203 

parte  suggestion  of  public  utility,  in  his  petition 
for  a  licence ;  the  practice  becomes  a  new  and 
dangerous  inroad  on  that  great  maritime  system, 
which  it  behoves  us  so  much  to  maintain. 

Should,   however,  the  neutral  powers   be    in- 
sane  enough  to  go  to  war  with  us,  for  the  sake 
of  the    colonial  trade,  the  well   regulated  use  of 
this    prerogative   would    soon   show  them  their 
folly  ;  and  obviate  every  inconvenience  to  which 
our  own  commerce  might,  in  consequence  of  the 
new  war,  be  exposed.     Though  I  cannot  under- 
take to  defend  the  consistency  of  licensing  to  Bri- 
tish subjects  a  trade  with  the  enemy,  from  which 
we  claim  a  right  to  exclude  neutral  nations,  yet 
should  those  nations  attempt  to  compel  a  surren- 
der of  that  important  right,  by  cutting   off  our 
commerce,  the  remedy  would  be  consistent  and 
just.     The  distress  of  the  hostile  colonies  would 
soon  present  most  tempting  markets  for  our  mer- 
chandize ; — the   demand  also  would  be  great  in 
the   United   States ;  and  America  would  be  una- 
ble to  prevent  even  her  own  merchants,  from  be- 
ing the  carriers  of  British  manufactures  to  her 
own  ill-guarded  coast,  as  well  as  to  the  ports  of 
our  present  enemies.     If  the  strict  revenue  laws, 
and  naval  force  of  Great-Britain,  cannot  prevent 
smuggling   and   trading  with  an  enemy  by  her 
own   subjects,  how  is  this  new  power,  with   its 


204 

lax  government  and  feeble  marine,  to  restraift  it« 
inerchants  from  similar  practices  ? 

Should  it  be  found  necessary  in  the  case  sup- 
posed, to  licence  any  commerce  of  this  kind, 
whether  in  British,  or  foreign  bottoms,  we  might, 
as  far  as  respects  the  trade  of  the  hostile  colonies, 
have  the  benefit  without  the  disadvantage  of  the 
present  traffic.  Not  a  hogshead  of  sugar,  in  the 
case  supposed,  ought  to  be  protected  from  the 
hostile  West-Indies,  except  in  its  way  to  the  Bri- 
tish market ;  there  to  be  taxed  in  such  a  degree 
as  would  preclude  the  present  superiority  of  the 
enemy  in  a  competition  with  our  own  planter^. 
Neither  ought  a  single  article  to  be  carried  by  li- 
tjence  to  those  colonies  that  can  serve  to  extend 
their  existing  scale  of  cultivation. 

I  protest,  in  every  event,  on  behalf  of  the 
British  planter,  against  the  further  settlement 
of  Cuba,  by  a  relaxation  in  any  mode,  of  the 
rules  of  maritime  war.  During  the  last  war, 
the  produce  of  that  vast  island  was  at  least  dou- 
bled ;  and  if  the  present  system  continues,  it  will 
soon  be  doubled  again  to  the  destruction  of  our 
own  sugar  colonies;  for  the  consumption  of 
West-India  produce  in  Europe^  has  natural  limits ; 
and  the  Jamaica  Assembly  has  satisfactorily  shown 
that  those  limits  are  scarcely  now  wide  enough 
40  receive  the  actual  supply,  at  such  prices  as 
the  British  planter  can  possibly  afford  to  accept 


205 

The  same  observations  which  I  have  offered 
us  to  the  new  channels  of  commerce,  which  we 
might  have  to  explore  in  our  transatlantic  trade, 
apply  equally  to  Europe.  Besides,  there  would 
here  still  remain  friendly  territory  on  the  conti- 
nent, the  ports  of  our  co-belligerents,  and  even 
maritime  powers,  neutral  in  relation  to  them, 
whose  countries  would  be  entrepots  for  our  com- 
merce. The  bugbear  of  a  non-importation  agree- 
ment by  America,  is  liable  to  the  same  remarks, 
and  would  be  a  measure  more  absurd  even  than 
war,  on  the  part  of  that  country,  for  it  would  in- 
jure herself  alone. 

After  all,  what  am  I  endeavouring  to  combat  ? 
The  notion,  that  manufactures  m  demand  all  over 
the  globe,  for  their  superiority  in  quality,  m  cheap- 
ness, and,  even  in  the  case  supposed,  ior  safety 
in  maritime  carriage,  can  be  effectually  excluded 
from  the  commeicial  countries  m  which  they 
are  at  present  consumed  ! — 1  might  have  more 
briefly  appealed  to  the  first  principles  of  com- 
mercial science.  I  might  have  appealed  even 
to  the  impotent  attempts  of  France  in  the  last  and 
present  war.  I  might  further  support  myself  by 
the  fact,  that  in  the  utmost  latitude  given  to  neu- 
tral commerce  in  the  colonies  of  Spain,  there 
was  an  express  and  anxious  exception  of  British 
-merchandize,  which  was  wholly  without  effect*. 

*  Case  of  the  Vera  Cruz  and  the  Emelia, 


206 

But  the  intelligent  reader  will  dispense  with  all 
such  arguments.  He  may  not,  indeed,  be  able 
to  foresee  clearly  what  will  be  the  new  channels 
of  our  trade,  when  the  old  are  forcibly  obstruct- 
ed ;  but  he  can  look  down  on  the  level  below 
the  regions  of  the  existing  demand  and  consump- 
tion, and  be  certain  that  there  the  stream  will 
soon  meet  his  eye  again,  in  spite  of  the  new  ar- 
tificial mounds  and  embankments. 

In  a  word,  take  care  of  your  maritime  system, 
and  your  commerce  will  take  care  of  itself. 

Were  it  not  necessary  to  hasten  to  a  conclusion, 
I  might  show,  that  the  commerce  of  the  country, 
is  much  more  endangered  by  the  existence  of 
the  present  abuses,  than  it  could  possibly  be  by 
any  effects  of  their  correction.  The  case  of  our  co- 
lonial trade,  has  been  the  only  commercial  evil 
which  I  have  distinctly  considered;  but  that  of 
the  merchants  trading  with  Germany  and  Flaur 
ders  might  afford  another  striking  instance  of 
the  mischiefs  of  a  licentious  neutrality :  it  has 
been  lately  stated  to  the  public,  in  a  compen* 
dious,  but  forcible  manner,  on  the  part  of  the 
suffering  merchants,  and  apparently  by  one  of 
their  body*. 

It   may   be   right    to    notice   another   alarm, 
that  has  been  grafted  on  the  idea  of  a  quarrel 

*  Sec  some  essays  in  the  Times,  iii  September  last. 


S07 

with  the  United  States.  America,  it  has  been 
said,  is  much  indebted  to  our  merchants ;  and 
she  will  confiscate  their  property.  America,  I 
answer,  is  too  wise,  and  I  believe,  also,  too  ob- 
servant of  national  honour  and  justice,  to  adopt 
so  opprobrious  a  measure.  It  would  be  an  act 
subversive  of  all  future  faith  and  confidence, 
hrcitvyeen  herself  and  the  merchants  of  Europe ; 
It  would'^iot  only  stain  her  character,  but  mate- 
rially retard  the  growth  of  her  commercial  inte- 
rests, in  every  part  of  the  globe.  She  will  now, 
should  a  quarrel  ensue,  have  no  pretence  for 
any  other  resort,  than  that  of  honourable  war. 
At  the  period  of  1794,  she  pretended,  with  some 
show  of  reason,  that  she  had  been  unfairly  sur- 
prised, by  an  order  to  capture  her  vessels,  with- 
out previous  notice  or  complaint :  but  no  room, 
of  course,  will  be  given  for  such  a  charge  at  this 
time,  should  our  government  wisely  resolve  to 
assert  our  belligerent  rights  *.  If  the  citizens  of 
the  United  States  can  possibly  be  persuaded  to 
think,  that  w-e  are  bound  to  submit  to  the  ruinous 
effects  of  that  assistance  to  our  enemies,  which 


*  Let  it  not  be  supposed,  however,  that  there  is  any  shadow  of 
ground  for  the  complaints  now  making  of  want  of  notice  respecting  the 
collusive  double  voyages:  the  judgments  in  the  cases  of  the  Essex,  the 
Enoch,  and  Rowena,  were  founded  on  a  rule  already  known  in  Ame- 
rica ;  and  wjiich  the  claiuaants  wert  fraudulently  att«inpting  to  elude. 


^08 

they  choose  to  call  neutral  commerce,  at  least  it 
will  be  felt  that  our  resistance  is  no  act  of  wanton 
enmity,  much  less  a  provocation  to  more  than  le- 
gitimate war. 

There  is,  however,  another  security  against 
such  an  injurious  and  disgraceful  act  on  the 
part  of  America ;  or  rather  against  any  quarrel 
whatever  with  that  power  at  the  present  can* 
juncture.  The  property  under  the  American 
flag,  which  would  be  now  exposed  to  our  hos- 
tilities in  every  part  of  the  world,  is  immense. 
In  1794,  the  merchants  of  the  United  States  were 
few  and  poor ;  now,  they  are  many  and  rich : 
then,  the  collective  value  of  their  property  at 
sea,  might  be  very  small  in  comparison  with 
what  they  ©wed  to  our  merchants  ;  at  this  time, 
after  the  large  deductions  that  ought  to  be  made 
for  property  which  is  but  nominally  their  own,  the 
former  must  bear  a  large  proportion  of  the  latter. 

But  America,  though  rich  in  commerce,  is  not 
so  in  revenue ;  and  were  her  trade  destroyed  by 
the  effects  of  a  rupture  with  this  country,  a 
great  burthen  of  war  taxes  must  be  immediately 
imposed  on  the  landholders  ;  who  have  no  debts 
to  English  merchants  to  retain;  who,  as  I  have 
shown,  would  have  no  interest  in  the  war  ;  and 
who  are  neither  very  able,  nor  very  well  disposed, 
to  submit  to  a  heavy  taxation. 

Those,  in  short,  who  suppose  that  America 


209 

would  be  easily  now  brought  to  engage  in  a  war 
with  any  great  maritime  power  of  Europe,  know 
little  of  the  commerce,  and  less  of  the  interior 
state  of  that  country. 

Such  are  my  reasons  for  believing,  that  a  quarrel 
with  the  neutral  powers,  would  not  be  the  price 
of  asserting  our  maritime  rights  in  respect  of  the 
colonial  trade ;  and  for  concluding  that  such  a 
quarrel,  if  certain,  would  be  a  less  formidable 
evil,  than  those  to  which  we  at  present  submit. 

Should  any  reader  be  disposed  to  dissent  from 
both  these  propositions ;  he  will,  perhaps,  sub- 
scribe to  a  third — It  would  be  better,  by  an  ex- 
press and  entire  surrender  of  that  ancient  mari- 
time system  on  which  all  our  greatness  has  been 
founded,  to  put  ourselves  on  a  par  with  the  ene- 
my, as  to  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of 
neutral  commerce  3  than  continue  to  submit  to 
these  ruinous  innovations,  of  which  all  the  bene- 
fit is  his,  and  all  the  evil  our  own. 

Let  us  subscribe  at  once  to  the  extravagant 
doctrines  of  Schlegel,  or  to  those  of  Bonaparte 
himself;  let  us  admit  the  old  pretension  of 
'^  free  ships  free  goods,*'  and  that  the  seizing  hos- 
tile property  under  a  neutral  flag,  is  piracy,  or  ma- 
ritime despotism — then,  following  the  exam- 
ple of  our  enemies,  let  us  suspend  our  naviga- 
tion laws,  that  we  also  may  have  the  benefit  of 
neutral  carriage  in  all  the  branches  of  our  trade 

2  E 


210 

—  let  brooms  be  put* at  the  mast-heads  of  all  our 
merchantmen,  and  their  seamen  be  sent  to  the 
fleets. 

By  no  means  short  of  these,  can  we  be  deliver- 
ed from  the  ruinous  inequalities  under  which  we 
at  present  labour ;  and  these,  alarming  though 
their  novel  aspect  may  be,  would  in  truth  be  less 
evils,  than  those  which  the  present  system,  if  long 
persevered  in,  must  unavoidably  produce. 

It  would,  however,  be  a  still  better  expedient, 
if  the  enemy  would  kindly  concur  in  it,  to  ab- 
jure, on  both  sides,  the  right  of  capturing  the 
merchant  ships,  or  private  effects  of  an  enemy 
— in  other  words,  to  reconcile,  as  some  visiona- 
ries have  proposed,  a  naval  war  with  a  commer- 
cial peace.  Our  neutral  friends  might  then  be 
dismissed  by  both  parties ;  and  would,  perhaps, 
in  the  next  war,  be  content  to  gather  up  the  chief 
part  of  the  spoils  of  the  weaker  belligerent,  with- 
out wrangling,  as  now,  for  the  whole. 

But  the  French  government  is,  probably,  too 
conscious  of  its  present  advantages,  to  concur,  in 
this  arrangement :  nor  would  it,  I  verily  believe, 
consent  to  respect  British  property  when  passing 
under  the  neutral  flag,  if  we  were  disposed  to  an 
equal  forbearance. 

What  then  remains  to  be  done  ? — to  make  peace 
with  Bonaparte  ? 


It  is  the  utter  impracticability  of  such  an  ex- 
pedient that  gives  to  my  subject  its  most  anx- 
ious and  awful  importance.  His  power  and  his 
pride  may  possibly  be  broken  by  a  new  war  on 
the  continent,  or  new  revolutions  may  deliver 
France  from  his  yoke ;  but  if  not,  w^e  are  only 
at  the  commencement  of  a  war,  which  our  long- 
continued  maritime  efforts  alone  can  bring  to  a 
safe,  much  less  a  prosperous  close.  You  may 
make  treaties  with  Bonaparte,  but  you  cannot 
make  peace.  He  may  sheath  the  sword,  but  the 
olive-branch  is  not  in  his  power.  Austria  may  have 
peace  with  France  -,  Russia  may  have  peace  with 
France  ;  but  Great-Britain  can  have  no  real  peace 
with  that  power,  while  the  present,  or  any  other 
military  usurper,  brandishes  the  iron  sceptre  he 
has  formed,  and  is  in  a  condition  to  hope  for  our 
ruin. 

Am  I  asked,  what  is  the  insuperable  obstacle  ? 
I  answer,  the  British  constitution.  I  can  repccit, 
ex  animo,  with  the  church,  that  w^e  are  fighting 
"  for  our  liberty  and  our  laws,"  for  I  believe  that 
their  surrender  alone  could  obtain  more  than  a 
nominal  peace. 

France,  under  her  ancient  i/nonarchy,  could 
look  across  the  streights  of  Dover  without  envy 
or  discontent ;  for  her  golden /chains,  burnished 
as  they  were  by  the  splendour  lc»f  genuine  royalty, 
rivetted  by  the  gentle  hand  of  time,  and  hallow- 


212 

ed  by  a  reverence  for  ancient  hereditary  right, 
were  worn  with  pride,  rather  than  humiliation  or 
dislike.  The  throne  stood  upon  foundations  too 
strong,  as  its  posssesors  fully  thought,  to  be  en- 
dangered by  the  example,  or  by  the  contagious 
sentiment  of  freedom. 

But  can  the  new  dynasty  entertain  a  similar 
confidence  ? — Let  Bonaparte's  conduct  and  lan- 
guage attest,  that  he  at  least,  is  not  so  simple. 
During  that  brief  term  of  pretended  peace,  to 
which  he  reluctantly  submitted,  what  was  his 
employment  out  of  France,  as  well  as  within 
that  country,  but  the  subversion  of  every  thing, 
which  approached  the  nature,  or  bore  the  name 
of  freedom?  In  his  treatment  of  the  little  states 
around  him,  he  was  even  ostentatious  of  his  con- 
tempt of  the  civil  liberty  they  enjoyed  or  affect- 
ed :  emd  he  does  not  scruple  now  to  avow,  in  the 
face  of  Europe,  the  very  principle  I  am  ascrib- 
ing to  him,  though  in  different  language,  in  his 
apology  for  his  treatment  of  Genoa  and  the  Ita- 
lian republic. 

English  liberty  was  happily  beyond  his  reach; 
and  it  was  necessary  to  temporize,  while  a  con- 
test with  the  negroes  suspended  those  prepara- 
tions for  a  new  war,  which  he  would  soon  have 
made  in  the  western  world,  and  in  India ;  but 
his  gazettes  exhibited  incessantly,  not  only  his 
hostile  mind,  but  the  true  cause  of  its  hostility. 


^13 

Our  freedom,  especially  the  freedom  of  our  press, 
was  the  subject  of  bitter  invective.  By  political 
hints,  lectures,  and  addresses,  he  laboured  inces- 
santly to  convince  Frenchmen,  that  there  is  no 
possible  medium  in  society  between  anarchy  and 
his  own  military  despotism ;  but,  as  the  known 
case  of  England  was  an  unlucky  knot  in  this  theo- 
ry, which  he  could  not  immediately  cut  asunder 
with  his  sword,  his  next,  and  anxious  purpose, 
was  to  confound  our  freedom  with  licentiousness, 
to  render  it  odious,  and  to  hint,  as  he  broadly  did, 
that  it  is  incompatible  with  the  common  peace 
and  security  of  Europe. 

Had  he  not  even  the  audacity  to  remonstrate 
to  his  Majesty's  government,  against  the  freedom 
of  our  newspapers,  and  to  demand  that  our 
press  should  be  restrained  ?  But  we  cannot  be 
surprised  at  this — Darkness,  as  well  as  chains, 
is  necessary  for  this  system ;  and  while  it  is  light 
at  Dover,  he  knows  it  cannot  be  quite  dark  at 
Calais. 

The  enmity  of  this  usurper,  then,  is  rooted  in 
a  cause  which,  I  trust,  will  never  be  removed, 
unless  by  the  ruin  of  his  power.  He  says,  "  there 
is  room  enough  in  the  world  both  for  himself  and 
us."  'Tis  false — there  is  not  room  enough  in  it, 
for  his  own  despotism  and  the  liberties  of  Eng- 
land.     He  will  cant,  however,  and   even  treat. 


214 


perhaps,  in  order  to  regain  the  opportunity  which 
he  threw  away  by  his  folly  and  guilt  at  St.  Domin- 
go, and  his  splenetic  temper  at  Paris. — He  would 
make  peace,  I  doubt  not,  anew,  that  he  might  re- 
cover the  means  of  preparing  better  for  war  ;  but 
would  be  impatient  and  alarmed,  till  he  could 
again  place  the  fence  of  national  enmity,  between 
the  people  of  England  and  France. 

These  prospects,  I  admit,  are.  cheerless ;  but 
let  us  not  make  them  quite  desperate,  by  surren- 
dering our  natural  arms.  There  are  conjunctures 
in  which 

"  Fear,  admitted  into  public  councils, 
"  Betra5's  like  trenson." 

— But  the  reins  are  in  no  timid  hands  ;  and,  after 
all,  unless  we  mean  to  abandon  all  that  remains 
yet  unsurrendered  of  our  maritime  rights,  peace 
is  more  likely  to  be  maintained  with  the  neutral 
powers,  by  a  firm  than  a  pusillanimous  conduct ; 
for  experience  has  shown  that  tjiey  will  not  be 
content,  while  any  restriction  whatever  remains 
on  their  intercourse  v\  ith  the  enemy,  which  fraud 
cannot  wholly  elude. 

To  conclude. — A  temperate  assertion  of  the 
true  principles  of  the  law  of  war  in  regard  to 
neutral  commerce,  seems,  as  far  as  human  fore- 
sight can  penetrate,  essential  to  our  public  safety. 


215 

In  Him,  at  whose  command  ''  nations  and 
"  empires  rise  and  fall,  flourish  and  decay,"  let 
our  humble  confidence  be  placed ;  and  may  we 
be  convinced,  that  to  obey  his  righteous  laws, 
is  the  soundest  political  wisdom,  the  best  provi- 
sion we  can  make  for  our  national  safety,  at  this 
jnomentous  period. 

But,  if  he  wills  the  end,  he  wills  also  the  ade- 
quate means — Let  us  not,  therefore,  abandon 
the  best  means  of  defence  he  has  given ;  let  us 
cherish  OUR  VOLUNTEERS,  OUR  Navy,  and 
Maritime  Rights. 


FINIS. 


M 


ftjVv* 


■m^m 


warn 


mmmsm 


